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ABSTRACT 
The following research aims at unfolding an authentic Christian attitude to 
euthanasia by means of a comparative analysis of Christian bioethical thinking and 
practice in Russia and in the West. It seeks to establish what is euthanasia, whether it is 
incompatible with Christianity and, if so, what is the alternative. 
The first chapter explores the meaning of 'euthanasia', comparing and rethinking 
a number of definitions from the existing multitude. Through the psychological thicket 
of slogans such as "mercy killing", "personal autonomy" and "death with dignity" the 
core characteristic of euthanasia- deadly intention- is hardly ever seen. 
With some notable exceptions with regard to self-defence, just war, or capital 
punishment, in Christianity intending to kill has always been regarded as a grave sin of 
breaking the sixth commandment. The second chapter shows how Western Christian 
bioethics has gone from the ethics of Paul Ramsey to the ethics of Tristram Engelhardt, 
from balancing between justifying certain forms of intentional killing while 
condemning others to purifying one's heart and cultivating one's soul in order to 
prevent the formation of an intention to kill. 
The third chapter is dedicated to the development of Christian bioethics in 
Russia. In a country with over a millennium of Orthodox tradition there is an 
exceptional opportunity for the bioethical framework of Engelhardt to settle in naturally. 
The fourth chapter presents a number of well-publicized medical situations in 
Britain where choices between life and death were exercised. The analysis based on the 
material of the previous chapters shows most of them to be clear cases of euthanasia, 
while others have a recognizable potential to be described as such. 
The history and an ongoing story of the modem hospice movement - a living 
alternative to euthanasia - are the focus of the fifth and last chapter of this dissertation. 
Its core ability - to live with suffering - sustains the opposition to euthanasia and is 
essentially a Christian virtue. 
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Introduction 
How one lives and how one dies have always been questions for profound 
reflection in the history of human thought. The technological sophistication of 
contemporary society has taken them out of the realm of academic studies, poetry, 
science fiction and personal contemplation and transformed them into a challenge of 
everyday reality. Modem medicine is at the forefront of this transformation. The areas 
of moral concern created by medical powers unheard of before have given rise to the 
discipline of bioethics. In the hierarchy of sciences it qualifies as 'a subspecies of 
ethics.' 1 Bioethics is specific enough in that most of the problems it seeks to address are 
being formed within the boundaries of modem healthcare environment, but in virtue of 
these problems it acquires a far broader scope than professional medical ethics. As a 
field of study it 'focuses on what is morally at stake in sexuality, the procreation of 
children, suffering, treating patients appropriately, establishing health care institutions, 
acting justly in the allocation of health care resources, and facing death. ' 2 A particular 
way of dying termed 'euthanasia' will be in the focus of this dissertation. 
This thesis is a search for personal answers to personal questions. One of my 
grandmothers died of lung cancer and according to my father's account her dying was 
filled with indescribable suffering. In the hospital they had to keep her constantly 
unconscious, because the moment she came to her senses it was all groaning from pain. 
Naturally, every time it happened my father would ask for another injection. Neither he 
nor the doctors knew for sure, but they had hoped they were killing the pain and for 
them this was the only thing to do at any rate. I often pondered what I could do for my 
grandmother, if anything, if I were there. Would I ever accept euthanasia as an option if 
I had to make a decision? First I thought that I would perhaps be inclined at least to 
consider it. On the other hand, something was telling me that choosing this option 
would be against my Christian conscience. 
So it happens that both the aim and the scope of my thesis have evolved round 
this personal dilemma. The main task of the research that follows is to identify an 
authentic Christian attitude to euthanasia. In order to accomplish this task I shall seek to 
answer three questions: 
1) what is euthanasia? 
1 Richard A. McCormick, 'Theology and Bioethics' in Stephen E. Lammers, and Allen Verhey (eds.), On 
Moral Medicine: Theological Perspectives in Medical Ethics (Cambridge: William B. Eerdmans 
Publishing Company, 2nd ed., 1998), 64 [hereafter abbreviated OMM]. 
2 H. T. Engelhardt, Jr., The Foundations of Christian Bioethics (Lisse: Swets & Zeitlinger, 2000), xii 
[hereafter abbreviated FCB]. 
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2) is it incompatible with Christianity? 
3) what is the alternative? 
Each chapter of the thesis will in some measure contribute to the overall pursuit of these 
objectives, at the same time focusing on each one in particular. 
Approaching the problem out of a Christian worldview, I shall concentrate 
mainly, albeit not exclusively, on the Christian sources. Still, the realm of Christian 
bioethics is so vast that in order for a particular topic within it to be covered sufficiently 
and consistently in a single study a certain method of enquiry should be adopted. 
As the title of this thesis indicates it is a comparative analysis. Comparison as a 
research method has two significant advantages. First, it allows to sharpen the focus of 
the dissertation by choosing what to compare. This choice is exercised at several levels, 
going from general to particular, from broad concepts to specific instances and from 
definitions to distinctions. At the same time it offers an opportunity to amplify the scale 
of research and gives it a sense of perspective. I have chosen not to limit the evaluation 
of Christian patterns of thinking with regard to euthanasia by referring to the experience 
of a certain country or nation, but have attempted a culture bridge between my own 
country and the West. The technique of comparison also works to build up a 
'dissertation within a dissertation' effect, constructing the theme of each chapter in a 
way that it acquires the potential to be developed as a research project in its own right. 
Thus the first chapter invites a discussion to define the term 'euthanasia' by comparing 
and rethinking a number of definitions from the existing multitude. The second and 
third chapters explore on a comparative basis two major academic frameworks that have 
evolved in the course of the thirty plus years' history of Christian bioethics in the West 
and relate their findings and problems to the emerging Russian Orthodox bioethics. 
The final two chapters highlight the opposition of euthanasia and palliative care 
approaches by examining the moral rationale behind some well-publicized end-of-life 
decisions and rediscovering the essence of the modern hospice movement. 
What is euthanasia? Many ideas that have come to be expressed in set phrases 
are usually the first associations prompted by the word. Euthanasia is taken to mean 
"mercy killing", "personal autonomy", "death with dignity", whereas the real meaning 
remains obscure. The first chapter brings it to light by showing the hollowness of such 
slogans, which in fact are not definitions at all. The majority of them are just well 
sounding terms skillfully put together in a psychologically impressive manner. These 
terms are either too ambiguous or have too broad a range of implications to provide 
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trustworthy guidance. Having abandoned them, one is left with the only decisive 
characteristic of euthanasia- namely, the intention of medical staff to kill. 
With some notable exceptions with regard to self-defence, just war, or capital 
punishment, Christianity has always seen taking one's own or somebody else's life as a 
grave sin, something profoundly wrong and indeed going against the very ethos of 
being Christian. This should have been enough to secure the incompatibility of 
euthanasia and Christianity. In the second chapter I attempt to show how it appeared to 
be insufficient and to explore whether there are resources for reinforcing the contrast. 
Developments in medical technology in the second half of the twentieth century 
pointed toward the legal justification of intentional killing of the innocent - euthanasia. 
The challenge to Christian theology was to follow and offer moral justification by 
amending the sixth commandment. However, most Christian theologians felt that this 
would be too big a leap to make. To approve of euthanasia would be to approve of a 
voluntary sin. Paul Ramsey was among the first and strongest voices in the emerging 
Christian theological opposition. Paradoxically, however, trying to ward off the 
euthanasiac temptation he ended up being caught in it, as we shall see. Many an 
academic follower was trapped in the same way. Instead of building the opposition on a 
return to the sixth commandment they further let it go by trying to balance between 
condoning euthanasia in some cases and vigorously condemning it in others. Stanley 
Hauerwas sensed this ill tendency and started to reverse the whole pattern oftheological 
thinking. He launched Western Christian bioethics on the journey back from amending 
the sixth commandment to learning how to live up to it. Instead of progressing in further 
classifications of evil that would help to get rid of the moral discomfort of killing 
Hauerwas insisted on facing the reality of it unabridged. The problem however was that 
there were a lot of Christian accounts of the way in which deadly intention is wrong, but 
much less preoccupation with the roots of it until Tristram Engelhardt came up with his 
traditional Christian bioethics. Unfortunately, the Western Christian academic tradition 
seems to have gone such a long way from the mind of the Church fathers of the first 
millennium that it will perhaps take another generation of scholars to replace Ramsey's 
version of the anti-euthanasia school. 
Therefore it would be valuable if Engelhardt's ethics of asceticism were to 
spread eastwards. The third chapter is dedicated to the development of Christian 
bioethics in Russia. Since the fall of the communist regime opened up numerous social 
and technological opportunities, mainly coming from the West, it is no wonder that the 
perception of these changes is inevitably influenced by western experience and 
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reflection. The point is to decide what will be most fitting for the Russian set up. In a 
country with over a millennium of Orthodox Christian tradition there is an exceptional 
opportunity for the bioethical framework of Engelhardt to settle in naturally. The 
uncompromising stance of rejecting euthanasia in any form taken by the Russian 
Orthodox Church and generally shared by the legal authorities lacks only the kind of 
academic basis offered in The Foundations of Christian Bioethics to make for a viable 
standpoint on the subject. 
However, in the field of bioethics even the best academic framework has a value 
only in relation to practice. The viability of any scholarly opposition to euthanasia has 
to be tested in the face of real suffering. The fourth chapter presents a number of well-
publicized medical situations in Britain where choices between life and death were 
exercised. The analysis based on the patterns of Christian bioethical thinking discussed 
in the previous chapters shows most of them to be clear cases of euthanasia, while 
others have a recognizable potential to be described as such. Nevertheless, public 
opinion appears to be in a great deal of confusion about the former and altogether 
ignores the latter. If this happens in a country with a long-standing Christian bioethical 
tradition, how much more likely it is to happen in the Russian post-atheistic 
environment! Even if Christian bioethics in Russia starts the fight against the ethos of 
euthanasia from the premises outlined by Engelhardt without repeating the wilderness 
wanderings of its Western counterpart, it will need something more than a rightly 
oriented case analysis. It will not do simply to keep to the orthodox understanding of 
euthanasia and its incompatibility with Christianity. Any opposition survives as long as 
it has an alternative to offer. 
A living alternative to euthanasia does exist. It is embedded in the modem 
hospice movement, the history and an ongoing story of which are the focus of the fifth 
and last chapter of this dissertation. Having started as a Christian response to the 
problem of suffering at the end of life, it has in the course of several decades grown into 
a world-wide philosophy and given birth to a new specialty of palliative medicine. So 
far hospices have successfully stood up against the emerging force of global 
euthanazation. However, the situation might change. Both pro-euthanasia supporters 
and palliative care specialists aim at reducing the suffering. Unfortunately, it often turns 
into an obsessive marathon where the former point to particular cases that seemingly 
admit of no solution except intentional termination of life and the latter strive to 
discover less radical ways out. The trouble is that there will hardly be any winners in 
this competition, ever. In a way those on the hospice side are already losing because the 
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suffering remains that does not respond even to the highest level and broadest range of 
palliative techniques. To keep firmly to the anti-euthanasia mindset the hospice 
movement should retain its core ability: to live with suffering. It is precisely this ability 
that sustains the opposition to euthanasia and it is essentially a Christian virtue. While 
any effort to reduce suffering should not be a goal in itself, now that principles of 
palliative care have become so much part of a religiously unidentifiable global 
philosophy it starts dominating. If this tendency continues, palliative services are likely 
at some point to give in to the fast growing pressure and tum into pre-euthanasia care. I 
would like to offer all that follows as a personal contribution to prevent it from 
happening. 
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CHAPTER I 
REDEFINING THE DEFINITIONS 
I. Introduction 
The word 'euthanasia' is one that truly 'speaks volumes' nowadays. Deriving 
) 
from two Greek words EU - good and Savatoc; - death and thus having an original 
meaning of simply 'a good death', it has now acquired both a different meaning and 
quite a number of definitions. It is worth mentioning that this is due not so much to a 
semantic as to a cultural change. The historical linguistic development would have had 
an insignificant influence on the modem usage, had our society not found in the second 
half of the twentieth century that it can no longer agree on what is 'a good death'. Much 
though there is to be said about the origins of such a transformation, it is not the purpose 
either of this chapter or the present research. The aim is to look at the way euthanasia is 
defined in various contemporary sources. 
I shall start with the definition of euthanasia in general, move on to the main 
distinction between its active and passive forms, look at the notions of voluntary, 
involuntary and non-voluntary, and conclude with a section on physician-assisted 
suicide. I shall try to show the advantages and disadvantages of the definitions adopted 
by different public bodies and scholars and work out my own. 
II. Euthanasia: General Definitions 
1. Reference Sources 
To find out what is the meaning of a particular word one usually looks it up in a 
dictionary. Here are some of the definitions given to 'euthanasia'. 
The Chambers Dictionary defines 'euthanasia' as 'the act or practice [my 
emphasis] of putting painlessly to death, esp in cases of incurable suffering'. 3 Even at 
first consideration this definition appears to be at least inadequate, if not misleading. 
There is no notion of who is acting or practising. One thing about euthanasia as a 
phenomenon that everyone seems to agree with, is that it is a specifically medical 
practice. It would have been more precise for this definition to state that euthanasia is 
3 The Chambers Dictionary (Edinburgh: Chambers Harrap Publishers Ltd, 2"d ed., 2001), 558. 
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the 'act or practice of members of the medical profession'. It is also puzzling why 
'acting' is not included in 'practice', which is obviously a broader concept, 
accommodating both acts and omissions. The distinction between them, as we shall see 
later on, is qualifying different kinds of euthanasia. And finally, the notion of suffering 
as well as incurability is highly elastic and subject to a vast number of interpretations. 
Another contemporary reference source, The New Encyclopa;dia Britannica, 
gives the following definition: 'euthanasia' is an 'act or practice of painlessly putting to 
death persons suffering from painful and incurable disease or incapacitating physical 
disorder' .4 The 'act or practice' may lead one to think that the author of the article also 
composed the entry for The Chambers Dictionary. As to the 'painlessness' of putting to 
death, the 'practice' itself has already shown in cases like that ofbaby John Pearson and 
Tony Bland that it is a highly questionable characteristic of euthanasia. Furthermore, 
this definition affords the notion of suffering to embrace a concept of mysterious 
'incapacitating physical disorder'. One might want to ask what would that be? Also, 
why does it have to be 'physical'? Would not 'mental' or 'psychological' be equally 
fitting? The evidence is that they already are.5 In short, the definition m the 
Encyclopa;dia in terms of clarity and accuracy is no better than the one m the 
Dictionary. 
Are these ambiguities and inaccuracies a fault of general dictionaries? If 
euthanasia is a medically related tem1, it is worth consulting specialist dictionaries. 
In the Dictionary of Medicine one finds the most apt definition of euthanasia: 
'mercy killing, the killing of a sick person to put an end to his suffering'. 6 The absence 
of the specific context in the definition itself can be justified on the grounds that the area 
covered by the dictionary implies a medical context. 'Killing' is just a concise 
substitution for 'putting to death'. The only somewhat imprecise notions are 'sick' and 
'suffering'. Should sickness and suffering be of a mental or a physical character, or 
both? 
Black's Medical Dictionary, perhaps one of the most popular, is even less 
precise about the context, and even more inaccurate in its terminology. It defines 
euthanasia as 'the procuring of an easy and painless death'. 7 Once again, according to 
4 The New Encyclopcedia Britannica, 151h ed., Vol.4, 610. 
5 The Dutch cases of Dr Chabot and Dr Sutorius described in John Keown, Euthanasia, Ethics and Public 
Policy: An Argument Against Legalisation (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002) [hereafter 
abbreviated EEPP]. 
6 Dictionary of Medicine (Cambridge: Peter Collin Publishing Ltd, 3'd ed., 2000), 155. 
7 Black's Medical Dictionmy (London: A&C Black Limited, 39th ed., 1999), 190 [hereafter abbreviated 
BMD]. 
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the current data euthanasia can no longer in good faith be described as 'easy and 
painless'. To do justice to the account in BMD, the text that follows the initial 
summative definition tries to give the reader an idea of the major issues at stake by 
providing an extended description of what the euthanasia debate is actually about. And 
the debate is, after all, about whether 'a medical practitioner ... should have the power 
to put to death any person suffering from a painful, distressing and incurable disease'.8 
However, it has to be emphasized that whether a person who is the object of euthanasia 
suffers and whether the disease is painful, distressing, or incurable or all of these at 
once, is irrelevant for the definition of euthanasia. It is relevant for the guidelines in 
practising it. 
2. Voluntary Euthanasia Society 
After examining the reference sources and finding their definitions of euthanasia 
not exactly satisfying, one might want to tum to a specialist opinion. It would be most 
natural to think that the materials of the Voluntary Euthanasia Society (VES) would 
give a definition that reflects accurately and exhaustively the meaning of this term, 
which it has obviously been set up to promote. 
The YES definition reads: 'Voluntary euthanasia is the ending of the life of 
another person at their request' .9 Leaving out the word 'voluntary' for the purposes of 
generalization, the reader is faced with a definition of assisted suicide, which stands for 
cases like that of Diane Pretty. To qualify as euthanasia 'the ending of life' should be 
performed by someone like Dr Cox or Dr Arthur. Moreover, the above definition has 
nothing to do either with particular medical decisions at the end of life, which 
euthanasia is still mainly about, or with suffering and dying as such. It must be said that 
further in the text some specifications appear. The YES sets out its aim to change the 
law in the UK 'so that competent adults, suffering unbearably from an incurable illness, 
would be able to receive medical help to die at their own considered and persistent 
request' .10 Also, on the same website, a more precise definition can be found, curiously 
enough under the heading of Physician assisted suicide and serving to explain the 
difference between the two: 'Voluntary euthanasia is where a doctor administers a lethal 
injection at the patient's request' .11 Even more interesting is the fact that euthanasia as 
8 BMD, 190. 
9 THE DEBATE Voluntary Euthanasia, http://www.ves.org.uk/Deb Vo!Euth.html (29 June 2002). 
10 Ibid. 
11 THE DEBATE Physician assisted suicide, http://www.ves.org.uk/Deb PhyAssSu.html (29 June 2002). 
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such, without any reference to its active or any other form, is finally defined in the IN 
DEPTH section under the heading of Factsheets on voluntary euthanasia. Informing the 
reader about the Greek origin of the word and admitting that today the meaning 'has 
widened to include how that good death is brought about', the section goes on to 
describe euthanasia as 'a good death brought about by a doctor providing drugs or an 
injection to bring a peaceful end to the dying process' .12 Such a variety of definitions, 
which sometimes hardly square with each other seems to bring more confusion than 
clarity into the question. It remains somewhat uncertain whether euthanasia occurs 
a) when someone ends the life of another person at their request; 
b) when a doctor gives a lethal injection at the patient's request; 
c) when medical help is provided for a competent adult to die at their own 
considered and persistent request; 
d) as a good death provided by a doctor giving either drugs or an injection. 
All of these are apparently different concepts and if each one of them was intended to 
complement the others there is still some doubt whether this intention has succeeded. 
Apart from the first one, the definitions presented consist almost entirely of notions that 
will themselves require further defining, which makes the understanding of what 
euthanasia is about even more complicated. For example, it is not possible to tell from 
the options presented whether any request would qualify for euthanasia or only a 
considered and persistent one, or both. Or, alternatively, maybe there are other 
requirements that should be met for the request to become valid? Should medical help 
be confined to a doctor, or is it a broad enough concept to include nurses and, perhaps, 
medically trained caregivers? Last, but not least, one should definitely distinguish 
between 'medical help to die' and 'medical help in dying'. There is a wide difference 
between the two, which can be easily overlooked. The former implies bringing a certain 
process about, and the latter aid in going through it. 
3. The Netherlands 
Since the YES does not, as one would have hoped, improve on the general 
reference sources in developing a clear definition of euthanasia, it is probably worth 
consulting another major authority, the Dutch. In 2001 the Netherlands became the first 
country fully to legalize euthanasia. Moreover, it has for a long period of time been the 
place in the world where it has been most widely practised. Whereas the YES is so far 
12 IN DEPTH: factsheets, http://www.ves.org.uk/DpFS lntro.html (29 June 2002). 
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only fighting for a change in the law, the Dutch have already changed theirs and thus 
would supposedly be much clearer in defining what it now allows. 
The State Committee on Euthanasia in 1985 gave the following definition: 
'Euthanasia is the intentional termination of a patient's life by someone else on request 
of that patient' .13 Although it seems to be to some extent more precise than the 
definitions that have been discussed above, it still leaves room for various 
interpretations. First, it is totally unclear who is understood by 'someone else': a doctor, 
a spouse, a relative, a friend or a passer-by? Again, let me remind the reader that 
stripped of a direct relation to a medical context, this definition would simply stand for 
assisted suicide. Marianne Daverschot and Hugo van der W al in their article about the 
Dutch experience in Ethics & Medicine specify that 'the performance of euthanasia is 
restricted to physicians'. 14 It would seem to me to be more appropriate to include this 
specification in the definition itself. The second problem lies in bringing the condition 
of a patient's request into the definition. The existence of a request is an attribute of 
voluntary euthanasia and thus is not quite fitting for defining the term in general. As 
will be shown in due course, termination of a patient's life without their request would 
still remain euthanasia. However, it has to be mentioned that 'euthanasia is always 
defined in the Netherlands as voluntary active euthanasia' .15 Although the Dutch 
practice shows there is unarguable evidence of non-voluntary and involuntary 
euthanasia, 16 it is not for us to go deeper into it for the time being. What is good about 
the Dutch definition is that it characterizes termination of life as 'intentional'. Without 
this, the definition might as well apply to clinical mistakes and mere negligence, which 
would describe instances of a different kind, not euthanasia. Of course, the notion of 
'intention' is open to a number of interpretations and brings certain problems of its own 
into the debate, but those will be dealt with later on. 
4. Academic Sources: John Keown 
In the 1960s bioethics became an academic discipline. Since that time huge 
numbers of eminent scholars have tackled the subject of euthanasia, among them 
philosophers, theologians and ethicists. All of them have tried to define euthanasia in 
13 Marianne Daverschot and Hugo Van der Wal, 'The Position of Nurses in the New Dutch Euthanasia 
Bill: A Report of Legal and Political Developments', Ethics & Medicine, Vol 17:2, Summer 2001, 86 
~hereafter abbreviated E&M]. 
4 Ibid, 87. 
15 Ibid, 86. 
16 See, for example, the most recent research into the matter in EEPP. 
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their own way. Being unable to reproduce the whole variety of definitions, distinctions, 
concepts and commentaries offered by the academic world, I have chosen to look more 
closely at what John Keown has to say. Lecturing in the Law and Ethics of Medicine he 
is probably one of the few academic scholars in Britain who has a thorough knowledge 
of the Dutch euthanasia practice. His recent book, Euthanasia, Ethics and Public 
Policy: An Argument Against Legalisation, while particularly concentrating on the 
evidence in favour of the 'slippery slope' argument against decriminalization of 
euthanasia, also contains a careful and exhaustive framework of definitions and 
distinctions. It is a very appealing attempt to find 'a path through the thicket of 
contradictory interpretations', 17 not only of the Dutch experience, but of euthanasia as a 
concept in general. The introduction to Part I is so sharp and at the same time so simple 
that it merits quoting in full: 
The euthanasia debate is riddled with confusion and misunderstanding. Much of 
the confusion derives from a failure of participants in the debate to define their 
terms. Part I seeks to clarify the confusion by noting some of the differing 
definitions in the current debate, indicating the underlying moral distinctions 
they reflect, and assessing their relative merits. 18 
Acknowledging that there is no one universally agreed definition of euthanasia, Keown 
insists that 'it is vital to be clear about how the word is being used in any particular 
context', 19 rightly pointing out that otherwise any discussion is senseless and frustrating. 
He presents three different meanings. They are: 
active intentional termination of a patient's life by a doctor who thinks that death 
is a benefit to that patient; 
intentional termination of a patient's life by act or omission by a doctor who 
thinks that death is a benefit to that patient; 
intentional or foreseeable termination of a patient's life by act or omission by a 
doctor who thinks that death is a benefit to that patient. 
All the three meanings have three specific features in common. They characterize 
decisions which: 
have the effect of shortening life; 
are set within a medical context; 
17 EEPP, 4. 
18 Ibid, Part I. Definitions (7). 
19 Ibid, 9. 
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concur in the belief that a patient's death is a benefit (and, one might add, the 
only one left). 20 
As follows from the contents of the book, the author adheres to the second definition, 
consistently arguing the narrowness of the first and the distortion of the third. 
As we have already had numerous chances to affirm the importance of 
'intention' in defining euthanasia, it would be useful to dismiss any misperception of 
the meaning of this word. Therefore probably the strongest concept introduced by 
Keown is the difference between intention and foresight. In short, it is the difference 
between 'aiming to bring about a consequence' and 'simple awareness that it may or 
will occur' .21 This is an important distinction, and Keown provides many persuasive 
illustrations of the differences between the two. However, as we shall see, it is also 
important to note that it can be difficult to detect what a person's intentions are. 
Indisputable as it is that 'it is by no means always difficult to decide whether someone 
intends a consequence or not', because 'there is often the evidence of what they say 
and/or what they do' ,22 it is nevertheless necessary for us to keep in mind that there are 
cases where difficulty can emerge in distinguishing between what people intend and 
what they say and/or do. 
5. Proposed Definition 
From the above examples, taken from a variety of sources, it is quite clear that 
one of the things one should do to define euthanasia is to avoid set phrases and notions 
that are as misleading as they are widespread. 'Easy and painless death', 'terminal 
illness', 'unbearable suffering' have all become slogans rather than meaningful 
concepts. They appear to have very little to do with euthanasia as such. They set one off 
on the track of 'intellectual "catch-22" ' 23 and cause a totally frustrated 'hit and miss' 
debate. Although Keown considers belief in death as benefit to the patient to be an 
important prerequisite of euthanasia, I prefer to exclude it from my definition. As 
discussion of Dr Shipman case will show in the fourth chapter of this thesis euthanasia 
does not have an absolute association with 'mercy killing'. 
What a definition of euthanasia should, in my view, necessarily include, is the 
medical context. Here I am wholeheartedly with Keown in believing that 'euthanasia 
20 Ibid, 10. 
21 EEPP, 18. 
22 Ibid. 
23 Ibid, 30. 
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involves patients' lives being shortened by doctors and not, say, by relatives' .Z4 As was 
mentioned before, if a doctor ends the life of someone other than a patient by medical 
means which he is professionally aware of and has access to, even if he is not on duty at 
the time, this is simply killing, not euthanasia. Equally, if, for example, a vicious 
relative of the patient steals an ampoule of potassium chloride and makes an injection 
when there is nobody on the ward, it would qualify as murder, not euthanasia. 
If more support should be lent to the necessity of the medical context, there are 
historical reasons for it. Most of the candour that the word 'euthanasia' acquired in its 
modem usage stems from the data revealed at the Nuremberg trial about the state 
medical programme of 'killing the worthless' in fascist Germany in 1939-1941. Also, 
paraphrasing Tristram Engelhardt in his usage of the classical account of causation in 
the law developed by Hart and Honore, the dying of patients is decisively relevant 
within a practice in which doctors discharge particular duties of caring for patients in 
hospitals.Z5 The only expansion that I am inclined to make is that on the account given 
there are no reasonable grounds to confine euthanasia to physicians and exclude 
nurses26 other than the current practice of professional subordination. 
Another cmcial component of the definition should be intention. Although it can 
give rise to its own problems of detection and judgement, it simply allows one to 
distinguish between euthanasia and the cases of inevitable medical mistakes, 
incompetence and negligence. 
Drawing on all that has been said my definition of euthanasia is: medical staff 
intending the death of a patient. 27 
III. Distinctions 
Euthanasia is a complicated phenomenon, as it occurs equally in acting and in 
failing to act on part of the medical staff. In the following section I shall draw out this 
important distinction and give an overview of what it can imply. 
1. Active Euthanasia 
Active euthanasia consists in medical staff intending the death of a patient by 
doing something28 and hence includes: 
24 Ibid, 10. 
25 FCB, 320. See also footnote 41 of Chapter 6. 
26 As it is obviously the case in the Netherlands: E&M, 87. 
27 Acts and omissions belong to the distinctions that follow. 
28 The preference I give to this simplistic phrase will be justified in due course. 
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intentionally giving an injection of a substance which has no curative or 
analgesic properties29 or an overdose of a pain-reliever lethal in itself (cases of 
Dr Cox and Dr Shipman); 
intentionally giving any type of oral medication which has no curative or 
analgesic properties or an overdose of it lethal in itself; 
withdrawing medical devices with intention to cause death (the case of Tony 
Bland). 
Whereas the first two instances clearly belong to the active form of euthanasia, the third 
one is usually attributed to its passive form. 30 I think this is a mistake, if by 
'withdrawing medical treatment' one means 'withdrawing medical devices', which are 
often described as 'life-sustaining'. One is precisely acting, i.e. doing something when 
one switches off artificial ventilation, or a heart-lung machine, or removes a nasogastric 
tube. It is an action, not an omission. 
Again, it must be stressed that to qualify for euthanasia, withdrawal should be 
aimed at death. Not any withdrawal is euthanasia. There are diseases which result in the 
patient's inability to breathe at night unless they have a ventilation machine, but they 
breathe absolutely freely during the day.31 Obviously, 'withdrawal' of ventilation 
machines in the mornings does not constitute euthanasia. Another example is Duchenne 
muscular dystrophy, a condition which requires a specific type of ventilator to help the 
patient's breathing, not to substitute for it. These examples show that one should be 
very careful in generalisations such as saying that 'ventilation replaces the patient's 
capacity to breathe' .32 
2. Passive Euthanasia 
Passive euthanasia consists in medical staff intending the death of a patient by 
doing nothing and hence includes: 
withholding an injection with intention to cause death; 
withholding any type of medication with intention to cause death; 
withholding medical devices with intention to cause death; 
stopping or not starting nutrition and/or hydration that can be provided without 
the help of medical devices. 
29 As it was the case with Dr Nigel Cox. See EEPP, 11-12. 
30 The distinction adopted among others (or following others?) by Jolm Keown. 
31 My interview with Margaret Hickie, Senior Nurse at the Rainbow Family Trust, Manchester, 17 June 
2002. 
32 EEPP, 220. 
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Here it has to be commented that contrary to withdrawal, withholding is rightly 
categorized as 'passive', because it presupposes literally 'not doing anything' or 'doing 
nothing'. A good example for the last of the listed instances is the Dr Leonard Arthur 
case. 33 
3. Voluntary, Non-Voluntary and Involuntary Euthanasia 
Further distinctions in the form of euthanasia are related to the participation of 
the patient in it. Medical staff can intend the death of a patient by doing something or by 
doing nothing 
according to the patient's request (voluntary euthanasia); 
without the patient's request (non-voluntary euthanasia); 
against the patient's will (involuntary euthanasia). 
The first and the last distinction apply to so-called 'competent' patients. As the notion 
of 'competent' is quite loose due to the difficulties in assessing 'competence' and to its 
changeable nature, the distinctions would typically include those patients that are not in 
coma, PVS or severe dementia. The second distinction would apply to those who have 
one of these conditions, and to newborns. 
IV. Physician-Assisted Suicide 
There is little if any difference between voluntary euthanasia and what has 
become to be known as physician-assisted suicide (PAS). The difference is usually 
thought to be in the mode of doctor's participation in the death of the patient. If in 
euthanasia it would be the doctor who makes the injection or turns off a medical device 
with intention to cause death, in PAS the doctor would only provide the syringe or point 
to the appropriate switch. Probably the most notorious example of PAS is the practice of 
Dr Jack Kevorkian, for which he has received the horrifying tag 'Dr Death'. 
Among the arguments in favour of the alleged difference between euthanasia 
' 
and PAS are: 
the patient, not the doctor, remains in control till the very end; 
there is more time for the patient to change his mind. 
To these Keown cites counter-arguments. Even in PAS he says, according to the 
opinion of many, 'whether assistance is given will depend on the decision of the doctor, 
33 David J. Atkinson, 'Causing Death and Allowing to Die', Tyndale Bulletin 34, 1983, 201-28 [hereafter 
abbreviated TB]. 
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not the patient'. 34 Secondly, if the patient's autonomy is what matters, why should it not 
be equally respected in voluntary euthanasia? 
Thirdly, the physical difference between intentionally ending the patient's life, 
and intentionally helping the patient to end his or her own life, can be negligible. 
What, for example, is the supposed difference between a doctor handing a lethal 
pill to a patient; placing the pill on the patient's tongue; and dropping it down 
the patient's throat? Where does PAS end and V AE [Voluntary Active 
Euthanasia] begin?35 
Indeed, this difference is difficult to trace even in the physical world and it is definitely 
non-existent in the moral world. 
34 EEPP, 33. 
35 Ibid. 
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CHAPTER II 
FROM THE ETHICS OF COVENANT TO THE ETHICS OF 
ASCETICISM 
I. Introduction 
Christian bioethics as a theological discipline emerged in the 1960s. In the West 
the failure of natural law styles of thought and the rapid decrease of the church as an 
important public institution were amongst factors that led theologians to search for new 
grounds on which to establish themselves in bioethics. These were found in using 
Christian presuppositions and values but stripping them of the context of tradition and 
community to which they once belonged. Joseph Fletcher and Paul Ramsey initiated 
this trend, although they probably could not have imagined the consequences that were 
to follow, in particular the difficulty of distinguishing between Christian bioethics and 
secular bioethics, so much lamented later by James Gustafson and constantly 
emphasized by Stanley Hauerwas. The question of where it all went wrong began to 
bother the brightest theological minds and the need for a candid Christian bioethics was 
finally re-established. In the second chapter of my thesis I will show how this happened 
in the form of a comparative study of the ethics of Paul Ramsey and the ethics proposed 
by Tristram Engelhardt. 
II. Paul Ramsey and the Ethics of Covenant 
1. Concept of 'Fidelity to Covenant' 
In the Preface to The Patient as Person, Ramsey states: 'This ... is a 
book ... written by a Christian ethicist. ' 36 It is the statement that is supposed to put one in 
the right perspective for reading all that follows. Whether this is what actually happens 
will be examined further. 
The principle which will prove central for the whole book is a Biblical norm, 
referred to as 'fidelity to covenant'. There is no room left for ambiguity in the reader's 
understanding of this covenant as that between human being and God. From this major 
36 Paul Ramsey, The Patient as Person: Explorations in Medical Ethics (New Haven: Yale University 
Press, 1970), xi [hereafter abbreviated PP]. 
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covenant all the 'canons of loyalty' between person and person emerge. So, ultimately, 
we are not only in covenant relationship with God, but in no smaller measure with all 
the people that we happen to come across in our life. Ramsey explicitly shows from the 
very first pages that covenants between persons are cmcial for any kind of relationships 
we develop, whether those we are born into or those we enter by choice. These 
covenants are reflections of that great eternal one. And Ramsey regards medical practice 
as the most powerful and explicit among them. 
In the light of this concept the very nature of human relationships is that of tmst, 
not dominion, as many of us are so eager to see it. The subject of our tmsteeship is life 
itself. The question follows: how are we supposed to understand life? Ramsey clearly 
speaks about its meaning in his Ethics at the Edges of Life, where he acknowledges that 
life is a gift, which is to be received with gratitude and to be treasured and cherished. 
Thus every man is a person because he is 'an embodied soul or ensouled body' and 
every person is 'a sacredness in bodily life . .J? The latter expression brings us to the 
meanings of sacredness and sanctity. Ramsey sees sanctity as an essential characteristic 
of the phenomenon of human life and sacredness as a characteristic of each human 
being bearing 'a touch of sanctity . .JS These two co-exist and in a certain sense overlap 
in securing each other: 
The sanctity of human life prevents ultimate trespass upon him [the person] even 
for the sake of treating his bodily life, or for the sake of others who are also 
only a sacredness in their bodily 1i ves. 39 
A careful reader of Ramsey will notice, as Hauerwas did,40 that theology in The 
Patient as Person surprisingly ends in the Preface. Although he declares in the opening 
that he writes as a Christian ethicist, there is nevertheless nothing within the book to 
support this statement. Fidelity to covenant on its own can with equal success be 
employed for example by an ethicist coming from a distinctively Jewish or Muslim 
tradition. I suggest that there are three identifiable reasons - although many are possible 
-why Ramsey did not work through his theological basis properly. 
First of all, his book was intended to show that it is 'necessary for an ethicist to 
go as far as possible into the technical and other particular aspects of the problems he 
37 PP, xiii. 
38 Ibid. 
39 Ibid. 
40 Stanley Hauetwas, 'How Christian Ethics Became Medical Ethics: The Case of Paul Ramsey', in 
Wilderness Wanderings (Boulder, Colorado/Cumnor Hill, Oxford: Westview Press, 1997), 128 [hereafter 
abbreviated WW]. It should be noted though that such non-theological reading of Ramsey is a subject of 
disagreement among Christian theologians. See: Oliver O'Donovan, 'Keeping Body and Soul Together', 
in OMM, 223-38. 
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ventures to take up' .41 The way he did this in my view makes him one of the best 
ethicists of the twentieth century. A good book on ethics is not the one that gives 
answers but one that skillfully puts thought-provoking questions. The Patient as Person 
is definitely in this category. Also, the depth of Ramsey's knowledge of specific 
medical issues is as admirable as it is rare for a theologian. On the other hand, this 
digging to the technological roots has unfortunately been purchased at the price of 
theological shallowness. After all, what is the main characteristic of covenant? If it is to 
resemble God's bond with his people, then it has to be everlasting. It seems that using 
the language of covenant and not of contract was meant to emphasize an endless 
'faithfulness to a fellow man' ,42 in the image of God's enduring commitment to his 
people. As we shall see, covenant for Ramsey has its limits. No matter how significant 
is the fact that he holds 'with Karl Barth that covenant-fidelity is the inner meaning and 
purpose of our creation as human beings ' 43 , it is apparently insufficient to secure 
theological, let alone Christian grounds for bioethics. Perhaps Ramsey's biggest tragedy 
was that despite his strong demand to be treated as a Christian ethicist, his writings were 
more often than not taken as a model for shaping a common denominator.44 
The second reason for the theological convictions being so poorly articulated 
was that the author believed that the remnants of basic Christianity were still present in 
society as a whole. Thus, he assumed that there was no great need to go deeper into the 
theological background. In his essay of 1982, 'Tradition and Reflection in Christian 
Life', Ramsey admits: 
Those who still address counsel to governments must believe either that a 
remnant of the Christian age remains on which they count when testifying 
before Congress or that in so doing they do so as only one among many other 
voices in a society that for the foreseeable future is irredeemably secular. . .It is 
in this sense that I continue to try to do "public ethics" ... At the same time I 
continue to try to do "church ethics" in hope that the day may come when the 
dominant secular viewpoints on morality will be extended from the church of 
Jesus Christ.45 
Apparently, Ramsey was in a certain sense saving his deeper theology for that day to 
arrive. Remarkably, somewhat thirty years after The Patient as Person, the appearance 
of Engelhardt's The Foundations of Christian Bioethics indicated the failure of this 
hope. 
41 PP, xii. 
42 Ibid, xiii. 
43 Ibid, xii. 
44 This problem has been somewhat sarcastically presented in a form of a 'medical case' by Stanley 
Hauerwas in WW, 124-6. 
45 Quoted in WW, 129-30. 
31 
Finally, in struggling to locate the framework he has developed, Ramsey partly 
could not and partly did not want to see the church as an appropriate locus for it.46 The 
reader would have to make a considerable effort to work out that Ramsey belongs to the 
Methodist tradition. The ethics of covenant seemed to be successfully institutionalized 
in medicine itself, leaving the church as an institution out of the equation. Although 
Ramsey wholeheartedly believed 'that Christian special ethics would still come to the 
conclusions I do' ,47 in the long run this principle has betrayed him. For some of the 
conclusions are different. They are conclusions belonging precisely to secular, not to 
Christian ethics. 
2. Defining Death 
The question of death appears to be the most interesting and important for 
Ramsey in addressing the problem of euthanasia. It is not by chance that the third 
chapter of The Patient as Person is treated as one of the most significant pieces of his 
work.48 It would be only to do justice to 'On (Only) Caring for the Dying' to say that it 
is an eye-opener in many respects, especially in its breath-taking deep insight into the 
specifically medical and technical aspects. In our age of oversophisticated medical hi-
tech it sometimes becomes difficult to establish whether the person was actually alive 
before euthanasia has taken place. 
Before undertaking a closer examination of what Ramsey has to say about 
defining death, I shall tum to his theological explanations of its meaning. Ramsey holds 
that 'as Christians we believe that death is the "last enemy" that shall be destroyed. '49 
He argues, in accordance with what has been said earlier about the Christian 
understanding of life, that to choose death as an end would be 'to throw the gift back in 
the face of the giver. ' 50 This may be too emotionally expressed, but it still makes perfect 
sense. 'Vitalism' does not, as it may seem, automatically follow. On the contrary, when 
a person is refusing to choose death as an end, his choice is rather about 'how to live 
46 For an extended explanation of this life-long search see: D. Stephen Long, Tragedy, Tradition, 
Transformism (Boulder: Westview Press, 1993), 131-3. 
47 Letter to Stanley Hauerwas quoted in WW, 131. 
48 See: David H. Smith, 'On Paul Ramsey: A Covenant-Centered Ethic for Medicine', in Allen Verhey 
and Stephen E. Lammers (eds.), Theological Voices in Medical Ethics (Grand Rapids, Michigan: William 
B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1993), 7-29. 
49 Paul Ramsey, Ethics at the Edges of Life (New Haven and London, Yale University Press, 1978), 147 
[hereafter abbreviated EEL]. 
50 EEL, 146. 
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while dying. ' 51 Indeed, it is one of the life choices. Ramsey aptly describes what we 
actually have to compare: 
... a certain state or condition of dying with another, one treatment with another, 
or treatment with no treatment. All such decisions are consistent with accepting 
life as a gift and a trust. None seizes dominion over human life and death. 52 
Now it seems to be quite clear that from the point of faith, we as a community of 
persons are called to fight against our 'last enemy', not desert to it, until we can join 
God in his victory and peacefully surrender to Him our earthly lives. Speaking 
metaphorically, life is a long conversation for us to take part in as actively and 
wholeheartedly as we can, but it is never an argument where the only way for us to be 
right is to have the last word. It belongs to God and does not subject us to humiliation, 
but bestows honour and glory upon us as faithful stewards and trustees. 
Some wise people in Soviet times taught that to fight successfully one has to 
know one's enemy. What, then, do we know about death? Ramsey shows our striking 
ignorance, despite all the sophisticated and regularly updated medical criteria. In some 
sense, we are still struggling through the scientific thicket being constantly caught in the 
brambles. At the beginning of chapter two in The Patient as Person Ramsey gives the 
following definition of death: 
Life means the functioning of the integrated being or physiological organism as 
in some sense a whole [Italics added]. Death means the cessation of this 
functioning. This in tum depends on the integrated functioning of certain great 
organ systems. 53 
The last phrase of the quotation opens up the question of what we nowadays regard as 
'integrated functioning'. Can we still apply that definition in the cases where one or 
more of the great organ systems are kept functioning only by artificial maintenance of 
the other(s)? Ramsey does not give a straight answer and all his examples and 
explanations tell us there is none. He tells the story of a Boy Scout leader, applying 
artificial respiration trying to save the life of a boy, whose brain is cleaved in two. It is 
wrong to think that when after several hours the leader gives up exhausted the boy is 
still alive. It would be misleading, Ramsey insists, to say that 'the leader stopped 
respiration while the heart still beat' in exactly the same way that it would be to assume 
'that he stopped respiration while the boy still breathed. ' 54 Transferred to the hospital, 
this story would have had the only difference in replacing the Scout leader who finally 
51 Here Ramsey quotes Arthur Dyck of Harvard University. 
52 EEL, 148. 
53 PP, 59. 
54 Ibid, 67. 
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got tired with a respirator that can virtually go on forever. The other side of the problem 
comes up in another example brought to our attention: people with 'pacemakers'. Are 
they already dead or still alive? If we subscribe to the view that one of the great organ 
systems sustained remotely by external means through another great organ system is not 
to be qualified as a sign of life, then our answer should be 'dead'. But one cannot 
possibly deliver such a verdict without getting oneself into trouble. Ramsey puts it this 
way: 
It may be granted that an essentially isolated brain life may be quite enough to 
warrant continuing by any means procedures that alone indefinitely stay the 
abolition of that brain. The question raised by the current discussion is quite 
different: it is whether an essentially isolated brain death (or some tests for this) 
are enough to warrant ceasing to treat a patient as a man alive and stating that 
death has occurred in the presence of continuing natural functioning of either 
lungs or heart. 55 
He insists that 'further updating the updating of death' is needed. Ramsey 
reminds about the danger of two possible confusions that are likely to occur consciously 
or unconsciously. 
A decision to continue or to discontinue life-sustaining treatment of a person 
who has suffered massive brain injury, or longer to sustain a comatose patient, or 
a conscious dying patient, is precisely a judgment made in the face of a life still 
present. 56 
The second confusion is to mix up death with 'organ donor eligibility'. It triggers the 
temptation to cheat in stating death for the sake of achieving organ donor status. And if 
this happens within the traditional moral framework, we will have to recognize that an 
eminent pro-euthanasia philosopher Peter Singer has a point in saying that those who 
defend the sanctity of human life are simply patching up the holes in the doctrine by 
redefining death 'so that they can remove beating hearts from warm, breathing bodies, 
and give them to others with better prospects, while telling themselves that they are only 
taking organs from a corpse' .57 The moment of one's death should never be an adjunct 
to another's life. Neither should definitions be updated with that kind of aim in mind. 
Summing up the problem of defining death, the crucial understanding that 
emerges is the uncertainty of the borderline between life and death and the only morally 
justifiable guideline is drawn: 
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Since we do not know the borderline between life and death, nothing less than 
the maximum definition of death will do - brain death plus heart death plus any 
other indication that may be pertinent - before final violence is allowed to be 
done. 58 
3. 'Euthanasiac acts and sentiments' 
Anybody who has read Ethics at the Edges of Life would never again feel very 
comfortable using the term euthanasia. Ramsey says the meaning of the word has been 
corrupted by its current usage. Euthanasia has become a negative tag as it tends to imply 
'choosing death as an end.' This kind of choice is totally unacceptable for Christians. 
The original meaning of euthanasia appears to have been lost and there is no hope of 
restoring it in its own right. Instead it is hedged about with inventive distinctions like 
'active' or 'passive', 'direct' and 'indirect', 'voluntary' and 'non-voluntary' mainly for 
the purpose of solving the old philosophical puzzle of whether there is a moral 
difference between acts of commission and acts of omission. For Ramsey it all went 
totally wrong precisely when that new 'corrupted' meaning was assigned to euthanasia. 
Therefore he claims he will 'get rid of all those terms. ' 59 I cannot tell whether he 
succeeded; perhaps he did at that time. Perhaps it was worth a try in 1978, but since we 
find ourselves in a new century stuck with the same 'corrupted' meaning, evidently his 
success did not last long. One of the reasons was probably a lack of basis for the 
claimed difference between 'euthanasiac acts and sentiments' and the ethics of care. 
The whole course of developing the latter ends up in accepting what it has so vigorously 
rejected in the beginning. 
For Ramsey the only meaning of euthanasia is 'dying well enough' according to 
the concept of 'fidelity to covenant' and to the 'faith that life is a gift.' Anything that 
fails to stand up to these is instantly reduced to mere 'euthanasiac acts and sentiments.' 
Bearing a somewhat pejorative connotation this phrase, as it seems to me, catches the 
heart of the matter further on, when Ramsey states that 'a religious outlook that goes 
with grace among the dying can never be compatible with euthanasiac acts and 
sentiments'. 60 While all this is extremely fair, it is nevertheless far from clear what this 
religious outlook stands for. If it is merely grounded in covenant and 'giftedness of life', 
it is too weak to withstand the wind of change, from whichever side it comes. 
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4. Curing and Caring 
One might ask what are we left with after dismissing the ethics of euthanasia in 
its modem sense. Ramsey just fits it all into a single sentence, saying that 'in caring for 
the dying, we cease doing what was once called for and begin to do what is called for 
'61 now. 
What is happening in the world of medicine now as well as in people's minds 
seems to reflect that we are no longer able to make that passage to only caring for the 
dying. Or, to put it more accurately, society is totally confused about the implications of 
it. Thus it is only natural that the ethics of only caring for the dying, which really is no 
less than our traditional medical ethics, meets opposition from two sides. Ramsey calls 
them 'extremes.' To put it simply, they are 'vitalism' and euthanasia. People are tom 
between them while they opt for one or the other, failing to see the middle way. The 
ethics of only caring for the dying avoids the perils of 'vitalism': 
We need rather to discover the moral limits properly surrounding efforts to save 
life. We need to recover the meaning of only caring for the dying, and the 
justification - indeed the obligation - of intervening against many a medical 
intervention that is possible today. 62 
Such an intervention can come in the form of distinguishing between ordinary and 
extraordinary means. Paradoxically the whole history of medical technologies can be 
characterized as converting extraordinary means into ordinary (customary) ones. 
Therefore the problem is not in deciding which set of means is morally justified. For 
the morality of only caring for the dying, Ramsey argues, there is no moral obligation to 
apply useless means, be they ordinary, natural or customary in practice. This is one of 
the foundation stones. Another crucial point is that ' ... the description of human acts of 
caring for the dying ... terminates in the man who is the patient of these ministrations 
and not in the disease or diseases he has. ' 63 In other words, our care does not stop when 
we cannot cure, it still continues or rather truly begins beyond the efforts of curing. This 
is precisely what the opening quotation in this section is telling us. We have to stop for 
a minute in the dashing marathon of conquering illness or 'striving officiously to keep 
alive'; and see the person, who is desperately trying to reach for our covenant 
partnership and crying out for company in the cold wilderness of advanced medical 
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technologies. As Dr Elizabeth KOhler-Ross sharply noticed, the patient is slowly but 
surely 'beginning to be treated like a thing': 
He may cry out for rest, peace, dignity, but he will get infusions, transfusions, a 
heart machine, or a tracheostomy. He may want one single person to stop for one 
single minute so that he can ask one single question - but he will get a dozen 
people around the clock, all busily preoccupied with his heart rate, pulse, 
electrocardiogram or pulmonary functions, his secretions or excretions, but not 
with him as a human being. 64 
All this said, one might wonder how the ethics of care manages not to coincide 
with what we would now mean by euthanasia. Misinterpretations do happen. There is an 
example in the writings of Joseph Fletcher, who 'wishes to subscribe both to an ethics 
of caring, but only caring, for the dying, and to euthanasia in its current meaning. ' 65 
Ramsey vigorously rejects that kind of 'cocktail.' Even the phenomenon of ambiguity in 
using pain-killing medication, known as 'the principle of double effect', does not shift 
caring for the dying to some sort of 'indirect' or 'involuntary' euthanasia. In Ramsey's 
view the life-shortening effect of pain-relieving drugs is not as self-evident as it is often 
assumed. Intense umelieved pain may equally shorten the patient's life, and if we are 
not providing available medication to alleviate it, are we not doing something more 
'euthanasiac'? 
Having described and affirmed the concept of 'only caring for the dying' it is 
time to see whether Ramsey makes any exceptions or sets any limits to that care. In 
other words, is there a boundary beyond which our efforts are in vain? Ramsey thinks 
there is. The first case of crossing the border would apply to those who are no longer 
capable of receiving our care. In relation to the covenant principle, some conditions, 
such as patients in deep and irreversible coma maintained alive for many years, can be 
regarded as having fallen out of the covenant bond between person and person. To be in 
the covenant partnership both parties have to be aware of it. Ramsey sees 'no 
contradiction to withhold what is not capable of being given and received. ' 66 In other 
words, at this point covenantal relationship starts to look suspiciously like an expired 
contract, where one of the parties not being able to participate automatically terminates 
it. This is how the ethics of covenant unintentionally turns simply into the ethics of 
consent. 
The second suggested case concerns patients whose dying is prolonged when 
medication fails to keep acute pain at bay. Reminding us that it is not for moralists to 
64 Elizabeth Kubler-Ross, On Death and Dying (London: Tavistock Publications, 1970), 8. 
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detem1ine whether such cases exist, Ramsey proposes that patients with bone cancer 
might fall into that category. These two situations are qualified as exceptions to the rule 
of always caring for the dying, or rather for Ramsey they are the areas where this rule 
does not apply any more and thus even positive action towards the end of life can be 
taken: 
One can hardly hold·men to be morally blameworthy if in these instances dying 
is directly accomplished or hastened [Italics added] .... A patient undergoing 
deep and prolonged pain, who cannot be relieved by means presently 
available ... would also be beyond reach of the other ways in which company 
may be kept with him and he be attended in his dying - as much so, depending 
on the degree of his undefeatable agony, as the prolonged comatose patient.67 
Astonishingly, if one brings together one of the previously quoted statements and the 
conclusion above, the result is a moral acceptance of intentional killing or active 
euthanasia. Moreover, there seems to be a logical contradiction. If a decision whether to 
discontinue sustaining a comatose patient is 'a judgement made in the face of a life still 
present' ,68 is one not acting still within covenants 'of life with life'?69 
It is not our duty to 'carry on our medical efforts to save life until the issue is 
taken out of our hands', but it is rather our duty to 'carry on our ministry of care and 
comfort and keeping-company with the dying until but only until that issue is taken out 
of our hands.' 70 What Ramsey seems to have overlooked is that ethics of covenant 
would have only benefited if it included such an immensely important part of keeping 
company and attending to the dying as prayer, which can be given and received not only 
consciously but on a subconscious level as well. But this would have meant going 
deeper theologically, which was not the plan for the author of The Patient as Person. 
III. Tristram Engelhardt and the Ethics of Asceticism 
1. Back to the Future 
One of my friends characterized The Foundations of Christian Bioethics as 
'tough'. This is the word he uses to describe a challenge. The book will be treated as 
such by many, or will be laughed at. Whatever the response, Tristram Engelhardt has 
launched a new framework for modem bioethics that is likely to find more opponents 
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than supporters. As Stanley Hauerwas puts it, he 'has thrown down a challenge to 
secular bioethics'. 71 I shall attempt to extend this account and argue that Engelhardt 
offers a new Christian bioethics, much more powerful than what was running under this 
title before. For a better understanding of this one has to keep in mind the author's 
conversion and baptism into Orthodox Christianity on April 6, 1991. The Foundations 
of Christian Bioethics is a result of a long journey, which started in 1986 with the ethics 
for 'moral strangers' and developed into the one of 'moral friends'. 
The Foundations of Christian Bioethics is a mirror of The Patient as Person. 
Ramsey focused his skills on the medical side of bioethics, Engelhardt pursued the 
spiritual side. To paraphrase one of the metaphors in The Foundations, they are two 
lungs of bioethics. If Ramsey's engagement in technological aspects almost converted 
Christian ethics into medical ethics, Engelhardt attempts to restore the balance working 
out a content-full theological basis. This is called for by our new era. Since Ramsey 
wrote our global society has become increasingly liberal, which unfortunately appears 
to be tantamount to post-Christian. It is no longer possible to rely on the commonly 
recognized remnants of Christianity, as Ramsey once did. The alternative is 'to join a 
religion and be careful to choose the right one'. 72 Engelhardt was and still is much 
criticised and mocked upon for this blunt proclamation. If Ramsey was largely read as a 
common denominator, Engelhardt seems to be saddled with a 'sectarian' stigma. Both 
are misinterpreted, the first because of his insufficient theology and tricky prose, the 
second due to misrepresentation and resulting misperception. What The Foundations 
actually offer is a logical continuation of the line brilliantly maintained by Stanley 
Hauerwas.73 It is precisely about finding a proper locus for Christian bioethics. 
a) From a Liberal to a Libertarian Cosmopolitanism 
In the first chapter of his new book Engelhardt suggests that a major cultural 
shift from a libertarian cosmopolitan moral understanding to a liberal one has taken 
place in modernity and marked all spheres of human life, including bioethics. 
One of the core features of the libertarian type of cosmopolitanism ts the 
distinction it makes between society- 'the space afforded in civil society for persons 
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and communities of diverse moral commitments to meet and interact' - and community 
- 'the highly morally constituted space of particular moral communities'. 74 In other 
words, in Engelhardt's corrected vision society should consist of and be shaped by 
communities understood as moral congregations. On the contrary, modem liberal 
society appears to be a new moral community absorbing and universalising diverse 
congregations. Whilst striving to give the impression of being free, it actually imposes 
an ideology of its own, promoting and securing certain social values like liberty and 
equality as well as moral ones such as self-determination and public consensus. In other 
words a libertarian type of society would be characterised by inclusiveness, whereas a 
liberal one would be characterised by substitution. 
Outlining the difference, Engelhardt astutely remarks that 'moral content is 
purchased at the price of universality' and vice versa.75 This being the case, the question 
arises whether any balance is to be found at all; or whether we are bound to travel in 
circles heading either towards content and losing in universality or the other way round. 
I am inclined to think that the vast majority of Engelhardt's readers would be ready to 
accuse him of calling humankind to embark on content and abandon universality. Such 
readers will run the risk of too simple an interpretation. 
For a deeper understanding of the author's argument for divorcing libertarian 
and liberal concepts (which might look very much alike to the untrained eye) it is worth 
going into each one in more detail. 
According to Engelhardt, the liberal ethos has the following characteristics: 
consent as a value; 
moral imperialism; 
liberation from 'the dead hand oftradition'.76 
The libertarian ethos, on the other hand, is described by: 
consent as a necessity; 
moral freedom; 
space for particular bonds. 
While the notion of consent appears to be a mutual characteristic, Engelhardt 
clearly shows that the meaning ascribed to it is dramatically different. If the centrality of 
the principle of permission in a libertarian society is but 'the only source available for 
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secular authority'77 , in a liberal perspective it becomes a value to be publicly 
recognized. Instead of allowance for co-existing moral principles, the liberal ethos 
forces both implicitly and explicitly a ranking system of its own, thus depriving 
individuals of a free moral choice. Hence, the liberal ethos is essentially neither truly 
liberal nor cosmopolitan. It claims to provide a new content-rich moral vision 
eschewing any particular bonds to the past that will not exactly fit in. The libertarian 
ethos, on the contrary, 'can compass divergent moral visions, moral communities, and 
fragments of moral communities'. It offers 'a modus vivendi with moral force but 
without content for a world marked by a plurality of moral visions'. 78 And in this sense 
it is truly liberating and cosmopolitan. It might preserve that very balance which keeps 
one on solid grounds between conservatism and empty universality. 
All of this is not to be taken as giving the status of an ideal model to a libertarian 
society. Engelhardt is convinced that for 'the traditional Christian' it would still feel 
uncomfortable. But at least 'it affirms a space for traditional Christians to live as they 
wish' .79 Not only for them, but for any specific moral community, as we have seen 
from the argument. It is just that the lapse into liberalism jeopardizes primarily the 
traditional moral framework. 80 
On the other hand, there is still something in Engelhardt's model of a 'peaceful 
libertarian society' that makes one feel uneasy. Hauerwas puts his finger on the problem 
in his essay on the second edition of The Foundations of Bioethics: 'I am not at all 
convinced that the peaceable society Engelhardt desires exists, can exist, or, if it did 
exist, would be peaceable' .81 Though Hauerwas acknowledges he does not have an 
altemative, at least on the theoretical level, he claims that 'our task, as Christians, is not 
to offer such theoretical altematives, but rather to be an altemative'. 82 It is another 
question what this actually involves. And if it means that 'we must be willing, if we are 
to live morally in this life, to let others suffer for our principles' ,83 the peace of 
Hauerwas might appear no less violent than he claims Engelhardt's to be. This is a 
profound dilemma that so far admits of no resolution. 
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b) From Secular to Christian Bioethics 
There is a crucial difference between liberal and libertarian moral frameworks in 
the kinds of ethics and bioethics they produce. While the former tries to accommodate 
secular bioethics which leaves no place for any form of distinct Christian bioethics, the 
latter, 'by default' 84 gives the only chance for the survival of both secular and Christian 
bioethics. 
Engelhardt's metaphor of 'moral strangers' opens the door to the ethical world 
of post-modernity. Largely developed in his previous works, it is only summarized in 
The Foundations of Christian Bioethics, but remains essential to the overall mapping of 
the author's thought. 
The terms "moral stranger" and "morally strange" are not used to indicate an 
opaque other whose actions are not understandable. As already indicated, the 
terms are employed to identify circumstances in which persons do not share 
either (1) common moral premises, rules of evidence, and rules of inference so 
that their moral controversies can be settled by sound rational argument, or (2) a 
common understanding of who is in moral authority, so that their moral 
controversies can be settled by a definitive ruling or process. 85 
It is precisely these two conditions described by Engelhardt that define modem societies 
and shape the ethics they practise. In a highly individualized world such as ours where 
diversity is so salient and bitter, morality has no common or, as Engelhardt puts it, 
'canonical' grounds except for those of consent or permission. 
Historically, there were two ways of resolving moral controversies. The older 
one was based on a recognized moral authority of the 'grand narrative' and the whole 
tradition thereafter. This was then exchanged for discursive reason in an attempt to give 
a better foundation for public discourse, as the old one seemed to have lost its relevance. 
Engelhardt draws out three 'fundamental Western experiences' ,86 which led step by step 
to the formation of secular bioethics: the split of Western Christendom after the 
Reformation into various 'Christianities and Christendoms' ,87 the vain effort of the 
Enlightenment to overcome the resulting diversity by discursive reason alone and, 
finally, post-modernity facing the same problem of separation and alienation. 
Humankind seems to have made a journey that has come full circle. 
Engelhardt argues that a common background morality accepted by all is a 
modem myth. It is used to construct the type of secular bioethics of the liberal 
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cosmopolitan kind, which is dead before it is alive because the basis it claims to have 
does not exist. The mistake is made when despite celebrating cultural diversity, one 
does not recognize its counterpart, moral diversity, and tries to dispose of it either by 
denying the significance of moral disagreements or condemning those who disagree 
instead of looking into the ways of reconciliation. In other words those who, in addition 
to cultural differences, do not share a common morality would not be able to start a 
sound rational argument and those who have similar moralities would have different 
moral theories, namely different scales of moral values and principles that would be 
argument-stoppers. Once realized, it reveals the falsehood of liberal secular bioethics 
and the 'moral unanimity' in the decisions of current bioethics commissions turns 
simply into 'a political construction' .88 The work of the National Commission for the 
Protection of Human Subjects of Biomedical and Behavioral Research is commonly 
taken to prove the existence of a common background morality, whereas in fact 
gathering people with similar moralities and only theoretical disagreements detem1ined 
its apparent success. Engelhardt suggests it would have been another story 
had the Commission when discussing fetal research included a representative 
from the pope of Rome, an atheist feminist, a fundamentalist Baptist, a Maoist 
communist, a libertarian, and an advocate of unhindered choice in the matter of 
abortions. 89 
He goes on to say that resolving moral controversies by engaging discursive reason is 
impossible not only for those who do not share common morality, but on a deeper level 
it appears to be impossible even for those who seem to adhere to the same morality and 
only differ in theoretical reconstructions of it or in particular accounts of it: 
If one begins with different rankings of important human values or right-making 
conditions, one will not share a common morality. If one does not have the same 
moral premises as well as rules of evidence and inference, one will not be able to 
resolve moral controversies by sound rational argument.90 
Given the failure of discursive reason as a binding principle and consequently the fall of 
the secular bioethics grounded in it, one is left with a choice between a new libertarian 
type of secular bioethics based on consent and a Christian bioethics. 
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c) Reconsidering Christian Bioethics: From Post-Traditional to Traditional 
One would have expected Engelhardt to hold on to this choice. He does not. The 
question further examined is whether there is any difference left. Engelhardt regards the 
'Christianness' of modern Christian bioethics as problematic.91 
Starting from the nineteenth century onwards, Roman Catholic theological 
reflection developed an extended medical-ethical tradition. However, after Vatican II it 
was profoundly shaken by an attempt to change the church tradition and 'ways of doing 
theology, including bioethics' .92 As Engelhardt aptly remarks, the Christian bioethics 
which emerged in the 1960s 'did not so much produce manuals or guides for the 
perplexed physician, nurse, or believer, as it did reports of theological perplexity'. 93 The 
later crisis of Christian ethics in general and bioethics in particular has its roots in the 
crisis of moral theology and, one step removed, in the crisis of self-identity encountered 
by Western Christianity. Engelhardt quotes Pope John Paul II lamenting 'the loss of 
faith' and 'a decline or obscuring of the moral sense'.94 All ofwhich seems to have been 
caused in the first place by dropping 'major elements of the Christian faith - the 
miracles, the Virgin Birth, the bodily resurrection of Christ, the expectation of Christ's 
return, the reality of eternal damnation'. 95 Christianity has become so diverse in itself 
that it can hardly provide a satisfactory moral guidance even for those within its 
boundaries. As has been indicated earlier, different moral theories cannot by definition 
imply common morality. Consequently, this kind of inner contradiction brings the 
Christian moral framework too close to the secular one. In abandoning beliefs that were 
once the substance of Christianity, the uniqueness is lost and some kind of middle 
ground acquired. The conclusion Engelhardt draws is that the battle for a distinct 
Christian bioethics has in the end been lost. One might wonder whether such a distinct 
bioethics was ever needed. After all, if we stick to the libertarian type of society and to 
the libertarian ethics of consent does it really make a difference to distinguish between 
secular and Christian moral frameworks? Engelhardt's answer is 'yes'. In the world 
literally structured according to 'which individuals have agreed to do what with 
whom' ,96 the hunger for content, value and meaning is ever increasing. Christianity 
might have been the 'bread' so longed for, but it appears that in its contemporary form it 
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is more likely to starve itself. The danger then is to give in to the new liberal moral 
imperialism. With regard to bioethics it would be to adopt a new religion of human 
rights and personal autonomy and to forgo defeated concepts of the sacredness of life 
and covenant as the foundation of relationships. 
The 'what to do' question remains. What Engelhardt suggests is radical in the 
deepest sense of the word. He emphasizes that 'Christian bioethics depends on knowing 
what Christianity is and which Christianity should guide' .97 He claims it should be 
traditional Christianity, the one ofthe first millennium. Its bioethics is grounded 'within 
an ascetic and liturgical theology confident that its inspiration is from the same Spirit 
Who inspired the Scriptures and directed the Apostles'. 98 Traditional Christianity as 
Engelhardt perceives it has no flavour of sectarianism or narrow-mindedness. On the 
contrary, it entails no impediments for 
the reader from whatever religion to enter into the religious experience alive in 
the texts, prayers, moral understandings, and spiritual concerns of Christianity's 
first millennium. Some might regard these texts and usages as only historical 
relics. Others might consider a call to return to the sources primarily as an 
invitation to study and reorient an academically framed theology. Here the 
invitation is to enter into a lifeworld that knows without doubt that St. Basil the 
Great (329-379), St. John Chrysostom (334-407), St. Gregory the Theologian 
(329-390) and St. Simeon the New Theologian (949-1 022) are constant, living 
companions. 99 
In other words, Christian bioethics introduced in The Foundations is universal in a 
brand new, illuminating sense. It is not bought at the price of content, but introduces the 
content that once had and still possesses the potential for universality. Engelhardt's 
Orthodoxy is not, as Stephen N. Williams thinks, either to be accepted or rejected. 100 It 
is to be seriously reflected upon. In a certain sense what one can find in the book can be 
shocking and at times deeply offensive to secular morality. If it feels the same with 
regard to 'other Christian religions', the reason would probably be in the fact that their 
morality has come to coincide with the secular one. And rather than accusing the author 
of fundamentalism, one would do better to ponder on the nature of contemporary 
liberalism. Being fundamental does not boil down to fanaticism. I would rather say that 
in his interpretation reason takes its place, namely as the human extension or reflection 
of God's wisdom. It is precisely the ranking that matters. The Foundations offers not a 
regressive process, but the way back to the future. It is a conversion of 'the process of 
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decision-making from harried perplexity into hopeful pilgrimage' .101 So let the journey 
begin. 
2. Suffering and Death: Reinforcing Their Christian Meaning 
a) The Cosmic Narrative Versus Tolerance and Acceptance 
Since I am especially interested in the problem of euthanasia, it is a regrettable 
but a necessary limitation that I will discuss in more detail only the framework offered 
for end-of-life decision-making, bracketing out questions regarding procreation and 
healthcare policy despite their being naturally intertwined. 
Engelhardt invites the reader to participate in the search for the 'enduring 
meaning' of human finitude. This meaning, he argues, 'must not be transient' .102 The 
answers to the most profound metaphysical questions asked in the face of suffering and 
death are nowadays provided within the liberal cosmopolitan ethos. These answers, 
being rooted in the values of self-determination, liberation from the constraints of the 
past and self-fulfilment103 fail to reach beyond the realm of immanence. They give no 
appropriate food to 'still the hunger for the transcendent' .104 Moreover, this liberal 
cosmopolitan ethos virtually makes post-traditional Christianity an offer that cannot be 
refused. The central thing that contemporary Christianity seems to be able to offer 
unanimously, whatever denomination, is love for your neighbour. Leaving aside the fact 
that even this concept is interpreted differently, ranging from Ramsey's covenantal 
framework to Fletcher's situationalism, it has in itself no grounds for separating itself 
from the ethos of personal autonomy. 
Christians who love their neighbors should in terms of this liberal cosmopolitan 
reorientation encourage choices concerning death that support the values, 
freedom, and dignity of their neighbors. 105 
Engelhardt suggests there are only two ways for post-traditional Christian bioethics to 
be compatible with secular liberalism: tolerance and acceptance. If tolerance 
presupposes allowing others to engage in something which one considers to be wrong 
(e.g. physician-assisted suicide and active voluntary euthanasia), acceptance entails 
acknowledging certain practices to be right for others, but not for oneself. The final step 
will be to question the impossibility of granting oneself the liberty one has already 
101 Ibid, 78. 
102 FCB, 309. 
103 See: ibid, 312. 
104 Ibid, 313. 
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granted others. To escape from this moral trap, it is instructive to return to that well-
forgotten 'grand narrative' of sin, forgiveness and salvation. 
There are fewer and fewer Christians who would recognize themselves as 
bearers of the consequences of Adam's sin largely due to misinterpretation of the 
process. Adam's sin is not hereditary, it is not stamped on the forehead of every 
newborn. It is rather an echo of that first distortion of the human nature, which affects 
each of us in particular and all our lives in general. Here is the metaphorical allusion 
Engelhardt uses to facilitate a proper understanding of the meaning of the original sin: 
Like a father who in sin contracts a disease he passes to his children without his 
children inheriting the guilt, all inherit the consequences of Adam's sin, though 
not his guilt. .. Adam and Eve infected our nature with sinful inclinations, 
suffering and death. Each of us then further compounds the problem by adding 
the consequences of our own voluntary pride and rebellion. 106 
In this light suffering per se should be avoided whenever possible and when it cannot be 
avoided it should be borne with patience and faith in God, who says: 
Come unto me, all ye that labour and are heavy laden, and I will give you rest. 
Take my yoke upon you, and learn of me; for I am meek and lowly in heart: and 
ye shall find rest unto your souls. For my yoke is easy, and my burden is light. 
(Mt. 11. 28-30) 
It is only in Christ and with Christ that the meaning of suffering and death is truly 
revealed and transformed, revealed where it seems to be meaningless and transformed 
into a great gift where it seems nothing but a punishment. Christ through his own 
suffering and death on the Cross has deprived these categories of an absolute meaning. 
His victory is the one that can be and should be followed by Christians. Outside the 
Christian context the only liberty left is to eliminate suffering altogether and at least 
control death. With Christ's resurrection neither of this is needed. Even the most painful 
concern about suffering of the innocent children is answered. Engelhardt gives an 
example of the babies in Bethlehem slaughtered by Herod. He shows that they 'in dying 
because of Christ were saved as martyrs for Christ', 107 and affirms redemption through 
baptism for all innocent children. The point Engelhardt makes explains why the 
Orthodox Church maintains the tradition of infant baptism. Given the fact that children, 
though innocent themselves, are affected by the consequences of Adam's sin and often 
suffer from their parents' misbehaviour, only baptism in Christ can transform this 
dreadful state of affairs and bring great glory out of pure misery. To summarize, 
suffering and death are always the consequences of sin in one way or another and may 
106 FCB, 314. 
107 Ibid, 316. See also footnote 32 of Chapter 6. 
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be avoided where possible. But this should not become an aim in itself, because through 
Christ we are given the promise of eternal life, a breakthrough from the immanent to the 
transcendent. Unavoidable suffering can have a therapeutic role that helps to 'abandon 
pride, and purge the heart from the passions that control us' .108 
The narrative so powerfully presented to the reader is cosmic in the sense that it 
is open to everybody and embraces everything while at the same time remaining 'a 
particular story involving particular people and their relationship with a transcendent 
but personal God' .109 This narrative reminds us of a universal potential for participation: 
'And other sheep I have, which are not of this fold: them also I must bring, and they 
shall hear my voice; and there shall be one fold, and one shepherd' (Jn 10. 16). 
b) From Sin to Holiness Through Asceticism 
Christian bioethics rooted in the cosmic narrative opens a new horizon for 
medical decision-making. As Christians, we are not only called to be good, but to 
ascend to holiness. This assumption takes one a significant step further than justice, 
canons of loyalty, the sanctity of life or steadfast love. The promise of eternal life is the 
opportunity for every person to become holy. This is what salvation is about. Tragically, 
the true meaning of holiness is often misunderstood. A saint is not somebody who is 
totally free of sin, but the one who has 'fought the good fight' either against the 
consequences of original sin or against his own sins and won. The ideas of sin and 
holiness properly understood put all that we do in the right perspective. They give a new 
solid ground for Christian bioethics. As Engelhardt defines it, 'beyond the sphere of 
morality as the domain of responsible action, there is holiness which we will not be able 
to endure unless our hearts are purged from defilement' .110 
Indeed, attempts to ground Christian bioethics solely in covenant, sacredness of 
life or in love for the neighbour, 'aim somewhat short of the mark' .111 All of these 
would do very well even outside a Christian context, in Judaism or Islam, for that 
matter. As has been previously shown, covenant-centred ethics is limited to the 
capacity of the parties involved. Ramsey acknowledges that there comes a time when a 
person is beyond our care. 112 And it is then that active euthanasia becomes morally 
justified. Love for the neighbour is no better guide, unless properly understood: 
108 FCB, 315. 
109 Ibid, 313. 
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Fletcher's interpretation leads to treating an embryo in certain circumstances as 'an 
aggressor or unwelcome invader' and claims this treatment to be in the name of love. 113 
Finally, the concept of life as a sacred gift takes us only so far with the notion of 
sacredness as well as with the metaphor of gift. Any precious possession we have this 
side of death is limited to the 'best before date', which does not however deprive it of 
intrinsic value. Totally wrong as it may be 'to throw the gift back in the face of the 
giver', 114 there are no reasons not to return an enriched and fruitful life exercised in 
good and faithful stewardship as the offering of the talents in the parable. From this 
point of view, one might have strong doubts that 'our living is an obligation' .115 Every 
trusteeship is finite by definition and the foundation Christian bioethics really needs is 
the one that would not be subject to expiry. In summary, 
this is not to deny a place in Christian bioethics for moral rules, commandments, 
or precepts: properly understood, they indicate real boundaries beyond which 
one will go very wrong rather than enter into union with God. But they cannot 
be systematized in terms of conceptual foundations. 116 
An attempt to systematize moral commandments into a basis for an ethical framework 
taken by numerous theologians starting with Ramsey, though no doubt sincerely well-
intended, has paradoxically resulted in 'going beyond the boundaries'. 
Engelhardt offers the foundation of holiness, the ultimate goal of pursuing the 
Kingdom of Heaven. The means is a fight against sin, the method is asceticism, 'the 
discipline of becoming watchful so as not to be mastered by passions, temptations, or 
even particular goals and projects, in order to tum fully to God' .117 The approach in 
making moral decisions is therapeutic118 and the focus is on spiritual concerns. 
c) Spiritual Dimensions in Medical Decision-Making 
Traditionally, three conditions are central for Christian moral decision-making in 
the context of death: intention, motivation and the nature of causal involvement in 
human death. The right intention should be to avoid a spiritual threat, the right 
motivation should be to submit humbly to God's will, and these two additionally should 
113 See the case study in Joseph Fletcher, Situation Ethics (London: SCM, 1966), 37-9 [hereafter 
abbreviated SE]. 
114 EEL, 146. 
115 Stanley Hauerwas, 'Rational Suicide and Reasons for Living' in OMM, 674. 
116 FCB, 209. 
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118 It seems to break the concept of 'three approaches' in SE, 17. 
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be secured by spiritual therapy in cases of involuntary homicide. 119 In other words, the 
framework suggested is not juridical (i.e. judging the guilt and/or its degree), but 
spiritually therapeutic (i.e. curing the effects of even unintentional involvement in evil). 
Engelhardt outlines the following points to abide by in medical decision-making: 
the direct will to kill the innocent is voluntary and unmitigated homicide in 
the full sense; this applies to all kinds of euthanasia (voluntary, non-
voluntary and involuntary) and physician-assisted suicide in their 
contemporary meaning: the evil of these actions is not done away either with 
consent or with pleadings of the subject; 
killing in a certain capacity (e.g. as an executioner) or under certain 
circumstances (e.g. in self-defence or in a just war) can be spiritually 
harmful and therefore should not be exempt from spiritual therapy; 
medicine can and should be used both to cure disease and postpone death 
provided appropriate spiritual circumspection is present; 
medical intervention should not be 
a) so demanding or absorbing as to harm spiritual life (Engelhardt includes 
here heart transplants, complex repetitive surgery and long-term artificial 
hydration and ventilation); 
b) so little as to refuse adequate remedies that God has allowed medicine to 
develop (insulin for diabetes and antibiotics for sub-acute bacterial 
endocarditis) or to choose only between elimination of suffering and pain 
and a premature death; 
pain control should be aimed not only at comfort but also at aiding in 
preparation for death; analgesia provided should not be in itself sufficient to 
bring about death; 
extraordinary means to sustain life may be appropriately used to win extra 
time for repentance and spiritual preparation for death. 120 
Interestingly, in setting the 'upper' and the 'lower' levels for medical intervention, 
Engelhardt is, in fact, distinguishing between ordinary and extraordinary treatments. 
While stating that both kinds (if imposing an excessive spiritual burden) not only may 
be but should be withdrawn or withheld, 121 he nevertheless stresses the imperative for a 
hermit to avoid travelling to a dialysis center to treat renal failure by using 'should', at 
119 FCB, 324. 
120 My surrunary of spiritual guidelines given by Engelhardt in FCB, 326-7. 
121 This statement will be more closely examined in the section dealing with medicine as an idol. 
50 
the same time regarding the failure to use insulin and antibiotics as 'usually sinful'. 122 It 
would seem to me that whilst obviously making room for certain exceptions in the 
obligatory usage of ordinary treatments, Engelhardt would have been more consistent 
not to ascribe categorical prohibition to the extraordinary ones. In the context of 
winning extra time for repentance and adequate preparation for death, would it not be 
morally justified in some cases to go ahead with heart transplants or even repetitive 
surgery? 
All this taken into consideration, three instances in medical-ethical decision-
making seem to beg further clarification. How does one apply Engelhardt's framework 
in the case of 'voiceless patients', as Ramsey would have called them, namely 
'defective newborns', those in deep and prolonged coma and in PVS? 
Since it is traditionally a custom in the Orthodox church for children to start 
their confessions at the age of seven, it presupposes that younger children would not 
really need a preparation to death in any way similar to that required of adults. As has 
been mentioned earlier, suffering of the innocent is transformed in the union with 
Christ. The only crucial thing then would be to win time for baptism. But once a baby is 
baptised, it could probably be quite fitting to determine the further course of action by 
engaging a medical indications policy, as has been thoroughly worked out and carefully 
presented by Ramsey in his Ethics at the Edges of Life. 123 He has argued that Dr 
Zachary, using strictly medical criteria for judging the eligibility of spina bifida babies 
for an operation is standing on morally safe ground. What this doctor tries to do 'is not 
to add years to their lives but to add life to their years'. 124 Neither taking the years of a 
baby's life nor judging the quality of the possible period of life is taking place. 
With comatose and PVS patients it is rather difficult to see a direct spiritual 
threat in medical treatments. Although Engelhardt lists long-term artificial hydration 
and ventilation as spiritually harmful, it could probably be more so for the family and 
caregivers rather than for the patient himself. Therefore, Engelhardt advises the use of 
advance directives 'not only to avoid medical interventions likely to be useless or 
spiritually burdensome, but also positively to ensure appropriate spiritual guidance as 
death approaches.' 125In this respect it is worth pointing out that not only a proxy 
decision-maker but also a person's spiritual father should be indicated in the advance 
directive. Moreover, a proxy decision-maker may not need to be a 'usually expected 
122 FCB, 326. 
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family member', but someone 'most likely to aid in one's pursuit of the kingdom of 
heaven' .126 The big question though is whether anything can be done in the case where 
the patient for whatever reasons might have not had a chance for repentance and proper 
preparation to death before coma or PVS happened. Our inability to communicate with 
such patients does not necessarily mean God's inability. And if this is the case would 
there not be at least some sense in continuing to sustain them for a longer period of time 
if only to keep praying for them, or even with them? I think there is an indication for it 
in the words of the Bible quoted by John Breck: 
I slept, but my heart was awake (Song of Sol. 5 :2) 
If I ascend to heaven, Thou art there; if I make my bed in Sheol, Thou art there! 
(Ps 1381139:8)127 
d) Suicide 
Before proceeding with further examination of euthanasia-related issues, it is 
worth clarifying the question of suicide. Most of the ethos of euthanasia that has 
currently emerged is largely due to confusion about what is to be counted as suicide and 
what is not. For example, Christian theologian Paul Badham builds his argument in 
favour of euthanasia on Biblical authority, saying that 'it is not actually the case that the 
Bible condemns self-slaughter and Biblical suicides are characteristically regarded as 
honourable' .128 Engelhardt rightly traces the degree to which the confusion has 
sometimes amounted to the theory of Christ's death on the cross 'interpreted as a kind 
of suicide' .129 
To put matters straight, one has to bear in mind the distinction, made by the 
early Church, between suicide and martyrdom. This distinction is, precisely, 'between 
those acts through which one turns to oneself or others versus those through which one 
turns oneself first and foremost ascetically to God' .130 Engelhardt gives examples from 
the lives of the saints such as St Martinian ( 422), the Martyr Nicodemus (eighteenth 
century) and Fr Augustinus the Russian (1965). The first and the last have to do mainly 
with threatening one's life to preserve chastity and the second one with exposure to 
126 Ibid, 322-3. 
127 John Breck, The Sacred Gift of Life: Orthodox Christianity and Bioethics (Crestwood, New York: St 
Vladimir's Seminary Press, 1998), 231. 
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Diskus, 4 ( 1) ( 1996), http://www.uni-marburg.de/religionswissenschaft/joumaUdiskus/badham.htrnl (26 
April 2004), Abstract [hereafter abbreviated SACE]. 
129 FCB, 327. See also footnote 60 of Chapter 6, 347. 
130 Ibid, 330. 
52 
martyrdom. I reproduce here the whole story of Fr Augustinus, as it appears to be both 
summative and closest to the reader in time. 
[Augustinus was called Antonius until he was clothed.] As he told me [i.e. 
Alexander Golitzin131 ], he was at a monastery that was almost entirely 
composed of old men and they despatched him to serve as an aide for an 
employee of the monastery in the fishery, for the monastery was supported by 
the fishery. One day, the daughter of the employee came and told her father that 
there was an urgent task at home, so she sat in his place to help [the novice]. 
Temptation overcame the poor woman and without thinking she threw herself on 
the novice with sinful intentions. At that moment, Antonius lost control because 
the event happened so suddenly. He made the sign of the Cross and said, "My 
Christ, it is better to drown than to sin" and flung himself from the shore into the 
deep river! But the good God, viewing the great heroism of the holy youth, who 
acted like a new St Martinianos in order to preserve his virtue, held his head up 
above the water without even getting wet. As he told me, "Although I flung 
myself headfirst, I did not understand how I found myself standing above the 
water without even getting my clothes wet!" 
At that moment, he also felt an internal peace and an inexpressible sweetness, 
which made every sinful thought and every carnal urge disappear, which had 
been provoked beforehand by the impious gestures of the girl. When the girl saw 
Antonius standing upright, she began to weep in repentance because of her sin 
and also because she was moved by the great miracle itself. 132 
Let me justify this prolonged quotation by pointing out a certain dangerous tendency it 
might provoke. What Engelhardt apparently tries to underline is that proper 
understanding is essential to avoid mistaken suicidal judgements. Clear enough as the 
distinction might be between suicide and readiness for martyrdom, namely to be 
prepared to confess one's faith up to the point of dying for it, the difference is not as 
obvious in the case of preserving chastity as Engelhardt presents it. There is the 
possibility that the justification he gives might be taken too far through an assumption 
that as long as one entrusts oneself to God and makes the sign of the cross it is not sinful 
to choose death. Besides, there would surely be other ways to reject the sinful 
temptation in a situation similar to the one in which St Augustinus found himself. To 
get the message of this story right one has to look at it from a slightly different angle, 
which Engelhardt is well aware of when he says that traditional Christian bioethics is 
not legalistic but therapeutic in its nature. The way St Augustinus acted is not 
determined by the circumstances he found himself in but rather by what kind of person 
he was at the time when these circumstances occurred. Had he been older and wiser, 
had he already acquired the spiritual experience necessary to resist the temptation in less 
radical ways, he would have no doubt used it. But he was only a novice and the decision 
131 For the source of original quotation see: ibid, footnote 68 of Chapter 6, 34 7. 
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he took was due to the unexpected pressure, when the only thing he could have known 
for sure was that he did not want to sin. Hence what he did was in a way a plea for 
God's help. It was as if he had said: 'My Christ, this is the only way I see of escaping 
from the spiritual threat that I am now facing, see me through this'. And he was heard. 
The story is not as much about what St Augustinus did or did not do as it is about who 
St Augustinus was. It does not tell us what to do but what to be. 
There are certainly cases where some safeguard is needed m order to tell 
whether one is turning oneself 'first and foremost ascetically to God' or acting to the 
contrary. Engelhardt seems to be aware of this slippery slope when he cautiously 
remarks that 'the boundaries of what is allowable will at times be unclear and will 
require spiritual discernment' .133 This brings us to the question of moral authority and 
the way it is seen and exercised in traditional Christianity. According to Engelhardt, this 
authority belongs to the spiritual father. I would add also that an original safeguard is to 
be found in Jesus' answer to the tempter: 'Thou shalt not tempt the Lord thy God' (Mt. 
4.7). 
Not to underestimate the definition Engelhardt gives, but rather to enforce it, I 
would suggest that the distinction with regard to death will be between placing all hope 
first and foremost in oneself or others or abandoning all hope whatsoever, versus always 
having hope in God, even if hope in oneself or others fails. The former disposition is 
most likely to lead to death by suicide, the latter will lead to a good Christian death. In 
these terms the suicide of Judas Iscariot is often interpreted as a result of the sin of 
despair, which is losing hope in God. 
e) Against Medical Idolatry 
Having established firmly that 'traditional Christianity is fundamentally opposed 
to physician-assisted suicide and euthanasia' 134 in a form they have taken within a 
liberal cosmopolitan ethos, one is still left with a puzzle regarding Engelhardt's 
unconditional demand that spiritually harmful medical interventions should be 
withdrawn or withheld. This kind of imperative could be very much welcomed by the 
proponents of the culture Engelhardt so explicitly distances himself from. It will be 
133 FCB, 330. 
134 Ibid, 331. 
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inevitably defined as passive euthanasia and may lead to, as James Rachels has shown, 
formation of 'a moral doctrine that may well be indefensible'. 135 
To restore the consistency of the argument one has to return to the basis of 
traditional moral decision-making. As has been indicated earlier, the grounds taken for 
certain allowances or prohibitions are rooted in the pursuit of the Kingdom of Heaven 
and primarily focused on balancing spiritual costs and avoiding spiritual threats rather 
than in the values of autonomy and self-determination. Hence euthanasia, active and 
passive alike, physician-assisted suicide or any other form of 'death with dignity' in 
secular liberal terms would be alien to traditional Christian bioethics. As Engelhardt 
suggests, terminology should be sorted out. Describing sins in terms that usually 
identify virtues is the worst case scenario. 136 It has to do with the good intentions with 
which the road to hell is paved. 
Traditional Christianity sets its face against medical idolatry. Neither physician 
nor the art of medical science as a whole should take the place of God in our lives. In 
Engelhardt's words, nowadays 'few individuals will sell all that they have to pursue 
eternal salvation, while many will sell all they have to secure a few more years of 
life' .137 Given the promise of resurrection, this earthly life is not all one has. Therefore 
physical or even psychological health is not the prime target to aim at. The target is 
spiritual health or holiness. Amongst other things asceticism implies resistance to 
overwhelming goals and projects in this life. St Basil the Great warns against 'whatever 
requires an undue amount of thought or trouble or involves a large expenditure of effort 
and causes our whole life to revolve, as it were, around solicitude for the flesh'. 138 To 
draw on this warning, any kind of medical treatment that falls under the qualification 
given is eligible for withholding or withdrawing. One has to keep in mind that 
'paradoxically, the technological imperative to use all available resources to save life 
can lead to the temptation to take life' .139 The paradox applies both to extraordinary and 
ordinary means. Engelhardt acknowledges that in some cases even eating may become 
burdensome for a particular patient. In consequence, it is often more significant how 
something is done medically rather than what is or is not done. Neither action nor 
omission should proximately lead to death independently of the disease process. In 
omissions, for example, one should act with the right intention of avoiding spiritual 
135 James Rachels, 'Active and Passive Euthanasia' in Tom L. Beauchamp and Terry P. Pinkard (eds.), 
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injury, not bringing about an earlier demise. However, Engelhardt takes this argument 
further in admitting the difficulty in drawing a clear-cut line. Withholding or 
withdrawing treatment and pain relief may in some instances and in some sense be the 
cause of death as much as any of the pathological processes. To facilitate clarification, 
Engelhardt engages a distinction developed in the classical account of causation in the 
law by Hart and Honore. 140 He emphasizes that the difference is somewhat like the one 
of secular or non-traditional bioethics between intentionally causing death and allowing 
to die. However, 'the traditional Christian approach does not fully fit within this 
classification: it focuses primarily (albeit not exclusively) on intention and the 
avoidance of proximate causal involvement in the death of a human' .141 The latter 
condition appears quite puzzling until explained in more detail. As an illustration, 
Engelhardt argues, inter alia, the incompatibility of being a priest and being a surgeon. 
This obviously echoes the statement that even killing the guilty or involuntary killing 
can harm our souls and thus requires spiritual therapy. The following grounds are given: 
Also, out of appreciation for the holiness of the altar, priests should generally 
avoid involvement in surgery as a profession, not just because of its bloody 
character, but because of the risk of being proximately causally involved in the 
death of a patient. It is not appropriate for the one who presides over the 
bloodless sacrifice of the Eucharist to have bloody hands. 142 
Let me point out that presenting this statement without a comment, Engelhardt runs the 
danger of rendering inappropriate the whole life of a contemporary Russian saint, 
Archbishop Luka (Valentin Voino-Yasenetsky), one of the best surgeons of the 
twentieth century, whose Studies in Purulent Surgery won a Stalin Prize, First Class, in 
1946 and is still among the essentials in surgery. 143 The existence of contradictions such 
as this may seem to make Engelhardt guilty of being 'too ready simply to report what 
the early Fathers taught without exploring the inner rationale of their teaching' .144 Or, to 
be more precise, being guilty of generalizing a particular experience, turning it into 
something legalistic, which he himself strictly opposes. Nevertheless, the remedy for 
140 Ibid, 319-320. See also footnote 41 of Chapter 6, 345. Cf H. L. A. Hart and Tony Honore , Causation 
in the Law, second edition (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1985). 
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this is not the conclusion, which Gilbert Meilaender145 reaches too easily, that the 
Fathers were simply mistaken and Engelhardt carries their mistakes on. 
Let me reverse methodologically the pattern I used in discussing the abstract 
from the life of St Augustinus. There I attempted to present Engelhardt's example in a 
way that would avoid deriving a general statement from a particular experience. The 
assumption about the incompatibility of being a priest and a practising surgeon needs to 
be accompanied by a particular experience to sound less imperative and less general. 
Here is a dream that Archbishop Luka had, described in his autobiography: 
The altar in a small empty church is lit up. Next to the altar there is a tomb of a 
saint against the wall with a heavy wooden cover on it. A naked corpse lies on a 
wide piece of wood upon the communion table. Medical students and doctors 
are gathered round, smoking and listening to my lecture on dissection. All of a 
sudden a heavy bang makes me shiver and tum around. The cover has fallen off 
the tomb and the saint is sitting up and looking at me with a silent reproach. [my 
translation] 146 
This dream is very interesting as it shows that St Luka was aware of the possible 
'inappropriateness' suggested by Engelhardt. Partially it was due to the respect the 
church has traditionally paid to the body of a dead person, which dissection seems to 
withdraw in a certain sense. Partially the dream might have reflected the guilt that the 
surgeon had for the deaths of some of his patients during operations. One of his 
assistants wrote later that for Dr Y asenetsky each death was a personal tragedy deeply 
felt. He was obviously struggling to reconcile his spiritual vocation and professional 
commitment. And he repented for the inevitable 'proximate causal involvement' in 
death, which the latter presupposed. St Luka, like St Augustinus, prayed that whatever 
he was doing in attending both to souls and bodies might be put right by God. 
Reconciliation was granted when once during his prayers he heard: 'This do not 
confess.' 147 It is, again, first and foremost a story of being. 
The beauty of the spiritual heritage in traditional Christianity lies in its richness, 
which is not a set of contradictory imperatives as it may seem if approached 
legalistically, but a mutually fulfilling experience of particular persons passed down to 
us through generations. Consequently, the much misunderstood concept of moral 
authority in traditional Christianity (or in present-day Orthodoxy, for that matter) is not 
substantially about imposing an absolute vision of what is morally right or wrong per 
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se, but rather about the ability to 'discern the spirits'. In this framework, the role of the 
spiritual father is not so much in assigning penitence, but in 'feeling the way' to 
holiness for a particular person here and now. 
IV. Conclusion 
Deeply rooted Christian disapproval of taking a person's life has been 
challenged in the second half of the twentieth century by the unbelievable technological 
progress in medicine. It took quite an effort for theologians to produce a viable anti-
euthanasia argument. In the rise of bioethics as such and particularly Christian bioethics 
in the 1960s an attempt to draw a clear distinction between 'euthanasiac acts' and 'a 
good death' unfortunately failed. Even Paul Ramsey's highly inquisitive and at times 
over-sophisticated concept ended up being caught in an acknowledgment of exceptional 
cases for an active termination of one's life. Other Christian writings on the subject 
turned out to be even more vulnerable to criticism. Neither love for the neighbour nor 
the sacredness of human life nor the divine giftedness of it could have provided a secure 
foundation to condemn the administration of a lethal injection, let alone the passive 
forms of terminating the patients' lives. Christian bioethics started to lose its face and 
began to be equated with a secular one. Indeed, the confidence that Paul Ramsey once 
had about the in-built Christianity of medical ethics, has later led some Christian 
theologians not only to believe that it is 'entirely legitimate for a Christian to look at 
these moral problems through the same eyes as the secular moralist', but even to argue 
that 'Christians ought to feel uneasy in any situation where their moral values differ 
from those of a caring, thoughtful and well-informed atheist' .148 This worrisome 
tendency was captured by Stanley Hauerwas, who has powerfully turned theological-
ethical discourse from theoretical casuistry to practical wisdom. Rather than trying to 
advance the precision of definitions or to give exhaustive guidance on moral matters he 
urged Christians to remember how to live as such. Hauerwas' work increasingly showed 
that the ambiguity of Christian bioethics largely stemmed from the fact that it was 
desperately trying to address the wrong issues. As Christians we should not seek to 
explain or eliminate all evil and suffering, but to learn how to respond to it in a 
Christian way: to live it out rather than cast it out. Instead of joining in the competition 
of theodicies, Hauerwas invited both moral theologians and bioethicists to bring out the 
Christians in themselves more distinctively, i.e. to explore how to be with suffering and 
148 SACE. 
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evil rather than what to do with them. Paraphrasing Michael J. Buckley, it suddenly 
dawned on the academic world of moral theology, with much help from Hauerwas, that 
the problem with evil is that it is not a problem. 149 A revelation of this sort, I reckon, 
was timely indeed, given the growth of different evils in modem society accompanied 
by much spiritual decline. It was a great contribution, taking Christian bioethics a huge 
stride forward in its development by bringing back what used to be a living tradition in 
the past. From being a purely intellectual enterprise this fairly new branch of moral 
theology acquired the stance of spiritual challenge. This challenge is further reinforced 
by Hugo Tristram Engelhardt Jr. h1 the Foundations of Christian Bioethics he managed 
to find a new cornerstone to build upon. Holiness as the ultimate vocation of every 
human being is so profound and at the same time so much forgotten that it comes as a 
new breath into the lungs of bioethical discourse. Unlike the idea of covenant, it is 
open-ended all through this earthly life, less exposed to misinterpretations than the idea 
of love, and much broader than the notion of gift. However, as has already been pointed 
out, while Engelhardt succeeds in strengthening the Christian rejection of active 
euthanasia, some of the guidelines he sets out can look peculiarly similar to what would 
be often called passive euthanasia. This creates an unpleasant ambiguity, which renders 
the whole framework wanting. The main reason for this, in my view, is that the 
therapeutic approach to bioethical issues is not and will hardly ever be completely 
susceptible to any definitions, even if they are presented as 'spiritual dimensions in 
medical decision-making'. The ethics of asceticism cannot be truly fulfilled as an 
academic framework, only as a way of life. 
149 Michael J. Buckley, S.J., At the Origins of Modern Atheism (New Haven: Yale University Press, 
1987), 13. 
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CHAPTER III 
A RUSSIAN ORTHODOX APPROACH TO EUTHANASIA: 
TOWARDS A CLEARER PERSPECTIVE 
I. Introduction 
In the second chapter of my dissertation I attempted to show how Western 
Christian bioethics has been transformed in the course of its development over a period 
of approximately thirty years, starting with the works of Paul Ramsey and currently 
reoriented by Tristram Engelhardt. With the idea of holiness as the ultimate aim of 
human existence Engelhardt performs a breakthrough, eliminating for Christian 
bioethics the danger of either conscious or unconscious advocacy for active euthanasia. 
The problem though is that he goes further and in a vigorous attempt to dismiss the 
understanding of medicine as a purpose in itself or regarding it as an idol seems to lose 
the thin balance and lapse into justifying a kind of passive euthanasia in the form of 
withholding or withdrawing 'spiritually burdensome' treatments. Having set its face 
against active euthanasia, Christian bioethics should search for ways of explaining how 
one is supposed to tell a really good Christian death from passive euthanasia. This 
painful dilemma, which sometimes leads to describing the problem as admitting of no 
solution, is exposed more than anywhere else in Russian law and practice. The current 
state of affairs in Russian society in general and in medicine and law in particular with 
regard to the question of euthanasia is paradoxical. While Russia has a law that 
explicitly prohibits euthanasia, public opinion polls recently reveal an astonishingly 
high percentage of proponents. 150 Moreover, according to an unspoken presumption, a 
passive form of this procedure is currently practised by Russian doctors. 151 This kind of 
collision appears to have two major reasons: progressing secularisation and a very low 
level of legal knowledge in the society. 
Naturally, in a country with over a millennium's history of Orthodox tradition, 
the church is bound to respond to this overwhelming contemporary concern. The 
Church-Public Council on Bioethics Under the Moscow Patriarchate was established in 
150 According to a poll conducted by RPOMR (POMI1P: PoccMHCKoe 06mecTBeHHoe MHeHMe 11 
l1ccJie.li.OBaHMe phiHKa!Russian Public Opinion & Market Research) in 2000, 20. 4 % of the participants 
consider euthanasia to be justified in the majority of cases and 18. 7 %believe it to be justified always, 
http://vv·\vw.mls.ru/analytdoc!romopr 135.html ( 12 May 2002). 
151 MaprapMTa JleoHM.li.OBa, 'CMepTh rro-.ll.o6poMy MJIM rro-6o)l(eCKM', HeBcKoe BpeMR N2 66 (2526), 11 
arrpeJUI 2001 r./Margarita Leonidova, 'A Good Death or a Godly Death', Nevskoe Vremya, No. 66 (2526), 
11 April 2001 http://v.rww.nvrem.dnx.ru!200 1/arts/nevrem-2526-art-13.html (12 May 2002). 
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1998 with a membership including clergy and lay people: doctors, lawyers, and 
philosophers. Its research materials and prepared documents were actively consulted 
during the work on the Foundations of the Social Concept of the Russian Orthodox 
Church at the Jubilee Bishops' Council ofthe Russian Orthodox Church 13-16 August 
2000. 
On the academic side, Irina Siluyanova pioneered in systematizing bioethical 
knowledge in the light of Orthodox Christianity in her now well-known books Ethics of 
Cure: Modern Medicine and Orthodoxy and Person and Illness. She has a doctorate in 
philosophy and is currently the head of Bioethics Department at the Russian State 
Medical University. Since the Foundations of the Social Concept were adopted between 
the two editions of Ethics of Cure and the author is a Vice-Chairperson of the Church-
Public Council, Siluyanova in a certain way represents Russian Christian bioethics 'in 
development'. 
I shall present the full text of the Statement of the Church-Public Council on 
Bioethics under Moscow Patriarchate Concerning Current Tendencies to Legalize 
Euthanasia in Russia and the section of the Foundations of the Social Concept of the 
Russian Orthodox Church, which relates to the problem. I shall then move on to explore 
the writings of Siluyanova in the light of these two documents and conclude by drawing 
some parallels with Engelhardt's account that was discussed in the second chapter. 
II. Adopting Western Practice: Peculiarities of Russian Health care 
Undertakings which the Western world has pioneered are eagerly repeated in the 
East. Medicine is no exception. Informed consent and the value of autonomy are now as 
much Russian realities. Being taken and transferred as they are, these concepts adjust 
themselves often in the most unexpected and even skewed manner. Immersed into a 
different culture, often artificially placed right on the ruins of the previous alien 
structures they sometimes reveal a dark side. 
The former Soviet healthcare system had two major characteristics that were 
officially approved and legally recognized, namely providing the right of every Soviet 
citizen to free medical services and the absolute duty of every Soviet doctor to always 
preserve health and save life. As a result, under the Soviet system even the idea of 
discussing euthanasia simply could not have been possible. Apart from the imperative 
and an absolute aim to preserve life, the pattern of a doctor-patient relationship that was 
adopted, automatically excluded any open conversations on the matter. One of the major 
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traits of the Soviet totalitarian paternalism was the concept of the 'sacred lie': 'In our 
medicine in general and in Soviet medicine in particular this question - whether to 
inform the patient about the likely death- has always had and still has [italics added] a 
negative answer' .152 And this negative attitude, as the quotation shows, exists in spite of 
the Article 31 of the Foundations ofthe Healthcare Law ofthe Russian Federation that 
states the right of the patient to know the diagnosis and prognosis of their illness and to 
have access to their medical history. 153 Unfortunately, the majority of doctors and 
practically all the patients 'have no idea about the Foundations '. 154 
Nevertheless, new biomedical technologies and the change in mentality of the 
former Soviet people caused by Western influence, forced the medical profession to 
deal with problems they would have never come across within the old set up. Many 
among the older generation of doctors still struggle to solve them in general as well as 
at a personal level. Something that can be described as 'half-truth' or 'version' has 
taken the place of the former 'sacred lie'. It is believed now that 'the doctor-patient 
relationship should not have a fixed standard, neither a blunt truth-telling nor total 
disinformation is justified' .155 Slowly the Russian healthcare profession moves towards 
answering the question of 'how to tell' rather than 'what to tell'. However, the bias is 
still, by and large, towards the doctor's decision, not the patient's. And many 'old 
school' specialists would be 'quite happy that nobody is aware of the existence of this 
law.' 156 In other words, if one does not insist on having the information, the chances are 
one would receive none. 
Another sign of the emergence of a new mentality is represented by two articles 
that incorporate the concept of informed consent. 
Article 32 in Section XI says that 'informed voluntary consent of a person is the 
necessary pre-condition of a medical intervention' .157 This confirms the freedom of 
every individual with regard to starting the treatment and choosing its form. Another 
matter is that the theory is corrupted by the absence of choice in practice. The strongest 
152 n. A. fleliiJIHCKHH,).7eoHmOJI02llR6 mepaneBmutteCKOU npaKmUKe (MocKBa: MeJJ,HUHHa, 1989 r.)/L.A. 
Leshinskij, Deontology in the Therapeutic Practice (Moscow: Medicine, 1989), 99. 
153 OcHOBbl 3aKOHOI)ameJibCmBa PoccuucKou (/JeiJepa!JUU o6 oxpaHe 30opoBbR zpa:>~cOaH (MocKBa: fpaHT, 
2000r.)/Foundations of the Healthcare Law of the Russian Federation (Moscow: Grant, 2000), 25 
[hereafter abbreviated FHL]. 
154 BarrepHH lJ.HCOB H Co!lJb.!! )J;apb.!!nOBa (MOCKOBCKHH OHKOnOrHLfeCKHH HHCTHT)'T HM. Il.A. repueHa 
MHHHCTepcTBa JJJ,pasooxpaHeHIDI P<l>), 'Tipo6neMa spaLfe6Hoi1 TaHHbi B OHKonomH', MeiJu!fUHCKGR 
zmema, N2 68, 12 ceHT.!!6pn 2001 r./ Valerij Chisov and Sophia Daryalova (Moscow Research Institute of 
Oncology named after P.A. Hertzen, Ministry of Health of the Russian Federation), 'Problems of Truth-
Telling in Oncology', Meditzinskaya gazeta, N2 68, 12 September 2001, http://medgazeta.rusmedscrv. 
com/ (12 May 2002) [hereafter abbreviated PTTO]. 
155 Ibid. 
156 PTTO. 
157 FHL, 26. 
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monopoly is held in oncology and brain surgery. Having only one special neurosurgical 
hospital and two institutions specializing in oncology, all of them ridiculously corrupt 
due to the general disastrous situation in healthcare and high demand for their services, 
one can hardly enjoy the right secured by the law. 
Article 33 in the same section states a person's right 'to withhold or to withdraw 
medical intervention' .158 Following Western practice, according to this article doctors 
are under an obligation to inform the patient about the possible consequences and 
ensure that the patient's decision is properly documented and signed. The decision can 
be taken not only by the patient himself but also by his 'legal representative'. The whole 
idea of a legal right of a patient to refuse treatment was so alien to the principles of 
Soviet medicine that Russian doctors still find it difficult to accept. 'How can a doctor 
accept a patient's refusal of the treatment that would save his life?' asks Professor 
Sophia Daryalova. 159 Despite all the sympathy post-Soviet society has to the values of 
human rights, and much eagerness in copying Western schemes, the older generation in 
the medical profession would still strongly object to any kind of 'stepping back' in the 
fight for health and life. Within the Soviet healthcare system there was an unspoken 
presumption that the only victory is a life saved by all means and at all costs available. 
Any failure was automatically condemned. This has probably been one of the reasons 
for the Association of Russian Doctors declaring passive euthanasia unacceptable. 160 It 
must be said though that younger doctors are much less sensitive in that respect and the 
majority of medical students do not have any objections to euthanasia. 49% of the 
doctors aged between 21 and 30 answered the question 'Do you consider euthanasia 
permissible?' answered either 'Yes, if that is the patient's wish', or 'In special 
circumstances'. 161 
Here one must remember that in Russia there is a great deal of confusion about 
what should be understood by euthanasia. And this is to be expected when the law 
contradicts itself. Article 45, Section VIII reads: 
158 FHL, 26. 
159 PTTO. 
160 HpHHa CHJiyHHOBa, 3muKa Bpa'leBaHUR: coBpeMeHHaJl MeOUlfUHa u npaBOCJiaBue (MocKsa: 
l13.LJ.aTeJ1hCTBO MoCKOBCKOfO llO.LI.BOpbH CBHTO-TpoHLJ,KOH CeprHeBOH naspbl, H3.LJ., 2-oe, 2001r.)/Irina v. 
Siluyanova, Ethics of Cure: Modern Medicine and Orthodoxy (Moscow: Publishing House of Troitze-
Sergieva Lavra, 2"d ed. 2001), 41 [hereafter abbreviated EC]. 
161 C. B. EbiKOBa, E. r. IO.n.HH, n. B. JlcHaH, '3BTaHa3HH: MHeHHH Bpaqetf': IO.LJ.HH E. r. (pe.n..), 
Euo::JmuKa: npuHl{Unbz, npaBUJia, npo6JieMbl (MocKsa: 3.LJ.HTOpHan YPCC, 1998r.)/ S.V. Bykova, B.G. 
Yudin and L.V. Yasnaya, 'Euthanasia as Seen by Doctors' in Yudin B.G. (ed.), Bioethics: Rules, 
Principles and Problems (Moscow: Editorial URSS, 1998), 367 [hereafter abbreviated BRPP]. 
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It is prohibited for the staff of medical institutions to perform euthanasia, i.e. to 
follow the patient's request to quicken his death by carrying out any acts or 
employing any means, including stopping artificial life-sustaining procedures. 162 
With a virtually non-existent bioethical theory the reality of everyday practice is in 
danger of going beyond the moral boundaries. Therefore, the articles of the Healthcare 
Law were so to speak not 'putting the cart before the horse', but appeared as an attempt 
to respond to the already existing practices and tendencies. Nevertheless, with a 
situation where euthanasia in one or another instance is approved by almost half of the 
younger generation of doctors (21-30 years old) 163 and 39. 1% of the population in 
general, 164 in spite of being officially illegal, ways other than just a legal prohibition 
need to be found to ensure high moral standards and appropriate ethical decisions. 
However strong is the conviction of the Minister of Health of the Russian Federation 
Yurij Shevchenko that 'a law similar to the one adopted in the Netherlands will never 
exist in Russia, because our society, tradition and culture would never allow that', 165 
more than these notions is needed to secure such confidence. Our culture is becoming 
more and more secular, seventy-odd years of communism have forced tradition to 
retreat to geographically and intellectually remote parts of our society which has already 
started to live by the same liberal values of freedom, equality and personal autonomy of 
which the Dutch are so proud. Therefore it is extremely interesting to hear Shevchenko 
saying that euthanasia 'is a grave sin and we cannot allow it to happen' .166 Fortunately, 
statements like this open the door for Christian bioethics into the public discourse. If the 
Minister of Health operates with a notion of sin, there is a need for an explanation why 
he would regard euthanasia as such and what are the ways for it not to happen in Russia. 
Here is one such explanation. 
III. The Rise of Christian Bioethics in Russia 
1. Statement of the Church-Public Council on Bioethics under the Moscow 
Patriarchate Concerning Current Tendencies in Euthanasia Legislation in Russia167 
The problem of euthanasia has emerged in our society out of "ideological 
pluralism", which presupposes the co-existence of different value systems, 
162 FHL, 33. 
163 BRPP, 367. 
164 Percentage added up in the RPOMR public opinion poll. 
165 
'WeB'IeHKO npoTHB 3BTaH<l3HH', l13eecmWl, 11 anpenll 2001 r./ 'Shevchenko Against Euthanasia', 
lzvestiya, 11 April 2001, http:/ /news.km.ru/news/view.asp'?id=21 B93615DDO 1407 A84 7 AD2 F3AB54 
B 18A [hereafter abbreviated SAE]. 
166 SAE. 
167 My translation. 
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including the one allowing killing and "a right to die". Proponents of euthanasia 
are convinced that this "right" should be embodied in law and provisions should 
be made for it to be exercised, using the resources of contemporary 
pharmacology and the healthcare system. 
On this matter the Church-Public Council on Bioethics under the Moscow 
Patriarchate considers it necessary to make the following statement. 
Acknowledging the value of life of each person created in the image and 
likeness of God, autonomy and dignity as unique personal characteristics, 
Orthodox clergy, academicians and doctors disapprove of any attempts to 
legalize euthanasia which, as an act of intentional taking of life of terminal 
patients, is a specific form of murder (when it is a doctor's or family's decision), 
suicide (when carried out upon the patient's request), or a combination ofboth. 
The Council is against euthanasia in any form on the ground that its practice will 
inevitably lead to: 
a) medicine acquiring a criminal character and the healthcare system losing its 
credibility; 
b) violation of the sanctity of life; 
c) perverting the meaning of the medical profession and undermining the 
dignity of the doctor; 
d) slowing down in the development of medical knowledge: resuscitation 
techniques, pain-relief, remedies for presently incurable illnesses, etc.; 
e) increasing cynicism, nihilism and moral decline in society in general as a 
result of forgoing the commandment 'do not kill'. 
A qualified doctor should know that a plea to accelerate death may come out of 
depression, which distorts the perception of reality. It is also important to bear in 
mind that freedom of choice and a right to change one's decisions is intrinsic to 
human nature. 
Drawing on all of the above, the Council regards euthanasia as morally 
unacceptable and firmly objects to its legislation, which will integrate into the 
public conscience the possibility of a medical murder or suicide. 
2. Foundations ofthe Social Concept of the Russian Orthodox Church 168 
Xll. Problems ofbioethics 
XII. 1. The rapid development of biomedical technologies, which have invaded 
the life of modem man from birth to death, and the impossibility of responding 
to the ensuing ethical challenges within traditional medical ethics have caused 
serious concern in society. The attempts of human beings to put themselves in 
the place of God by changing and «improving» His creation at their will may 
bring to humanity new burdens and suffering. The development of biomedical 
technologies has outstripped by far the awareness of possible spiritual-moral and 
social consequences of their uncontrolled application. This cannot but cause a 
profound pastoral concern in the Church. In formulating her attitude to the 
problems of bioethics so widely debated in the world today, especially those 
involved in the direct impact on the human being, the Church proceeds from the 
ideas of life based on the Divine Revelation. It asserts life as a precious gift of 
God. It also asserts the inalienable freedom and God-like dignity of man called 
168 The translation is taken from the official website of the Russian Orthodox Church at: 
http://www.russian-orthodox-church.org..ru/sdOOe.htm (9 May 2002) [hereafter abbreviated FSC]. I have 
substituted here the word 'Foundations' for 'Bases'. 
65 
to be <<the prize of the high calling of God in Jesus Christ» (Phil. 3:14), to be as 
perfect as the Heavenly Father (Mt. 5:48) and to be deified, that is, to become 
partaker in the Divine nature (2 Pet. 1 :4). 
XII. 8. The practice of the removal of human organs suitable for transplantation 
and the development of intensive care therapy has posed the problem of the 
verification of the moment of death. Earlier the criterion for it was the 
irreversible cessation of breathing and blood circulation. Thanks to the 
improvement of intensive care technologies, however, these vital functions can 
be artificially supported for a long time. Death is thus turned into dying 
dependent on the doctor's decision, which places a qualitatively new 
responsibility on contemporary medicine. 
Holy Scriptures treat death as the separation of the soul from the body (Ps. 
146:4; Lk. 12:20). Thus it is possible to speak about a continuing life as long as 
an organism functions as a whole. The prolongation of life by artificial means, in 
which in fact only some organs continue to function, cannot be viewed as 
obligatory and in any case desirable task of medicine. Attempts to delay death 
will sometimes prolong a patient's agony, thus depriving him of the right to 
«honourable and peaceful» death, 169 for which the Orthodox Christian solicits 
the Lord during the Liturgy. When intensive care becomes impossible, its place 
should be taken by palliative aid (anaesthetisation, nursing and social and 
psychological support) and pastoral care. All this is aimed to ensure the true 
humane end of life couched in mercy and love. 
The Orthodox understanding of an honourable death includes preparation for the 
mortal end, which is considered to be a spiritually significant stage in the life of 
a person. A patient surrounded with Christian care can experience in the last 
days of his life on earth a grace-giving change brought about by a new reflection 
on his journey and penitent anticipation of eternity. For the relatives of a dying 
man and for medical workers, an opportunity to nurse him becomes an 
opportunity to serve the Lord Himself. For according to the Saviour's word, 
«inasmuch as ye have done it unto one of the least of these my brethren, ye have 
done it to me» (Mt. 25:40). The attempt to conceal from a patient the 
information about the gravity of his condition under the pretext of preserving his 
spiritual comfort often deprives a dying person of an opportunity to be 
consciously prepared for death and to find spiritual consolation in participation 
in the Sacraments of the Church. It also darkens his relations with relatives and 
doctors with distrust. 
Death throes cannot be always effectively alleviated with anaesthetics. Aware of 
this, the Church in these cases turns to God with the prayer: «Give Thy servant 
dispensation from this unendurable suffering and its bitter infirmities and give 
him consolation, 0 Soul of the righteous» (Service Book. Prayer for the Long 
Suffering). The Lord alone is the Master of life and death (1 Sam. 2:6). «h1 his 
hand is the soul of every living thing, and the breath of all mankind» (Job 
12:10). Therefore, the Church, while remaining faithful to God's commandment 
<<thou shalt not kill» (Ex. 20:13), cannot recognise as morally acceptable the 
widely-spread attempts to legalise the so-called euthanasia, that is, the deliberate 
destruction of hopelessly ill patients (also by their own will). The request of a 
patient to speed up his death is sometimes conditioned by depression preventing 
him from assessing his condition correctly. Legalised euthanasia would lead to 
the devaluation of the dignity and the corruption of the professional duty of the 
169 A more accurate translation of the full phrase is: 'A Christian end to our life, painless, unashamed and 
peaceful, ... let us ask'. 
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doctor called to preserve rather than end life. «The right to death» can easily 
become a threat to the life of patients whose treatment is hampered by lack of 
funds. 
Therefore, euthanasia is a form of homicide or suicide, depending on whether a 
patient participates in it or not. If he does, euthanasia comes under the canons 
whereby both the deliberate suicide and assistance in it are viewed as a grave 
sin. A perpetrator of calculated suicide, who «did it out of human resentment or 
other incident of faintheartedness» shall not be granted Christian burial or 
liturgical commemoration (Timothy of Alexandria, Canon 14). If a suicide is 
committed «out of mind», that is, in a fit of a mental disease, the church prayer 
for the perpetrator is allowed after the case is investigated by the ruling bishop. 
At the same time, it should be remembered that more often than not the blame 
for a suicide lies also with the people around the perpetrator who proved 
incapable of effective compassion and mercy. Together with St. Paul the Church 
calls us: <<Bear one another's burdens, and so fulfil the law of Christ» (Gal. 6:2). 
3. An Unfolding Parachute: The Works of Irina Siluyanova 
Irina Siluyanova appears to be the first Russian specialist who has seriously 
studied biomedical ethics in the light of the tradition of the Orthodox Church. Whereas 
in the West, those 'who disagree with a sinful way of life have long ago won the 
opportunity to protest', 170 in Russia the voice of Christian bioethics is only starting to be 
heard. Metaphorically speaking, Siluyanova does a job of unfolding the Christian 
parachute. She tries to rediscover Orthodox Christianity for bioethics in Russia in a way 
Engelhardt attempts to do it in the West. This parachute will hopefully help slow 
society's descent down the 'slippery slope' of euthanasia. 
a) The 'Physics' and 'Metaphysics' ofDeath 
Like many of her colleagues in the West, Siluyanova approaches the problem of 
euthanasia within a Christian understanding of life and death. She starts with the 
reminder that Christianity has given people an understanding of the value of human life. 
This understanding is based on the idea that life comes 'as a gift, in communion with 
that Life which gives and sustains the life of the world.' 171 Death also has a meaning 
that transcends its physical aspect. 
170 ITpoTOH.epefi ,[(HMHTPHH (CMH.pHOB), 'floflhiTKa pacKphiTh napaiiiiOT': I1pH.Ha CIDI)'HHOBa, lfeno6eK u 
6one3flb (MocKBa: ¥13.llaTeJihCTBO CpeTeHcKoro MOHaCTbipH, H.3.ll. 2-oe, 200lr.)/Revd. Dmitrij Smimov, 
'Unfolding Parachute', Preface to Irina Siluyanova, Person and Illness (Moscow: Publishing House of 
Sretensky Monastery, znd ed. 2001), 4 [hereafter abbreviated PI]. 
171 EC, 95. 
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New medical criteria of human death - 'brain death' - and new social 
approaches to the death of an individual - 'the right to die' - are not pure 
medical issues. The "physics" of death as it is directly links with its 
"metaphysics", i.e. its moral interpretation. 172 
Religion and morality form the flesh of 'metaphysics', whereas 'physics' has to do with 
medicine. Through the centuries of human history these two co-existed within the 
boundaries of Christian civilization. In the past death was certified by the respiratory 
standstill and cardiac arrest, echoing the Christian understanding of heart activity and 
breathing as the basics of human life. Therefore the first attempts at reviving human 
beings were aimed at the renewal ofblood circulation and respiratory function. 
In the nineteenth century the stormy development of medical technologies called 
for a more precise certifying of death. Later the investigation of revival methods was 
accompanied by detailed studies of the process of dying. The Russian doctor V. 
Negovsky173 has divided it into five stages: 1) pre-agony, 2) terminal pause, 3) agony, 
4) clinical death, 5) biological death. This distinction between clinical death (the 
reversible stage of dying) and biological death (the irreversible stage) has given grounds 
for reanimatology* as a science, which studies the mechanisms of dying and revival. 
The term 'reanimatology' was introduced into scientific usage by Negovsky at the 
International Congress ofTrauma Specialists in Budapest (1961). 
Unbelievable success in resuscitation technologies in the 1960-70s would be 
ascribed by many to overcoming the traditional criteria of human death and reaching a 
new level in death certification - brain death. This breakthrough, remarks Siluyanova, 
increases the ethical tension. Do resuscitation procedures always work to the patient's 
benefit? Needless to say, in a number of cases modem resuscitation techniques allow 
the saving of a person's life, but they may as readily tum into the 'prolonging of dying'. 
Conunenting on this, Siluyanova quotes M. Heidegger, who sees 'technical' as a human 
plan in a broad sense, which eventually forces one to undertake certain actions whether 
one wishes to do so or not. In medical practice it means that modem medicine, equipped 
with resuscitation devices, can no longer refuse to apply them, thus 'converting its 
patients into victims.' 174 In this situation life support exists on the verge of prolonging 
of death, the latter 'having a technological potential of up to ten years.' Siluyanova 
alludes to Professor B. Yudin, who, speaking of patients in coma, aptly defines the 
172 EC, 225. 
173 About V. Negovsky see: Kamnor 3o!IOmaJI KHU2a Poccuu. roo 2000 (MOCKBa: ACMO-rrpecc, 
2000r.)/Catalogue The Golden Book of Russia. Year 2000 (Moscow: ASMO-press, 2000), 
http://ana !ytics.ex.ru!cgi-bin/txtnscr.pl?node=5 78&txt=463&lang=2&sh= 1 (I 0 May 2002). 
• This is a literal translation from Russian, the English equivalent is 'resuscitation teclmology'. 
174 EC, 228. 
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period between 'certainly alive' and 'certainly dead' as an 'area of uncertainty'. This 
area 
finds itself literally outside the Bible commandments. The sixth commandment 
'thou shalt not kill' (Ex. 20. 13) simply 'doesn't work' here, because in terms of 
traditional morality this is an area of inevitable killing, or of rejecting 'life 
supporting treatment.' In attempting to take moral and legal responsibilities from 
the involuntary performers of the 'area's will'- the doctors, society turns to the 
principle of euthanasia- intentional, pain-free killing of terminally ill people. 175 
b) The Last Right of the Last Illness or Death as a Stage in Life 
Current medicine has a wide range of research works on the psychology of 
terminally ill patients at its disposal. Among the most detailed and profound Siluyanova 
points out the works of Dr E. Kiibler-Ross, who together with her colleagues developed 
a concept of 'death as a stage of growth'. Schematically it could be divided into five 
stages: 1) denial ('It can't be me, it's not cancer'), 2) protest ('Why me?'), 3) request for 
delay ('Not right now, just a little later'), 4) depression ('Yes, it is me dying'), 5) 
acceptance ('Let it be'). Remarkably enough, the final stage is often characterized by 
statements similar to the following: 'I had a richer and more rewarding life for the last 
three months than ever before.' And these are the words of people who were very well 
off before their illness. Siluyanova sees this position as 'a result of realising the 
existential drama of human life, which is the unfolding of the real meaning of life and 
death only "in the face ofdeath".' 176 She shows just how close psychological studies in 
healthcare can sometimes be to the Christian attitude towards dying. 'Orthodoxy does 
not accept the principle of 'telling lies'. In the Christian perception of the world death is 
a way to eternity. Terminal illness is an utterly significant event, preparation for dying 
and coming to terms with death. It is an opportunity to repent, to reflect, to intensify 
one's spiritual labours and prayer, it is a transformation of the soul into a certain quality 
of being, which is recorded in eternity.' 177 This echoes the statement in Foundations of 
the Social Concept of the Russian Orthodox Church: 
The attempt to conceal from a patient the information about the gravity of his 
condition under the pretext of preserving his spiritual comfort often deprives a 
dying person of an opportunity to be consciously prepared for death and to find 
spiritual consolation in participation in the Sacraments of the Church. It also 
darkens his relations with relatives and doctors with distrust. 178 
175 EC, 229-230. 
176 Ibid, 250. 
177 Ibid, 251. 
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The right of a patient to his own point of view, the right of personal freedom and self-
determination are only fully exercised in conjunction with the right of the last illness. 
c) On Euthanasia 
According to Siluyanova the recent progress in medicine and the drastic change 
in values and moral priorities towards centralizing the idea of 'human rights' within 
modern civilization are the two major factors that have contributed to the spreading of 
euthanasia as a new medical method of solving the problem of suffering. 
Since 1996 surveys regularly conducted at the Russian State Medical University 
show that 80-90% of students are in favour of legalizing euthanasia and ready to 
perform it for their patients. In spring 2000 an opinion poll launched in the Moscow 
Medical Academy named after I.M. Sechenov revealed that 78.4% of its students were 
for and only 18.9% against euthanasia; the rest were unsure about their position. 179 The 
following year 256 medical students participated in a survey conducted by the 
Department of Bioethics at RSMU. Although 70.7% identify themselves as Orthodox 
believers, 39.8% agree with euthanasia and 37.7% do not. 18° Commenting on the data, 
Siluyanova sees the process of secularisation as one of the most important factors in the 
increasing percentage of euthanasia supporters. Another explanation she gives is the 
'inability of the current educational system to satisfy the students' spiritual need' 181 by 
offering adequate courses in theology, philosophy, religious and cultural studies. It is 
vitally important, for example, to be aware of the different forms of euthanasia, and 
primarily to differentiate active and passive types. The results of the surveys, one might 
add, would have been perhaps quite different had the distinction been made clear. 
Siluyanova defines active euthanasia as the 'lethal injection of a medication 
performed by a doctor.' 182 In the case ofpassive euthanasia 'medical help is stopped in 
order to quicken the natural death.' 183 Further Siluyanova describes three subdivisions: 
voluntary, non-voluntary and involuntary. The first one is performed upon request of a 
competent patient, the second can take place upon the decision of the family or trustees, 
179 PI, 93. 
180 11pHHa CHJJYHHosa, ' "KOHBEH~HJI 0 JIPABAX lfEJJOBEKA H EHOME/{H~HHE" COBETA 
EBPOJ!bl H "OCHOBbl COL(HAJJhHOft KOH~EJIL(HH" PYCCKOft JIPABOCJJABHOft ~EPKBH: 
CPABHHTEJJhHblft AHAJJH3'/Irina Siluyanova, 'Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine of the 
Council of Europe and the Foundations of the Social Concept of the Russian Orthodox Church: 
Comparative Analysis', http://www.pravoslavie.ru/jurnal/society/socdoc.html (12 May 2002) [hereafter 
abbreviated CA]. 
181 CA, http://www.pravoslavie.ru/jurnal/society/socdoc.html (12 May 2002). 
182 EC, 231. 
183 Ibid. 
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provided the patient is incompetent (i.e. incapable of making her own decisions) and, 
finally, the third one is carried out 'without the competent person's consent. ,~ 84 
The crucial arguments in favour of voluntary euthanasia (active and passive 
alike) usually presented within the modem liberal context are compassion for the 
suffering and acceptance of the right of every person to determine the time of their own 
death. Offering death as a 'treatment' of pain is a supportive medical argument. Another 
reason for voluntary euthanasia is regarded as 'altruistic': a wish of a patient not to be a 
burden to family and friends. However, comments Siluyanova, in most cases this wish 
'is determined not so much by the fact that the person does not want to continue living 
as by the fact that she must not continue, thus allowing the concern about the people 
around her to absorb the individual will to live.' 185 This commentary captures well the 
other side of an over-optimistic 'right to die with dignity.' The 'quality' or 'dignity' of 
death in the proposed meaning is to a great extent influenced by the 'quality' oflife and, 
suggests Siluyanova, is often based on an 'egoistic motivation.' 186 Defending euthanasia 
can also have serious social consequences. Social approval of euthanasia logically ends 
up in getting rid of handicapped people, especially the newborn. Siluyanova reminds 
her readers of a well-known practice in Fascist Germany, where a special 'programme 
of euthanasia' was executed in 1938-39 and of an organisation called "Euthanasia", 
which in the 1930s in America tried to change the law and legalize the killing of 
mentally defective or physically handicapped people. If in the first half of the twentieth 
century the world rejected such ideas, today, warns Siluyanova, they are evolving again. 
Mercy for those patients who are 'hopeless' and justice with respect to their relatives or 
even to society in general, including insurance companies and various state institutions, 
are the two foundation stones laid by modem apologists of euthanasia. Nevertheless, to 
operate with Christian ideas of mercy and justice does not necessarily mean to be 
Christian. Siluyanova argues that to use these ideas in justifying euthanasia is 'one of 
the signs of sheer anti-Christianity as a form of spiritual imposture' .187 The powers 
directly opposite to Christianity appropriate Christian ideas and values. What a crooked 
way of putting the two mutually excluding words together in a new term of 'mercy 
killing'! Can anybody help being tempted to accept euthanasia as a way not to become a 
burden and to exercise true care and love for one's nearest and dearest? However, 
reminds Siluyanova, such 'care' and 'love' would only be superficial, because the real 
184 EC, 232. 
185 Ibid, 233-4. 
186 Ibid. 
187 Ibid, 235. 
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'love for your nearest consists in the opportunity during the illness to take care of the 
one you love with patience and thus truly and directly to serve the Lord.d 88 Father 
George Chistyakov, a well-known Moscow priest, echoes this concern in stating that 
'the problem is not in euthanasia as such and not even in the horror of pain that the 
dying people go through, but in our abandoning them, because we think we cannot help 
them' .189 He calls us to learn not only how to think, but how to feel as Christians, that 
is, how to behave as such. 
Summarizing, Siluyanova considers the conservative position to be 'simple and 
non-ambiguous.' 190 To define it, she quotes Orthodoxy and Bioethics by S. Harakas, 
where the author evaluates intentional killing of a dying patient as a particular instance 
of murder, if performed without a patient's awareness, or as suicide, if performed with a 
patient's approval. Siluyanova emphasises the fact that the conservative position is not 
confined to the Orthodox one, but also includes the opinion of specialists, which was 
once that of a majority. The negative response to the moral and legal possibility of 
euthanasia goes back to the Hippocratic Oath, which was adopted 'against the 
background of the absolute social acceptance of suicide in the cultures of Ancient 
Greece and Ancient Rome.' 191 According to Siluyanova, doctors have their own reasons 
to support the conservative point of view. These reasons emerge from medical practice: 
the history of medicine is familiar with the cases of 'spontaneous cure' of, for 
example, cancer; 
people with various disabilities are still able to maintain a lifestyle they are 
happy with; 
the acceptance of death as a variety of medical 'treatment' will inevitably limit 
the development of medicine itself, largely stimulated by the constant 'fight 
against death'. 
IV. Conclusion 
If Paul Ramsey in the 1960s started his bioethics assuming 'that a remnant ofthe 
Christian age remains', 192 Tristram Engelhardt has flavoured his argument with the 
188 EC, 236. 
189 TipoToHepeii reoprHH 4HCTHKOB, 'YMHpaHHe HJIH 3BTaH£13ID!'/Revd. George Chistyakov, 'Dying or 
Euthanasia', http://cmf.narod.ru/pubs/euthleuth3.html ( 10 May 2002). 
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bitter taste of 'a frankly post-traditional secularity' 193through and through. Indeed, is 
Christianity no more, as Engelhardt claims? 
Siluyanova argues that what is happening to humankind in our time does not 
indicate the end of the historical existence of Christianity, but rather reiterates the 
'constantly returning' opposition of Life and Death, Christianity and Paganism. 
'Christianity has never in its history been outside this opposition. The differences were 
only in the manner, acuteness and scale of it' .194 Siluyanova has undertaken an 
extremely interesting and informative comparative analysis, which shows that the 
Foundations of the Social Concept of the Russian Orthodox Church are not only very 
close to the European Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine and other major 
international legal documents, but have something substantial to contribute. 195 
True as it may be that 'Western Christendom has become secular', 196 the 
situation in Russia has the potential to escape irredeemable secularity. Now is the time 
to work hard for the day Ramsey has hoped would dawn 'when the dominant secular 
viewpoints on morality will be extended from the church of Jesus Christ'. 197 In the 
country where the Minister of Health in order to ban euthanasia legislation uses as the 
main argument the notion of sin and appeals to tradition, where the law prohibits 'mercy 
killing' and provides for the patient to have a voice in decisions about medical 
treatments, there is a unique opportunity for Christian bioethics to integrate into the 
public morality. The Foundations of the Social Concept being in agreement with the 
state law gives more power to the Russian Orthodox Church in opposing euthanasia. On 
the other hand, while Siluyanova considers the conservative position on euthanasia to be 
simple and non-ambiguous, in reality it is still far from absolute clarity. The Statement 
of the Church-Public Council on Bioethics and Article 45 of the Foundations of the 
Healthcare Law unanimously condemn euthanasia 'in any form'. At the same time the 
Foundations of the Social Concept make it clear that 'the prolongation of life by 
artificial means, in which in fact only some organs continue to function, cannot be 
viewed as obligatory and in any case a desirable task of medicine' and thus 'attempts to 
delay death will sometimes prolong a patient's agony, thus depriving him of the right to 
"honourable and peaceful" death, for which the Orthodox Christian solicit the Lord 
during the liturgy' .198 In order for a Christian attitude to euthanasia to be viable some 
193 FCB, xiv. 
194 PI, 138. 
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guidelines are needed in judging when this deprivation begins, otherwise it runs the 
danger of condoning its passive form while setting its face against the active. These 
guidelines can be found in the framework developed by Engelhardt. In my view it can 
be that material which Orthodox Christian bioethics in Russia needs for completing the 
building on the foundation it already has. 
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CHAPTER IV 
CASE S'fUD][ES 
I. Introdluctt:ion 
No theory can be fully appreciated without its application in practice. The 
previous chapters as well as the euthanasia debate in general would hold little 
importance if left on paper. The whole purpose of academic ethical studies is, or at least 
should be, to evaluate the manner of acting in real situations of decision-making at the 
end of life. Comparison of the concepts developed by Engelhardt and Ramsey creates a 
spiritual perspective within which one can operate and the definitions and distinctions 
set out the terms of operation. This is not to say though that ethical decisions are totally 
dependent on choosing the correct framework. Moral issues do not qualify for manuals. 
The framework one uses rather stems from the kind of person one is, not the other way 
round. This simple truth seemed to gain understanding with much difficulty, even with 
Hauerwas pushing it hard, until Engelhardt confronted the academic world with his 
"traditional Christianity" explicitly distinguished from "other Christian religions". 
Much as criticism is and will continue to be addressed to the Foundations of Christian 
Bioethics for its 'fundamentalism', Engelhardt to a large extent takes the philosophy of 
Hauerwas to its logical conclusion when he writes that 'one should join a religion and 
be careful to choose the right one' .199 Taken literally it comes as an offence to those 
who fail to 'choose right', but it seems to me that a deeper implication of this phrase is 
an attempt to change the situation where 'Christian ethicists continue to leave the world 
as they found it'. 200 Metaphorically speaking, choosing a religion is precisely about 
deciding what kind of person one wants to be before engaging in action or refraining 
from it. Keeping this in mind I would like to discuss a number of cases, which have 
largely formed and recently kept the euthanasia debate high on the public agenda in the 
UK. 
Looking closely at these cases contributes to the future of bioethical discourse 
on Russian soil. Whereas in Britain controversial medical end-of-life decisions have 
been taken through the judicial system for quite a time already, in Russia such practice 
199 FB xi 
200 WW, 1.37. 
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is virtually non-existent. But it is only a matter of time. Public hearings in the courts 
similar to those of Diane Pretty and Miss B are sooner or later to be expected. And 
since, unlike in the West, there are still only a few strong bioethical voices in the 
Russian academic world, the general public will be left only with the media 
interpretation of the cases. This is a really dangerous thing to happen. Apart from the 
manipulative character of the modem vox populi, the lack of expertise mass media 
displays (whether negligently or intentionally) inevitably leads to misplaced 
judgements. As I have already stressed in the third chapter, progressive secularization 
and a high level of legal ignorance in Russian society today create numerous 
opportunities for abuse of public opinion in terms of ethics and morality. British 
euthanasia-related cases receive an almost immediate ethical, moral and legal evaluation 
from prominent scholars, professional associations and the Church. These cases, of 
course, become known in Russia, but newspaper articles and TV programmes are about 
the only sources to provide the coverage. Naturally, they come out at best as one-sided 
stories, at worst as a bad misinterpretation of facts. Therefore, Russian Christian 
bioethics badly needs not only the knowledge of Western Christian academic works on 
euthanasia, but some competent analysis of related cases, so that when the case-wave 
reaches Russia, one would know what to make of it. 
I shall start with the cases which in my view can be described as active 
euthanasia. The case of Dr Nigel Cox, one of the earlier trials of an English GP that 
stirred controversy over the issues of 'a good death', will be followed by an insight into 
the actions of the notorious Dr Harold Shipman. The latter, in my view, are among the 
best arguments against the legalization of euthanasia the world has ever encountered, 
and offer the most powerful support for John Keown's argument regarding the danger 
of the "slippery slope". The cases of Tony Bland and that of Ms B will close the section 
on the active form of euthanasia and I shall then tum to the case of Dr Leonard Arthur, 
which undoubtedly represents its passive form. The plight of Mrs Diane Pretty and the 
implications of her legal fight for the 'right to die' belong to the section on assisted 
suicide. 
In the course of case examinations I shall use the information provided by four 
main types of sources: academic, legal, medical and the media. I shall try to establish 
whether my definition developed in the first chapter can be applied to each of the cases 
and if so to further detennine the appropriate distinctions. I would like to emphasize 
here that the ultimate purpose of the analysis is not to judge the validity of particular 
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legal or medical decisions as such, since I have no expertise in those fields, but to unveil 
some of their moral and ethical implications. 
H. Active Euthanasia 
According to the definition in the first chapter euthanasia consists in medical 
staff intending the death of a patient. Therefore I consider the following four cases to 
qualify as euthanasia in general and as its active form in particular, although in various 
ways and with different distinctions. 
1. Dr Nigel Cox 
The story 
70-year-old Lillian Boyes suffered from an acute rheumatoid arthritis, was 
bedridden and had a gastric ulcer and bedsores. According to the competent body of 
medical opinion her life expectancy was low. Mrs Boyes was in much pain, which did 
not seem to have responded to the medication prescribed by the doctor. Dr Nigel Cox, a 
consultant rheumatologist in the NHS hospital in Hampshire where Mrs Boyes was 
treated gave her an intravenous injection of two ampoules of potassium chloride201 and 
she died in a few minutes. After the police investigation the Crown Prosecution Service 
took action and Dr Cox was convicted of attempted murder202 by Winchester Crown 
Court on 18 September 1992. On 17 November the same year the General Medical 
Council reprimanded the consultant but did not suspend his registration. 
Euthanasia or palliative care? 
According to the evidence given by the doctor himself 'he had administered the 
lethal injection so as to relieve Mrs Boyes of the intractable and incurable pain she was 
suffering'.203 Since pain-killers failed to perform that task, Dr Cox 'chose to relieve her 
201 EEPP, 12. 
202 As to why it was not a conviction of murder see John Harris, 'Euthanasia and the Value of Life' in 
John Keown (ed.), Euthanasia Examined: Ethical, Clinical and Legal Perspectives (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1995), 20, footnote 3 [hereafter abbreviated EE]. 
203 R. v. Cox, Medical Law Review, 1, Summer 1993, 232 [hereafter abbreviated MLR]. 
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pain by ending her life' .204 It might seem that the doctor was acting in total compliance 
with the so called doctrine of 'double effect', which is and has always been considered 
part of palliative care and thus has nothing to do with euthanasia. However, to equate 
what Dr Cox has done with palliative care is fundamentally wrong. 
The substance used for the injection is of crucial importance. It is a medical fact 
that potassium chloride 'has no curative properties and is not used to relieve pain'. 205 
Drugs such as potassium chloride or curare are poisons, not pain-killers and their 
'primary action is to cause death'. 206 Plainly speaking, the injection would not alleviate 
pain, 'but instead stop Mrs Boyes' heart'. 207 Moreover, it is agreed that 'one ampoule 
would certainly kill'. 208 Two were given. John Harris has suggested that 'had Dr Cox 
administered a lethal dose of an opiate which also possessed analgesic properties he 
would probably never have been tried for attempted murder' .209 This is a valuable 
observation, bearing in mind the two earlier trials of Drs John Bodkin Adams and David 
Moor, who administered fatal doses of diamorphine to their patients, and were both 
acquitted. The fact that they were able to walk free from a murder charge can probably 
be explained by the lack of consensus on the exact quantity of opiates to render the dose 
fatal. 210 However, it is crystal clear that this cannot in any way be applied to the case of 
Dr Cox. So much for the medical side of the problem.211 
The only option? 
Judge Ognall in directing the jury stated that '[i]t was plainly Dr Cox's duty to 
do all that was medically possible to alleviate her pain and suffering' .212 One might 
have the impression that what Dr Cox did was at least partially justified on the grounds 
that intravenous potassium chloride was indeed 'all that was medically possible' given 
the circumstances of Mrs Boyes's condition. In other words, was it not, one might 
suggest, one of these rare cases where the only way to alleviate the patient's pain and 
204 Ibid, 233. 
205 EEPP, II. 
206 Robert G. Twycross, 'A Doctor's Dilemma' in Euthanasia Booklet, Chapter 5, 
http:/h.rww.cmforg.uk!pubslbookletsieuth/dilemma. html (27 July 2002) [hereafter abbreviated EB]. 
207 BBC Panorama Case Histories: End of Life Decisions, Case 2, http://news.bbc.co.uk! 
I !hi/audiovideo/programmes/panorama/ 1971527 .shu (26 July 2002) 
208 EEPP, II. 
209 EE, 7. 
210 Medical expertise in Shipman's report. 
211 As to the legal side, there is an interesting interpretation of the principle of 'double effect' 
contradicting that of Keown in R. v. Cox, MLR, 233. Curiously enough both Keown and the author(s) of 
the commentary refer to the case R. v. Moloney. For Keown's account of this case see EEPP, pp. 27, 29 
and footnote 26 on p. 25. 
212 R. v. Cox, MLR, 233. 
78 
suffering was to kill the patient? However, even if such cases do exist, this was not the 
one. The commentary in Medical Law Review suggests that 'he could, presumably, have 
sedated Mrs Boyes without killing her'. 213 Likewise, Robert Twycross, who is one of 
the greatest authorities in palliative care in the UK, in his analysis of the case affirn1s 
that a lot more could have been done to ease Mrs Boyes's pain and suffering and gives 
an extensive medical evaluation of the possible patterns of treatment.214 He warns that 
euthanasia 'would take the medical profession and society over a dividing line, which 
however thin it may become on rare occasions, they cross at their peril. '215 
Summarizing, one has more than sufficient grounds to classify Dr Cox's actions 
as active (since it was an injection) euthanasia, and taking into consideration that Mrs 
Boyes 'repeatedly begged him to kill her', 216 the applicable distinction is 'voluntary'. 
2. Dr Harold Shipman 
Let not this name take the reader aback as ridiculously inappropriate to be 
included in the case studies on euthanasia. It seems to be a common agreement that the 
history of a doctor with 'a wonderful bedside manner' is so remote from any accounts 
of 'mercy killing' that it sounds almost like a blasphemy to hint that there is some 
connection. But it is precisely compassionate doctors whom we would imagine 
performing euthanasia, otherwise it would be indeed indistinguishable from a 'cold-
blooded murder for selfish motives.' 217 The importance ofthe Shipman case is twofold. 
On the one hand it is in some respects strikingly similar to the histories of the other 
'deadly' doctors, 218 which makes one wonder whether the situation would have been 
different had not his behaviour been so arrogant and stupid. On the other hand, since 
euthanasia is often associated with a merciful motive, the apparent absence of such in 
most of the doctor's cases creates the impression of their total unrelatedness to the 
phenomenon of 'mercy killing.' For the reader's consideration, here are some cases, 
which have the potential to be interpreted as active euthanasia. 
213 Ibid. 
214 EB. 
215 Ibid. 
216 EE, 7. 
217 EEPP, 10. 
218 Expression used by Jim Paul, 'Euthanasia', Nucleus, October 1998, http://www.crnforg.uk/ 
pubs/nucleus/nucoct98/euth.html (26 July 2002). 
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Background 
Harold Fredrick Shipman was convicted at Preston Crown Court on 31 January 
2000 of the murder of 15 of his patients while he was a General Practitioner at 
Market Street, Hyde, near Manchester and of one count of forging a will. He 
was sentenced to life imprisonment. Police have also investigated allegations 
that he may have murdered many more patients while he was a GP in Hyde and 
Todmorden. 219 
An official 2000-page report carried out by Dame Janet Smith and released on 19 July 
2002 reveals another 200 victims and further 45 potential victims. 220 
Intention 
Intention is crucial to distinguish euthanasia from a clinical mistake, 
incompetence or negligence. There is hardly any doubt that Dr Shipman fully intended 
the deaths of his patients, at least those of whose murder he was convicted. The 
evidence excludes the possibility that those deaths were a means of either covering 
sexual abuse or getting hands on the possessions of the victims.221 So, why then is the 
majority still of the opinion that the actions of Dr Shipman have nothing to do with 
euthanasia? One reason is the general assumption that none of the deaths fits into the 
description of 'mercy killing'. True as it may be for the majority of Shipman's cases, it 
is nevertheless not the whole truth. There were, as we shall see, patients in the tem1inal 
stages of cancer who suffered immensely. Another reason is the lack of consent in most 
of his cases. For many people the word 'euthanasia' automatically associates with the 
adjective 'voluntary', which, as we already know, is not its only form. However, there 
are, as we shall also see, cases among Shipman's killings where the accompanying 
circumstances suggest that death might have been consented to or even requested. 
Case 1 
The youngest of Dr Shipman's victims was Peter Lewis, a 41-year old who had 
been his patient since 1982. Mr Lewis developed cancer of the stomach in 1984 and 
219 
'Background to the Inquiry', http://www.the-shipman-inquiry.org.uk!backgroundinfo.asp (28 July 
2002). 
220 
'Doctor's Catalogue ofDeath', The Guardian, 20 July 2002, 5. 
221 In the article 'Britain's worst killer. A Final Count: But Why Did It Happen?', The Guardian, 20 July 
2002, page 23, it is acknowledged that 'there was "no suggestion of any form of sexual depravity"' and 
'there was no evidence that he killed for monetary gain, except in the case of the last victim, whose will 
he altered'. And even in that last case 'his incompetent forgery delivered to the family solicitor made 
"detection inevitable", as though he needed to draw attention to himself. 
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reached the terminal stage of it by Christmas that year. He was bed-bound and as the 
pain increased, the injections of morphine-based pain-killers were administered every 
two hours. Called in on 1 January 1985 by Mr Lewis' wife who noticed that her 
husband's breathing had become 'rattly' and his pain had worsened, Dr Shipman gave 
the patient an intravenous injection of an opiate, which was very likely to have been 
diamorphine. Mr Lewis died shortly afterwards. 
Euthanasia or Palliative Care? 
Dr Shipman, unlike Dr Bodkin Adams, 'was not in thrall to money'.222 Neither 
was he using a poisonous substance, as Dr Nigel Cox did. Given the circumstances, 
whether what happened to Peter Lewis was euthanasia or proper palliative care depends 
entirely on the dose of diamorphine. The problem is that there seems to be no 
universally agreed measurement of a 'lethal dose', supposedly because of the nature of 
diamorphine and the variety of human condition. Dame Janet Smith, commenting on the 
case, asserts: 
Doctors in this position may face a difficult decision. They may realise that the 
dose they think will be necessary to relieve pain will also have the effect of 
shortening that patient's life. If the dose is given with the primary intention of 
relieving pain, the act is not only lawful, it is entirely proper. If, on the other 
hand, the doctor deliberately gives a dose which is larger than that necessary for 
the relief of pain, with the primary objective of bringing life to an end, that 
would be unlawful. 223 
Since in the case of Mr Lewis it is unknown224 how much diamorphine Shipman gave, 
the only evidence of Shipman's intention 'is evidence of his words and actions that 
evening and the period of time which elapsed between the injection and the death' .Z25 
Although the timing appeared to be confused by the main witnesses, one thing Dr 
Shipman was heard to have said gives a helpful insight into what he might have 
thought. 226 Mr Lewis's wife recollects that in addressing the patient, he told him: 'Give 
222 Michael Gave, 'The Motives of a Murder Addict', The Times, 20 July 2002, 
http://www.timesonline.eo.uk/printFriendly/O, l-2-360562,00.html (22 July 2002). 
223 The Shipman Inquiry - Case Decision, http://w,vw.the-shipman-inquiry.org.uk/ 
case decision.asp?idx=c&id=DL&fn=23&from= (29 July 2002). 
224 However, there is a strong evidence that on a substantial number of other occasions, Shipman gave 30 
mg instantly. Professor Henry McQuay (one of the medical experts in the inquiry) is reported to have said 
t)lat it 'was a potentially lethal dose and that his professional colleagues would not let him go near them 
with a syringe loaded with more thanlO mg' [my emphasis]. 
225 The Shipman Inquiry Case Decision, http://www.the-shipman-inquiry.org.uk/ 
case decision.asp'?idx=c&id=DL&fu=23&from= (29 July 2002). 
226 Having said that, I must admit that this case is probably one of the best to illustrate just how 
insufficient the evidence of words and actions can be in spotting the intention. 
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up, lad, we've all had enough. We can't take any more' or something with a similar 
meaning.227 Dame Janet's conclusion is: 'I am quite sure that he had no moral or ethical 
scruples about hastening the death of a terminally ill patient. Indeed, I think it likely that 
he thought that when he did so he was doing the best thing for everyone concerned. 228 
In other words, the case of Peter Lewis has equal merits to be judged both as 
euthanasia and as palliative care. Assuming that the patient has never made any requests 
for it, it would have been an active involuntary euthanasia. But if Dr Shipman had 
spoken up and claimed that he was endeavouring to relieve the patient's suffering, there 
would have been no legal case whatsoever. 
Case2 
Another cancer patient who is on the list of Shipman's unlawful killings was 
Mrs Rose Ann Adshead, who died on 18 September 1988 at the age of 80. She had been 
diagnosed with cancer of the rectum three months prior to her death. According to the 
inquiry report 'she had been in a great deal of pain and had said that it was becoming 
too much for her and that she wanted to die' .229 She expressed this wish on the day of 
her death. Here is the sequence of events on that day as described in the inquiry report: 
Someone at the house telephoned the Donneybrook practice and asked that a 
doctor should visit. According to the duty doctor transfer diary, Shipman was the 
Donneybrook doctor on duty that day. Shipman arrived at the house at about 
midday ... Mrs Adshead was left alone with Shipman during the consultation. 
Shipman then came out of her bedroom and said that she was very unwell and 
that Mr Adshead 'would probably be calling him within an hour'. He then left ... 
Mrs Adshead appeared to be sleeping. From the time that Shipman visited, she 
did not open her eyes or say anything. About an hour after Shipman had left, Mr 
Adshead's uncle, Mr Bernard Tracey, said that Mrs Adshead had died. Shipman 
was called back to the house and confirmed that Mrs Adshead was dead.230 
It is not known, since the consultation took place in private, what exactly Shipman did, 
but it has been assumed, given the agony Mrs Adshead was in, that he administered an 
injection of an opiate, most likely morphine or diamorphine. Although Dame Janet 
Smith thought it possible that Mrs Adshead's death 'was entirely natural',231 she 
nevertheless suspected, given the time which passed between the injection and the 
227 The Shipman Inquiry- Case Decision, The Day of the Death, http://Vv>vw.the-shipman-inguiry.org.uki 
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death, that 'the dose was not intended merely to relieve pain but was, instead, intended 
to end Mrs Adshead's life'.232 If such was the case, euthanasia has clearly taken place. 
And remembering the wish Mrs Adshead expressed earlier that day, it may well have 
been what she wanted. This, in tum, makes it active voluntary euthanasia. 
Post scriptum 
The case of Dr Harold Shipman, as the above study shows, has a direct bearing 
on the problem of euthanasia. It reminds society just how slippery the slope is. In the 
treatment of terminally ill patients a lot, if not all, depends on the personality of the 
doctor. Were euthanasia legal in the UK, and were Dr Shipman's victims only 
terminally ill patients, the British 'Dr Death' would still be going round killing people. 
Even now, when euthanasia is not legalised, Shipman managed to carry on with his 
dreadful practice for more than twenty years with virtually no trouble whatsoever. 
3. Miss B 
In the previous cases I was looking at active euthanasia in the form of an 
injection of a substance which has no curative or analgesic properties and an overdose 
of a pain-killer lethal in itself. In my distinctions, however, I did not confine active 
euthanasia to these types. Withdrawal of medical devices with intention to cause death 
would also constitute an active form of euthanasia, since it would require precisely an 
action, not an omission. The following two cases qualify. 
Before I go into details of this particular case, let me focus for a while on an 
interesting theoretical analysis of legal hypocrisy advanced by John Keown in 
Euthanasia, Ethics and Public Policy, as I consider it to be of great assistance in the 
analyses that follows. 
There is an opinion that the Suicide Act 1961 created an inconsistency in the law 
by decriminalising suicide but leaving assistance in it a criminal offence. The 
misinterpretation of the Act consists in assuming that it established a 'right' to suicide. 
Keown argues to the contrary. He explains: 
Suicide, though no longer a criminal offence, remains 'unlawful'. It does not 
follow that, because conduct is not, or is no longer, a criminal offence, it is 
'lawful', let alone that one has a 'right' to engage in that conduct ... In short, the 
232 The Shipman Inquiry - Case Decision, Rose Ann Adshead, Conclusion, http:i/www.the-shipman-
inquiry.org.uk!case decision.asp?idx=c&id=DL&fn=23&from= (29 July 2002). 
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Suicide Act created neither a right to commit suicide, nor a right to be assisted in 
suicide. On the contrary, it reaffirmed the unlawful nature of the act and 
underlined the prohibition on assisting or encouraging another to commit it. 233 
On the other hand, the law appears to have granted competent patients an absolute right 
to refuse any medical treatment, including life-support equipment. 234 Dame Elizabeth 
Butler-Sloss in re MB said that 'a mentally competent patient has an absolute right to 
refuse to consent to medical treatment for any reason, rational or irrational, or for no 
reason at all, even where that decision may lead to his or her own death'. 235 The views 
of the BMA on the issue are similar: 
The law and codes of ethical practice emphasise that competent patients can 
refuse medical treatment, including life-prolonging procedures ... Where adult 
patients refuse procedures that which are likely to benefit them, the BMA 
advises health professionals to provide information in a sensitive manner about 
the implications and explore with the patient whether relevant alternative 
options would be acceptable to the patient. Ultimately, however, the patient's 
view must be respected. 236 
Keown's concern is whether the law is consistent in prohibiting the doctors from 
assisting a patient's suicide by handing them, for example, a syringe filled with 
potassium chloride and at the same time allowing them to assist suicide by withdrawing 
or withholding life-saving treatments. He assumes the problem boils down to assessing 
the intention in withdrawing or withholding of medical life support. Keown's opinion is 
that the law as it stands is open to at least two kinds of interpretation. 
Indeed, it is arguable that, in order to avoid the injustice of doctors forcing 
treatment on patients who are wrongly suspected of refusing treatment with 
intent to kill themselves, the law could properly require doctors to respect all 
competent refusals of treatment, without in any way endorsing those which are 
suicidal. If, by contrast, the law were to require or even allow doctors 
intentionally to assist refusals of treatment which are clearly suicidal, then the 
law would indeed have fallen into serious inconsistency.237 
Ifthe doctor's intention in withdrawing life-saving equipment is the same as in injecting 
a syringe of potassium chloride, namely to cause death, there is no moral difference and 
both will be euthanasia. It has to be said, though, that unlike in the case of 
administration of pain-killers, where it is harder to establish death as being an inevitable 
consequence, in cases of withdrawing life-saving equipment death, except for some 
233 EEPP, 65-66. Also footnote 20, 65. 
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kind of miraculous interference, is always inevitable. The question is whether by 
acknowledging an absolute right to refuse life-saving treatments for any reason the law 
has not already put doctors in a position of unavoidable assistance in suicidal refusals. If 
the law concentrates solely on establishing the competence of the patient and does not at 
all concern itself with the nature of intentions behind refusals how is it supposed to 
safeguard against intentional assistance in those that are clearly or supposedly suicidal? 
The story 
Miss B238 was a single lady born in Jamaica who had been living in the UK since 
the age of 8. On 26 August 1999 Miss B suffered a haemorrhage of the spinal column in 
her neck. She was admitted to the hospital and diagnosed with a cavernoma, a condition 
caused by a malformation of blood vessels. During her stay in the hospital Miss B 
executed a Living Will, which stated that should the situation occur when she was 
unable to give instructions, she wanted the treatment to be withdrawn if she was 
suffering from a life-threatening condition, permanent mental impairment or permanent 
unconsciousness. 239 That time Miss B 's condition gradually improved and she 
eventually returned to work. Thereafter she kept well apart from minor weakness in her 
left arm. 
The following happened more than a year later: 
At the beginning of 2001, Ms B began to suffer from general weakening on the 
left side of her body, and experienced greater numbness in her legs. She felt 
unwell on the 12th February 2001, and was admitted to the Hospital in the early 
hours of the 13th February 2001. She had suffered an intramedullary cervical 
spine cavernoma, as a result of which she became tetraplegic, suffering complete 
paralysis from the neck down. On the 16th February 2001 she was transferred to 
the Intensive Care Unit (the ICU) of the Hospital. She began to experience 
respiratory problems, and was treated with a ventilator, upon which she has been 
entirely dependent ever since.240 
Miss B told two consultants in the ICU that she had a Living Will and did not want to 
be ventilated. The answer was that the terms of her Will 'were not specific enough to 
authorise withdrawal ofventilation'.241 This was obviously correct. Although Miss B's 
condition was indeed most grave, her illness was not progressive and thus could not be 
238 Her full name has never been disclosed to the media in the interests of confidentiality. 
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regarded as 'life-threatening' in the full sense. Neither was she in any way mentally 
impaired or unconscious. On the contrary, her brain was as vibrant as ever and her 
mental capacity was not in the slightest affected. On 23 March 2001 Miss B had 
neurological surgery at another hospital, which resulted in the ability to move her head 
and to speak. She also retained the ability to eat and drink. 242 After this and until 22 
March 2002, the date of the hearing in the High Court, she was more or less persistent 
in her wish for the ventilator to be switched off. As the doctors in the ICU of the 
hospital where Miss B was did not agree to undertake such an action, and the situation 
of conflict increased with no prospective possibility of resolving it internally, Miss B 
went to court. The main issue for the judge, Dame Elizabeth Butler-Sloss, was to decide 
whether Miss B had 'the mental capacity to choose whether to accept or refuse medical 
treatment, in circumstances in which her refusal will, almost inevitably lead to her 
death'. 243 Emphasising that she was 'not asked directly to decide whether Ms B lives or 
dies but whether she, herself, is legally competent to make that decision', 244 Dame 
Elizabeth delivered a positive judgement.245 
Intention 
Following the adopted method in determining an act as euthanasia, I shall set out 
the evidence which in my view helps to assess the intention behind Miss B's wish for 
the ventilator to be switched off. 
According to the competent medical opinion, shared by all the doctors who gave 
evidence in the court, 'if the ventilator were switched off the end would be in a few 
hours'. It was also indisputable that 'immediate withdrawal would cause her death'. 246 
Therefore it is beyond any reasonable doubt that a doctor who turns the machine off will 
intend Miss B's death. Unlike injecting diamorphine, there is no place for the principle 
of 'double effect'. In this particular case the only consequence of switching the 
ventilator off is death and it is inevitable. It might be argued, of course, that the 
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intention may be to relieve the suffering, but such a judgement would be as misplaced 
here as in the case of Dr Cox. First, it would be absurd to claim that the primary purpose 
is to alleviate suffering and distress and only secondary to stop Miss B's breath. 
Secondly, even if one accepts that the primary intention is either to relieve the suffering 
or to respect the patient's autonomy, the means of achieving it is death and hence the act 
is euthanasia. 
Futile or burdensome treatment? 
It can be argued that by switching the ventilator off Miss B avoided futile or 
burdensome treatment. I shall advance counter-arguments from both medical and 
spiritual points of view. 
Medical considerations 
Lord Goff, commenting on the implications of tube-feeding, remarked that this 
treatment is futile because 'the patient is unconscious and there is no prospect of any 
improvement in his condition' .247 If these are the medical criteria of 'futility', than it 
surely does not apply to the situation of Miss B. She was fully conscious. And if the 
ventilator did not improve her condition as such, it was an important intermediate tool 
providing the opportunity for communication with others and thus offering a way to 
possible improvement. Paraphrasing Dr I, a consultant psychiatrist and a specialist in 
spinal injuries, removing the ventilator would bear in it a risk of removing potential 
benefits in the future_248 
Miss B had a choice of possibilities: 
a rehabilitation programme; 
a place in a hospice; 
a weaning procedure. 
According to Mr Alan Gardner, of the charity BackCare, for people like Miss B the 
following range of technical aids was available as part of rehabilitation: 
a tilted bed to help the patient sit upright; 
a spinal jacket to support her back; 
247 Quoted by John Keown in EEPP, 218. 
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mechanical arms controlled by eye or mouth movements; 
keyboards activated in that way, allowing a patient to type. 249 
All of these would have enabled her to achieve a higher quality of life and to move back 
home from hospital. As Dr G put it, 'she would be able to go out into the 
community' .Z50 Miss B rejected this offer on the grounds that it did not offer any 
possibility of recovery.251 Admitting that the independence achieved through 
rehabilitation 'is an improvement', she nevertheless appeared to be convinced that it 
was insufficient for her: 
My view [about rehabilitation] is that it offers me no real opporhmity to recover 
physically, that, in actual fact, it will be more teaching me to live with my 
disability and to make use of the technologies available and that sort of thing, 
working with carers. But, actually, I will not recover in any way. That is not 
acceptable to me.252 
During one of the conversations with Dr Sensky Miss B acknowledged: 'I cannot accept 
myself as disabled and dependent - it's too big a leap to make. The totality of 
dependence is intolerable' .253 However sympathetic and appreciative one may feel 
towards this position, the choice between cure or death is rather obvious. It is either 
physical recovery or non-existence. The middle way does not seem to be satisfactory. 
As to the second opportunity, a place in a hospice, the court report states that 
Miss B 'refused the possibility of a bed in a hospice in December [2001] since the 
hospice would not accept her wish to have her ventilator withdrawn' .254 This is the only 
reference to the opportunity of palliative care in this case. We do not know what it could 
have offered Miss B, but we do know that it was not given a chance. 
The third possibility was a one-way weaning programme, 'agreed by the 
clinicians but with reluctance as an acceptable compromise'. 255 Weaning the patient off 
the ventilator presupposes gradually reducing the number of breaths supplied, so that 
the patient's body can get used to breathing on its own. Usually, if this does not happen, 
the number of breaths given would be restored to the previous quantity. A one-way 
weaning would mean reduction without going back on support. In this case 'sedation 
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would be given but not so as to cause respiratory depression unless clinically 
indicated' .256 This possibility Miss B has also rejected, saying: 
I have refused the specialist clinic because weaning is essentially a long term 
treatment for patients who want to live without ventilation. This is not what I 
want, as it has no positive benefits for me given my level of disability ... I have 
refused this option because this would be a slow and painful death and my view 
of this is not disputed by the doctors ... My wish is to be sedated. I would expect 
it [turning the ventilator off as opposed to negative weaning] to be a quick and 
painless death and less distressing for my loved ones.257 
The stress put by Miss B on the impossibility of improving the level of disability 
suggests that her decision to withdraw the ventilator was rather due to judging her own 
life as not worth living than to judging the treatments offered as futile or burdensome. It 
was the disability and dependence that were intolerable, not the treatment. The prospect 
of negative weaning, dreadful as it may be, was not the only one. Although the 
consensus was that 'without the help of artificial ventilation, according to the medical 
evidence, she would have a less than 1% chance of independent ventilation', this 0.9 %, 
or whatever it was, still existed. After all, who would have been in a position to 
guarantee that this tiny beam of hope would not have turned out to be' a reality if a 
positive weaning was tried? 
To close the discussion on medical concerns, it is helpful to remember two 
instances where the futility of treatment acquires certain plausibility. In the previous 
chapter I have referred to an example of particular medical conditions, where a patient 
needs to be on a ventilator at nights, but can breathe normally in the daytime. In this 
case keeping the ventilator on during the day can be properly considered to be futile, i.e. 
having no purpose. The other instance would occur when a person is in the process of 
dying, where the use of a ventilator is rather an additional and unnecessary burden than 
a benefit. Neither was the case with Miss B. 
Spiritual concerns 
Engelhardt in his guidance on spiritual concerns in decision-making at the end of 
life suggests that medical intervention should not be 'so encompassing or burdensome 
as to harm the spiritual life of the patient'. 258 Did the treatment that Miss B was 
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recetvmg become so encompassing that it endangered her spiritual life? Her own 
account ofher faith casts some light on this matter. 
In many ways the decision to have my treatment withdrawn has been a very 
difficult one for me as I have been a Christian and a regular church attendee all 
my life. The dominant view in the church is that I should wait for God to heal 
me. Withdrawing ventilation would be seen as throwing in the towel. I have 
questioned myself about this and it has challenged my integrity. It has been a 
very difficult process to rationalise what I am doing in the context of my faith 
but I feel there is no alternative, as I do not have any realistic hope of recovery. I 
have come to believe that people die and become disabled and God does not 
always intervene. It has also been difficult for me to contemplate leaving the 
people I love behind. There has been a lot of talking and crying as no one wants 
me to die but almost all of them empathise with me and my situation and 
sincerely wish to respect my wishes, which I have made clear to all. 259 
It is extremely sad to know that a person of strong will and apparently strong faith has 
ended up seeing recovery as the only way for God to intervene and chooses death. It is 
also a great pity that even such devoted Christians as Miss B find it no longer 
acceptable to be totally dependent on others. May be it is because these 'others', 
especially fellow Christians, find it no longer acceptable to give total care and often try 
to escape responsibility, often subconsciously, by believing that their real duty is to 
'sincerely respect' someone's wish to choose death? I think the fact that Miss B 'did not 
have a supportive family' 260 significantly contributed to her willingness to cast out the 
suffering and not live it out. Also, having a strong character, she may have found it 
difficult to see her role as Christian to be anything less than an active minister. But even 
in her situation there still was a role. As another suffering lady once wrote in a letter to 
Stanley Hauerwas, 'when you can't preach, or teach, or confront, and you can only 
suffer, it is still possible to imitate Christ by bearing sufferings patiently' .Z61 Taking all 
this into consideration I am inclined to think that the case of Miss B was not so much, if 
at all, about a spiritually harmful medical treatment, but about the failure 'to accept the 
cross of suffering and pain medicine cannot set aside by instead accepting a premature 
death'. 262 
Summarising on this truly agonising case, I repeat after Keown: 
If a patient says to a doctor: 'Doctor, I want to hasten my death. Please, help 
me', what is the moral difference between the doctor intentionally doing so by, 
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on the one hand, giving the patient a lethal pill and, on the other, switching off 
the patient's life-support machine? . . . if the doctor's intention is the same in 
both cases, where is the moral difference?263 
There is none. To be sure there may be a technical difference that allows one to 
distinguish between euthanasia and physician-assisted suicide. The latter presupposes 
that the last act is carried out by the patient. This is not, as we know, what happened in 
the case of Miss B. To reinforce Keown's suggestion, I would say that there is no moral 
distinction between a doctor fulfilling his patient's request by deliberately injecting an 
ampoule of potassium chloride or a lethal dose of diamorphine and switching off the 
patient's life support. Both are actions and both intend death. It is indeed 'a distinction 
without a difference', because both cases are instances of active voluntary euthanasia. 
4. Tony Bland 
In Euthanasia, Ethics and Public Policy John Keown gives an in-depth analysis 
of the decision of the Law Lords to stop tube-feeding Tony Bland. As I largely agree 
with his argument and with the conclusions he reached, I do not see the need to repeat 
in my own words what has already been brilliantly expressed. What I do see, however, 
is the need, for the purpose of classification, to focus once again on the intention and 
whether the death in this case resulted from an act or omission. 
Tire story 
Before his death on 3 March 1993, Tony Bland had lain in Airedale Hospital for 
over three years in a 'persistent vegetative state' (pvs), a state in which, it was 
believed, he could neither see, hear nor feel. The medical consensus was that he 
would never regain consciousness. Neither dead nor dying, his brain stem still 
functioned and he breathed and digested naturally. He was fed by nasogastric 
tube, his excretory functions regulated by catheter and enemas. Infections were 
treated by antibiotics. His doctor and parents wanted to stop the feeding and 
antibiotics and the Hospital Trust applied for a declaration that it would be 
lawful to do so ... The declaration was granted by Sir Stephen Brown, whose 
decision was unanimously affirmed by the court of Appeal and the House of 
Lords.264 
Unlike the patients in the previously looked at cases, Tony Bland was unconscious. 
Taking into consideration that his cerebral cortex was irreparably damaged, it is 
assumed that he was not experiencing either pain or suffering. The decision to 
discontinue the treatment therefore seems to have rested solely on the notion of the 
263 EEPP, 67. 
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patient's best interests and since he could not express his own views, relied totally on 
the 'substituted judgement' delivered by his medical team and his parents. Whether 
these are valid legally is not for me to speculate on, neither is it my concern in this case. 
What I shall try to establish is whether the nature of intention in stopping Tony's tube-
feeding would be compatible with euthanasia and if so, whether it was an active or a 
passive form of it. If it was euthanasia, due to the patient's inability to participate in the 
decision, it would have been a non-voluntary one. 
Intention 
It merits reminding ourselves, as this simple fact tends to be easily overlooked in 
the thicket of arguments that it was in Tony's 'best interests', that the inevitable result 
of withdrawing the tube-feeding would be Tony's death of 'starvation and 
dehydration' .Z65 Since we assume that he was not suffering, one cannot claim the 
primary intention to relieve it. It is not in any dispute that the doctor's withdrawal of the 
nasogastric tube 'was causative of the patient's death' .Z66 It was also maintained that 
such a course would be lawful, 'even (according to a majority) with intent to kil1'. 267 
Given this, it is beyond any reasonable doubt that euthanasia has taken place. 
Active or passive? 
Interestingly, a disagreement seems to exist as to the active or passive nature of 
stopping the tube-feeding. Keown for the purposes of distinguishing between medical 
treatment and basic care separates the presence of the tube and 'the pouring of food and 
water down the tube'. 268 If one starts from this premise, the doctor who intentionally 
stops the flow of food and drink down the tube is performing euthanasia by omission. 
The doctor who withdraws the tube in order to remove the means for pouring food and 
water or who switches off the mechanism (if there is such) which automatically pours 
food and liquid at pre-set times, is performing euthanasia by action. In the case of Tony 
Bland the action has taken place. The commentary on the judgement states: 
265 EEPP, 235. 
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On the facts, the judges categorised the withdrawal of hydration and nutrition as 
an omission (i.e. to provide care) rather than an act even though the result could 
only be achieved through positive conduct by pulling out the tubes. 269 
It is somewhat mysterious how the judges managed to describe as an omission, i.e. 
failing to act, the type of undertaking so evidently active as 'pulling out the tubes'. I am 
not at all persuaded to follow this kind of twisted reasoning and therefore consider Tony 
Bland's death to be active non-voluntary euthanasia. 
HI. Passive Euthanasia: Dr Leonardi Arthur 
An example of passive euthanasia is presented in the case ofDr Leonard Arthur, 
which is summarized below: 
... baby John Pearson was born on Saturday morning 28 June, 1980 at Derby 
City Hospital. It was a normal birth, but the midwife immediately recognised 
Down's syndrome. Otherwise the baby was apparently healthy. The mother was 
distraught on hearing of the child's mongolism, and became more definite than 
most in saying that she did not want the child. Dr Arthur, the consultant 
pediatrician, saw the baby at noon, and after discussion with the mother, noted 
'Parents do not want the child to survive. Nursing care only.' He then prescribed 
regular doses of the drug dihydrocodeine, which in his later statement to the 
police he indicated was used by him as a sedative 'which stops the child seeking 
sustenance'. 
There was some dispute in court, and later in the press, about the meaning of 
'nursing care only'; in John Pearson's case it was interpreted to mean that he 
should be kept 'comfortable, warm and cherished' and fed with water but given 
no milk. The baby developed bronchopneumonia, and became critically ill by 
the Sunday evening. He died at 5 a.m. the following Tuesday morning, 69 hours 
old. 
The organisation LIFE gave some evidence to the police, and on 5 February, 
1981 Dr Arthur was charged with murder. In the course of the trial (which began 
on 13 October, 1981), evidence came to light which indicated that death could 
have been caused by a congenital heart condition from which the child may have 
been suffering from birth, and/or bronchopneumonia. The charge of murder was 
dropped in favour of the charge of attempted murder. 
The jury decided that the prosecution had not convinced them that Dr Arthur had 
attempted to murder John Pearson, and he was acquitted on 5 November, 
1981.270 
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Intention 
It is clear that the doctor's intention in this case was to bring about the child's 
death. Baby John was deliberately deprived of milk, which is normal 'food' for the 
newborns. This would have resulted in the only and inevitable consequence of 
starvation to death. The fact that according to the adopted interpretation of 'nursing care 
only' the child was 'fed with water', is totally incomprehensible. I cannot quite grasp 
how anyone, including a baby, can survive on water only. One may call it hydration, for 
sure, but not nutrition. The other crucial factor is that John Pearson was not dying. 
Sometimes in the last stages of cancer the patients would be given only water, but no 
food, but that is a different situation altogether. It will in most cases be the patient's 
wish not to eat anything, not because the intention is to starve to death, but simply 
because the patient's death is near due to the progress of the illness, which medicine is 
powerless to stop. The baby did seek to be fed, but was not only denied that, but 
deliberately rendered 'mute' by sedation. 
The discovery at trial of 'a congenital heart condition from which the child may 
have been suffering from birth' 271 does not change the doctor's intention one whit. He 
did not make any reference to any kind of serious health problem at the time he 
prescribed 'nursing care only.' The only thing he mentioned in his initial note was the 
fact that parents did not want the baby to survive. In other words, they wanted the baby 
to die. The argument that the doctor's intention was therefore simply to respect the 
mother's choice does not hold water. It may well have been a motive, whether a good or 
a bad one, but not the intention. 
Active or passive? 
Dr Arthur failed to act, with intention to cause death twice. First, when he did 
not provide nutrition for the baby. He decided precisely not to take an action in this 
respect. The second time he neither took any steps to treat a supposed heart condition 
(there is no evidence to indicate that it was medically untreatable), nor gave any 
medication to treat bronchopneumonia. There is strong evidence that he chose to be 
totally passive not because the treatment would have been futile in terms of a 'medical 
indications policy' approach, as, for example, Dr Zachary would have done, but 
precisely because he agreed on the futility of the baby's life. 
271 TB, 203 [my emphasis], also footnote 7 on this page. 
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To summarise, what Dr Arthur has done (or rather has not done) can be regarded 
as passive non-voluntary euthanasia. 
IV. Assisted Suicide: Diane Pretty 
In 2001 every British citizen came to know of Diane Pretty due to the immense 
publicity that accompanied her legal case. The story was unprecedented in its scale and 
had a significant impact on public opinion. Legally Mrs Pretty's plea went from the 
Divisional Court all the way to the European Court of Human Rights and although the 
decision sought was not granted, it stirred up the English judicial system quite 
significantly. In terms of public ethics the media coverage created a situation where 
virtually everyone had been participating in the decision about Diane's life and death. 
The legal implications of the case are thoroughly discussed by John Keown in 
the Afterword to Euthanasia, Ethics and Public Policy to which I take the liberty simply 
to refer the reader and allow myself to concentrate in more detail on the intention which 
has been the focus of the legal battle and on the medical side of the case, which has 
received much less scrutiny than the legal one. For a proper perspective m 
understanding the issues at stake it is crucial that the balance should be restored. 
Background 
Mrs Diane Pretty of Luton, Bedfordshire, was diagnosed with Motor Neurone 
Disease (MND) in November 1999 at the age of 40. She was living together with her 
husband, their daughter and granddaughter. The disease had reached an advanced stage 
in July 2001, when the first steps in what was to become a legal fight were taken. By 
that time Diane has become paralysed from the neck down, has almost lost the capacity 
to speak and had to be tube-fed. However, her mind remained intact. 
On 27 July 2001 in a letter written on her behalf Mrs Pretty asked the Director of 
Public Prosecutions (DPP), David Calvert-Smith, 'to give an undertaking not to 
prosecute the applicant's husband should he assist her to commit suicide in accordance 
with her wishes. ' 272 On 8 August 2001 Mrs Pretty's solicitor received a negative answer 
to this request. On 20 August an application was made to the Divisional Court for the 
judicial review of the DPP's decision, which was refused on 17 October 2001. With the 
272 Pretty v. the United Kingdom, European Court of Human Rights, Fourth Section, Application 
no.2346/02, Judgement, 29 April 2002, The Facts, The Circumstances of the Case, bttp:/i 
hudoc.echr.coe.intlhudoc!V iewHtm ... O&Noticemode=&RelatedMode= I &X=72620 160(26 July 2002). 
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help of her legal team Diane Pretty appealed to the House of Lords, which on 29 
November 2001 unanimously upheld the judgement of the Divisional Court. The last 
legal resort for the Prettys was the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg. The 
application was lodged with the Court on 21 December 2001, a public hearing took 
place on 19 March 2002 and the judgement was delivered on 29 April 2002. It was not 
in favour of the applicant. Diane Pretty died on 11 May 2002. 
Intention 
There is no ambiguity about what Diane Pretty was trying to achieve. According 
to her barrister, Philip Havers QC, who spoke before the Divisional Court judges, 
She requires and wishes the active assistance of a third party in carrying out 
some of the steps leading to her death although the last acts that lead directly to 
her death will be carried out by herself. In essence Mrs Pretty's wishes are that 
someone else, namely her husband Brian, assist her in committing suicide. 273 
Diane's intention, although not the circumstances of the situation, seems to be quite 
similar to that of Miss B in that she wanted death as opposed to protracted suffering. 
Before the ruling of the Law Lords Mrs Pretty said: 'I have tried every type of medical 
treatment and fought this disease every step of the way. If I am allowed to decide when 
and how I die, I will feel that I have wrested some autonomy back and kept hold of my 
dignity. ' 274 As with Miss B, the emphasis is on the lack of autonomy and the absence of 
dignity in suffering as seen by the patient herself. But it has to be noticed that increasing 
dependence does not have to diminish one's dignity. Also, one can exercise control in 
how one dies without recourse to suicide.275 To equate lack of autonomy with lack of 
dignity is to adhere to a misguided and morally dangerous judgement. Diane Pretty, like 
Miss B, was totally dependent on others and they both seem to have found this 
undignified. The terrible irony in both cases was that the choice which was supposed to 
end the indignity of dependence could not have been exercised outside this vety 
dependence. Both women seem to have thought that the victory of dignity is either cure 
of the disease or termination of life. Since cure was not possible to achieve, death 
emerged as the only option in the most extreme circumstances. However, on closer 
273Case No: C0/3321/2001 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF JUDICATURE 
QUEENS BENCH DIVISION (DIVISIONAL COURT), 17 October 2001, http:// 
W\Vw.courtservice.gov.uk/judgmentsfiles/j389 /Pretty_ v _DPP _SSHD.htm (4 June 2002). 
274 John Chapman, 'How Dare the Judges Condemn Me to Live', Daily Express, 30 November 2001, 1, 6, 
column 5. 
275 The possibility of this control is one of the purposes of palliative and hospice care. 
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examination of the facts it appears that other options were there for Mrs Pretty as they 
were for Miss B. I shall discuss them further on. 
The framework developed by Keown shows the importance of distinguishing 
intending death from foreseeing it. As it was put in the Divisional Court's judgement, in 
the case of Diane Pretty the judges were 'being asked to allow a family member to help 
a loved one die, in circumstances of which we know nothing, in a way of which we 
know nothing'. 276 In other words, the only thing that seemed to have been clearly 
established is that it was a request to terminate one's life. Death was presented as a 
desired end and therefore explanation of the means of bringing it about has taken the 
back stage. Mrs Pretty's case was not, using Ramsey's description, about comparing ' ... 
a certain state or condition of dying with another, one treatment with another, or 
treatment with no treatment', 277 it was precisely about comparing a certain state or 
condition of living with non-existence and choosing the latter. Therefore death could 
not have been simply a matter of foresight. It was intended. 
The argument could have taken quite a different stance were there a question of 
potentially 'futile or too burdensome treatment'. Were Diane Pretty dependent on an 
artificial device like Miss B the issue at stake would have been to decide whether it was 
indeed futile or too burdensome or both. If, for the sake of the argument one would 
imagine Diane swapping places with Miss B, the intention behind withdrawal of 
ventilator could well have been to avoid futile, i.e. medically useless treatment. Mrs 
Pretty was in the process of dying, her disease constantly progressed and in this case the 
use of a ventilator would have had no real or potential benefits and thus would appear 
truly burdensome. And if she had in this hypothetical situation chosen to seek a court 
decision to remove the ventilator, her intention would clearly be justified legally, as 
well as morally. It would have been neither euthanasia nor assisted suicide. 
Likewise, it is interesting to see how the case of Miss B could have been 
interpreted had she not been in the hospital, but at home with a family, just like Diane 
Pretty. It seems that, given the grounds for her decision remained as they were, had she 
asked for her husband's help in bringing death about she would most likely not have 
been granted her wish. In terms of physical ability both Miss B and Mrs Pretty were in 
the same position at the time of the legal procedures. And if by 'the last acts that lead 
directly to her death' Diane's lawyer meant that she would, for example, swallow the 
lethal medication provided by her husband, surely Miss B was capable of doing the 
276Case No: C0/332112001, The Human Rights Arguments, Articles 8 and 9. 
277 EEL, 148. 
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same. In the interview with Dame Elizabeth Butler-Sloss, Miss B discussed among 
other subjects the possibility of assisted suicide. Having been asked whether she would 
turn the ventilator offherselfwere the appropriate mechanism provided, she replied: 'If 
I was desperate before and there were no other way, of course, as a last resort, I would 
do it. ' 278 She added though, that she herself would not see it as suicide. Sadly, Mrs. 
Pretty must have found herself much closer to this last resort than Miss B, the last resort 
to exercise the choice of death. 
Both cases were widely presented as legal fights for the 'right to die' ,279 
unsuccessful for Diane Pretty and successful for Miss B. If the latter was finally able to 
enjoy this right, why was it denied to the forn1er? In this respect, the law appears to 
have been inconsistent, at least from a moral point of view. Indeed, ifMiss B's intention 
was the same as that of Mrs Pretty, has the law not thereby allowed her to commit 
suicide?280 One has to distinguish between the 'right to die with dignity' and the 'right 
to choose death'. These rights are not and should not be interchangeable. If Mrs Pretty 
was fighting to have a ventilator switched off, she would have indeed fought for her 
right to die with dignity. However, what she has fought for was the right to choose 
death by committing assisted suicide. If Miss B's request to switch off the ventilator 
was made with a suicidal intention and as we have seen there is some evidence to that 
effect, then her fight was indeed the same as that of Diane Pretty: not for the right to die, 
but for the right to choose death. It is important both ethically and legally, to tell the 
difference. 
Medical side 
Throughout the duration of Diane Pretty's case the media coverage pressed hard 
the fact that in preventing assisted suicide, the legal system and, one step removed, 
society on the whole, was condemning the woman to a terrible death by 'progressive 
suffocation' .281 One of the news articles commissioned already after Diane's death 
278 BBC News, Health, 'Right-to-die woman gives evidence', http://news.bbc.co.ukihi/english/ 
health/newsid 1861000/1861002.stm (11 July 2002). 
279 See, for example: Clare Dyer, 'Paralysed Woman Wins Right to Die', The Guardian, 23 March 2002, 
http://www.guardian.co.ukiuk news/story/0,3604,672723,00.html (24 July 2002) on the case of Miss B; 
Clare Dyer, 'Final Right to Die Plea Rejected by Court', The Guardian, 30 April 2002, 
http://society.guardian.co.uk!health/story/O, 7890. 707596,00.html (24 July 2002) on the case of Diane 
Pretty. 
280 See Keown's argument regarding the alleged right to commit suicide by refusing treatment in EEPP, 
66-68. 
281 AC Grayling, 'A Good Death'. The Guardian, Saturday Review, 27 October 2001, 1-2. This theme is 
carried on in many more publications. See, for example: Polly Toynbee, 'For Those Who Wish to Die the 
Law is a Cruel Torment', The Guardian, 22 August 2001, 5. 
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informed the reader that 'she feared the choking and asphyxia often caused by her 
disease·.Z82 Nobody would deny the fact that MND is one of the most distressing and 
terrible illnesses, but one has at least to get the medical facts right, if one wants to use 
them in the argument. It is quite disturbing to find that the medical side of the story has 
been constantly misrepresented, thus creating a totally wrong bias in the public opinion. 
The simple fact is that there is no medical evidence as to choking or suffocation being 
the causes of death from MND. Indeed, there is strong evidence that they are not. The 
MND Association lists death by choking or suffocation as myths: 
The most common cause of death in people with MND is respiratory failure due 
to weakness in the muscles and death is very peaceful. It is very rare for 
someone to die from choking to death. People will never suffocate as a result of 
MND.283 
This statement of the MND Association is backed up by the vast data of clinical 
research collected by hospices.Z84 In the study conducted at St Christopher's hospice 
only one in 100 deaths has been attributed to choking. Moreover, post-mortem showed 
that even in this single case the airways of the person were clear. 285 Among other myths 
quoted by the Association are the ideas about MND being untreatable and that people 
affected lose all ability to communicate. It is true that this disease is at present 
incurable, but it is false to think that there is no treatment for it. As the MND 
Association explains, 'the drug riluzole (brand name Rilutek) is known to slow down 
the progression of MND by between three and six months. Treatments are also readily 
available for the individual symptoms of the condition. ' 286 Communication is not 
completely cut off. There is a variety of means available including 'Lightwriters, 
computers and even blinking. ' 287 
This evidence casts serious doubts on the contention that to refuse assisted 
suicide would be tantamount to inflicting 'inhuman or degrading treatment' on Mrs 
Pretty. Was Diane aware of the possibilities offered by palliative care services? At the 
hearing in the Divisional Court her barrister, Mr Havers 'said simply that Mrs Pretty has 
282 BBC/HEALTH, 'Diane Pretty Dies', http://news.bbc.co.uk/l!hilhealth/1983457.slm (12 August 2002) 
[my emphasis]. 
283 Motor Neurone Disease Association website, Press Office, MOTOR NEURONE DISEASE - MYTH 
OR REALITY? http://www.mndassociation.org.uk!full-site/press/office.htm#myth (9 August 2002). 
284 See: D.J. Oliver and C. Saunders, 'Motor Neurone Disease' in Patricia A. Downie (ed.), Cash's 
Textbook of Neurology for Physiotherapists (London: Faber & Faber, 4th ed., 1986), 459-68; Tony 
O'Brien, Moira Kelly, C. Saunders, 'Motor Neurone Disease: A Hospice Perspective', BMJ, Vol. 304, 22 
February 1992,471-3. 
285 Cicely Saunders, Thomas D. Walsh and Mary Smith, 'A Review of 100 Cases of Motor Neurone 
Disease in a Hospice' in Cicely Saunders, Dorothy H. Summers and Neville Teller (eds.), Hospice: The 
Living Idea (London: Edward Arnold Ltd., 1981), 126-47. 
286 MOTOR NEURONE DISEASE - MYTH OR REALITY? 
287 Ibid. 
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not been offered any such care. ' 288 However, it is well known that Diane spent her last 
days at the Pasque Hospice in Luton, near the place where she lived, where she was 
given care of outstanding quality. As her husband said afterwards: 'The staff were 
wonderful at their job and there was always someone there with her. ' 289 Dr Ryszard 
Bietzk, medical director of the Pasque Hospice has commented on Diane's death saying 
that it was 'perfectly normal, natural and peaceful. '290 
In one of the TV programmes after Diane's death, Brian Pretty reaffirmed that 
the care provided by the hospice was excellent, but said it was not what Mrs Pretty had 
wanted. This simple statement puts the whole case in the right perspective. It was 
indeed a question of choosing between 'dignified' and 'undignified' death. Only the 
public seemed to have been confused as to which is which. The story of Diane Pretty 
should be alarming for society not because she has not been allowed to commit suicide, 
but because surrounded by a loving family she had come to want it, in spite of medical 
technology and palliative care being 'advanced to a level where most people in the 
developed world, including those with motor neurone disease, are able to die 
comfortably.'291 Watching the programme I couldn't help having an uneasy feeling that 
the whole campaign was conveniently utilised by the VES, which, while being 
concerned about Mrs Pretty, has nevertheless tried to pave the way to its goal through 
the legal system at her expense. 
V. Conclusion 
Pitifully, the way in which the widely publicized euthanasia related cases have 
been presented has not so much informed the debate as further confused it. To claim 
that cases such as that of Dr Shipman and Miss B have no direct bearing on the problem 
of euthanasia or assisted suicide is shortsighted. To equate good medical practice or 
palliative care with euthanasia, lack of autonomy with lack of dignity and choosing 
death with a right to die with dignity is to miss crucial distinctions. It would be a bad 
resolution of the modem ethical tensions to choose between medical technology 
overtaking our lives and exercise of self-termination. Although this can be seen as the 
only choice, thankfully it is not and as Christians we hope it will never be. Therefore, 
288Case No: C0/332112001, Judgement, The Facts [my emphasis]. 
289 BBC/HEALTH, 'Diane Pretty Dies'. 
290 Ibid. 
291 The Christian Medical Fellowship, 'Diane Pretty - Statement on House of Lords Decision', 29 
November 2001 http://www.cmf.org.uk/press/291101.htm1 (27 July 2002). 
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careful evaluation of the inner rationale of end-of-life decisions is called for nowadays 
more than ever in the past. Not only is it of significance in balancing bioethical theory 
and practice. If not pursued with due determination, it is likely to leave modem society 
without any recognized public morals. 
In most of the cases where people tum to euthanasia or assisted suicide these are 
believed to be the only option or the last resort. The above stories show they do not 
need to be. Palliative and hospice care have either not been considered or have been 
rejected. It largely happens due to a lack of knowledge as well as a lack of 
understanding of the meaning of these concepts. Therefore it is vital to fill the gap. 
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CHAPTER V 
HOSPICE V EUTHANASIA 
I. Introduction 
The aim of this chapter is threefold. First, it is to give a general idea of what the 
hospice movement and palliative care is about, secondly, to explain how it can be 
distinguished from the practice of euthanasia, and finally, to show that the hospice can 
be a particular type of Christian community serving the needs of the vast majority, if not 
everyone, in a world 'marked by a plurality of moral visions. ' 292 
In the country where modem hospices originated and the standards of terminal 
care have become exemplary, it is inexcusable that somebody like Diane Pretty 'has not 
been offered any such care. ' 293 Paradoxically, after more than thirty years since the 
modem hospice movement started, the knowledge about it in the UK itself is far too 
superficial and sometimes even non-existent. By contrast, the flow of information about 
euthanasia and assisted suicide is overtaking it in quantity, if not in quality. In the cases 
discussed in the previous chapter the information regarding the possibilities of palliative 
and hospice care is scant and very much matter of fact. The fact that euthanasia and 
assisted suicide have acquired such an appealing stance is not least due to them being 
presented as the only dignified and merciful way out in certain circumstances, the 
number of which is continuously expanded. However, instead of trying to stretch 
exceptions to change the rule it would be wise to find opportunities for the rule to lessen 
the number of exceptions. These opportunities are already embodied in the hospice 
philosophy and constantly develop. One cannot possibly put them aside. 
It is not only ignorance in terminal care matters that prevents people from giving 
a fair hearing to the alternatives to euthanasia and assisted suicide. Even when people 
know about hospices and palliative care, there is among many a grievous misconception 
that these are but part of the practice of euthanasia. In the sense that hospice philosophy 
promotes a chance for a good death for every person, it is certainly true. In the sense 
that it represents yet another way of killing patients, it is certainly not. The trouble is, 
292 FCB, 42. 
293 
*R (on the application of Pretty) v Director of Public Prosecutions and another, Judgement, The 
Facts, cited above (see footnote 284). 
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again, the lack of clarity in definitions. I shall endeavour to examine what good terminal 
care involves and how to distinguish it from euthanasia. Failure to draw the line 
between the two has already led, as Keown shows, both to ethical and legal hypocrisy. 
The Christian roots of the modem hospice movement are an advantage and a 
disadvantage at the same time. The advantage that Christianity gives the movement is 
the spirit which holds it together and places it in the context of the transcendent. The 
disadvantage is that it can be seen as too narrow and too demanding. In the century 
when disbelief on the one hand and a broad concept of spirituality on the other have 
often replaced institutional religion, some people are reluctant to embrace the hospice 
philosophy for fear of being forced at the end of their lives into a totally alien setting. 
Years of experience have demonstrated that this need not happen. Indeed, hospices 
reaffirm that unity in diversity which Engelhardt attributes to a libertarian type of 
society. Somehow the idea on which a modem hospice is based affords a combination 
of universality and particularity without abusing either. This is a phenomenon that 
merits not mere recognition but earnest attention and vigorous support. The story of St. 
Christopher's Hospice started the history which brought Christianity of the first 
millennium into the reality of the twenty first century. It has fulfilled the expectations 
both Ramsey and Engelhardt have expressed. On a personal level the hospice way of 
death294 offers an opportunity to tum from oneself to God, to reach out for holiness 
whilst at the same time incarnating on the public scale that vision of secular morality 
'extended from the church of Jesus Christ. ' 295 
I shall start with an overview of the development of hospices from the first 
institutional provision for the dying established in 1879 to the foundation of St. 
Christopher's Hospice in 1967, which has come to be a symbol of the modem hospice 
movement. Having started in the British Isles as a revolution in terminal care it has now 
spread all over the world and has changed the face of healthcare on the global scale. 
Remarkably, this was done almost single-handedly by a determined Christian woman. 
In Russia a man has followed her example, for fifteen years fighting the great silence of 
the Soviet era on his own. Although with a different personal and cultural background 
they share the same idea and show the same power of commitment. The differences and 
similarities in hospice work in Britain and in Russia will be the background against 
which I shall explore the distinction between palliative care and euthanasia and the role 
ofhospices as Christian communities. 
294 This phrase stands as the name of a book: Paul M. Du Bois, The Hospice Way of Death (New 
York/London: Human Sciences Press, 1980). 
295 Hauerwas quotes Ramsey in WW, 129-30. 
103 
H. 'fhe History o1f the Hospice Movement 
The word 'hospice' derives from the Latin hospitium, from hospes- a stranger, 
guest. 296 It was first coined in Rome in the late fourth century AD.297 During the early 
Christian era it was used to describe 'a place where hospitality was offered to pilgrims 
and other travellers as well as the sick and destitute. ' 298 Initially these early 
establishments were neither particularly concerned nor specifically devised for the care 
of the dying, although many ofthe 'strangers' and 'guests' must have ended their lives 
in the early hospices. The first institution to use the word 'hospice' strictly in relation to 
the dying was a home founded by Mme Jeanne Gamier in France in 1842.299 
1. The Rise of Homes for the Dying in Britain 
Independently from Mme Gamier's initiative, in 1879 the Irish Sisters of 
Charity, a Catholic monastic order, opened Our Lady's Hospice for the Dying in 
Dublin. This venture pioneered the linking of hospices with specialized care for the 
dying in Britain and became a prototype of the broader concept of the 'hospice 
movement' which was to evolve in the 1950s in this country. It marked a period of 
revival following the decline that hospices experienced between the Middle Ages, 
where they 'played an important role in the development of the first hospitals', 300 and 
the late Victorian era with its concern for provision of an adequate care for the dying 
'respectable or deserving poor. dOl The network of the voluntary run hospitals which 
used to provide for the medical needs of this particular type of lower class members 
tended 'to give priority to patients who were considered useful for the research and 
education of medical practitioners. ' 302 Incurable cases were seen as not fitting these 
purposes and apart from being a burden on the hospital's budget, the dying patients did 
not contribute positively to its overall image as an institution of health. After discharge 
296 The Chambers Dictionary (Edinburgh: Chambers Harrap Publishers Ltd, 2"d ed., 2001), 775. 
297 Robert Kastenbaum, 'The Moment of Death: Is Hospice Making a Difference' in Inge B. Corless and 
Zelda Foster (eds.), The Hospice Heritage: Celebrating Our Future (New York: The Haworth Press Inc., 
1999), 256. 
298 Cicely Saunders, 'A Hospice Perspective' inK. Foley and H. Hendin (eds.), The Case Against Assisted 
Suicide: For the Right to End-ofLife Care (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 2002), 283 
[hereafter abbreviated CAAS]. 
299 CAAS, 283. 
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from the hospital, the dying poor, unlike the members of the middle and upper classes 
of Victorian society, were, by and large, unable to receive proper medical, nursing and 
spiritual care at home. This gap within medical practice of that time needed to be filled 
in. Here was the breath of a new life for the somewhat forgotten hospices: 
The idea was to admit patients who had been discharged from the hospitals as 
incurable, and who were suffering from diseases which, in the natural course of 
events, would likely prove fatal within a period of a few months. 303 
However, the nuns of the Irish Sisters of Charity were unable to put this idea into 
practice due to the lack of space in any of the Dublin convents to accommodate such an 
undertaking. The opportunity began to materialise when the Motherhouse and Noviciate 
were removed from Harold's Cross to a new location. The old building was then 
converted into a home suitable for the dying patients with a capacity of twenty-seven 
beds. In 1886 a larger building was commenced with an intake of 110 patients. For the 
first several decades of its existence it provided end-of-life care mostly for those 
suffering from tuberculosis, but with the elimination of this disease by the 1940s it 
gradually reoriented itself to palliative services for cancer and other acute terminal 
illnesses and general nursing care of the chronically ill and elderly. More than a century 
later Our Lady's Hospice is still successfully functioning. A brand new palliative care 
complex with 36 in-patient beds and a day centre was officially opened in 1993.304 
Apart from making up for the shortcomings and deficiencies of the healthcare 
system, hospices were to cater for the spiritual needs of the dying. In a certain way they 
became an important antithesis to the increasing secularisation of death. 
A longer life expectancy, improved medical treatment and a declining mortality 
rate reduced the immediacy of death; naturalistic explanations for disease, a 
declining belief in the doctrine of hell and the relevancy of salvation undermined 
the need to minister to the soul. .. The creation of institutions committed to 
helping patients undergo spiritual preparation for death ... ran counter to these 
developments. 305 
Continuing the long-standing Christian tradition of the ministry to the sick and dying 
four out of five hospices established in London at the tum of the nineteenth century 
were affiliated to a religious sisterhood. The Hostel of God founded in 1891 in Clapham 
was run successively by the Sisters of St James' Servants of the Poor and the Sisters of 
St Margaret's of East Grinstead. Two years later in 1893 St Luke's House was opened 
303 WLS,147. 
304 The Hospice History Project, Timeline of Hospice Development in the United Kingdom and Ireland, 
1870-2000, A Listing of Hospices by Founding Year, 1870-1900, Our Lady's Hospice for the Dying, 
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by Dr Howard Barrett, the Medical Superintendent of the Methodist organisation the 
West London Mission. The Home of the Compassion of Jesus opened in 1903 belonged 
to the Anglican Community of the Compassion of Jesus. In 1905 Fr Peter Gallwey, a 
Jesuit priest, established St Joseph's Hospice for the Dying in the East End of London 
in Hackney. As Our Lady's Hospice, it was run by the Irish Sisters ofCharity.306 
The fifth home for the dying was set up by Miss Frances Davidson in Mildmay 
Park in 1885. It was called Friedenheim and seems to have been meant as part of the 
network of non-religious hospices planned by the cancer hospitals at the end of the 
nineteenth century, which nevertheless never fully flourished. The reason for the failure 
of this secular type of hospice is worth noting, as it proved to have influenced the 
mindset of the medical profession far beyond expectations: 
The competing demands for the support of clinical laboratory research into 
cancer were given priority, in the hope that discovery of a cure would remove 
the need for such 'Friedenheims'; this shift in emphasis has had lasting influence 
on provision for cancer and cancer patients.307 
First hospices for the dying were also a new trend in philanthropic 
developments. They gave a splendid opportunity for a visible result of charitable 
activities. And the importance of charitable deeds was backed up and encouraged by all 
Christian denominations, particularly by the then enormously influential evangelical 
church. 
To summarise, the shared basis of the first hospices was 
the provision of bodily and spiritual care within a home-like atmosphere for the 
respectable poor who were medically certified as 'dying' and whose domestic 
and family circumstances meant that they could not be nursed at home. 308 
This overall basis remained almost intact up to the second half of the twentieth century 
when it was given a new form. 
2. From St Luke's and St Joseph's to St Christopher's 
Two of the early hospices, St Luke's and St Joseph's played a major role in 
developing the philosophy of terminal care which was later to shape the modem hospice 
movement. 
In 1948 Cicely Saunders, a 30-year-old medical social worker telephoned St 
Luke's House and soon was helping there as a volunteer sister in her spare time. Her 
306 WLS, 149. 
307 Caroline C. S. Murphy, 'From Fliedenheim to Hospice: A Century of Cancer Hospitals' in Lindsay 
Granshaw and Roy Porter (eds.), The Hospital in History (London/New York: Routledge, 1989), 221. 
308 WLS, 161. 
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motivation for coming to St Luke's was both professional and deeply personal. From 
her work as a nurse she knew she had that rare gift of relieving people's suffering and it 
strengthened her wish to be with the dying. Talks with David Tasma, the man whom 
Cicely loved and who was one of her patients while she was an almoner, helped to 
shape her ideas. David was dying from cancer at Archway Hospital and Cicely was his 
only visitor. They discussed what could be done for many others like him, who were 
ending their lives desperately alone and in great pain. When David died, he left Cicely 
five hundred pounds towards the future project of a home for the dying of a new type. 
That was a 'window',309 round which to build the house that Cicely longed for but did 
not yet visualise. 
A qualified nurse, Cicely often witnessed the officious striving to cure the 
incurable and the abandonment of the dying patients who no longer responded to the 
aggressive treatment offered by contemporary medicine. Often seen as disturbing cases 
illustrating the limits of medical power, these patients were left to die comatose from 
dmgs or in a state of an ongoing unrelieved pain. As in the late nineteenth century, in 
the 1940s those who suffered from terminal illnesses found themselves outside the 
healthcare system from the moment when all curative efforts were exhausted to the time 
of death. The hospices that already existed by that time were the only places where the 
complex needs of the dying were understood and an attempt made to meet them. Dr 
Howard Barrett, the founder ofSt Luke's House, thus described the hospice philosophy: 
We do not think or speak of our inmates as "cases". We realise that each one is a 
human microcosm, with its own characteristics, its own life history, intensely 
interesting to itself and some small surrounding circle. Very often it is confided 
to some ofus.310 
Not only this vision, which she, as an evangelical Christian rejoiced to see being put to 
practice, but also the innovative use of analgesic dmgs impressed Cicely when she 
joined St Luke's team. For the first time in her health service career she saw the dying 
patients 'with both their mental and physical pain relieved so that they were relatively 
comfortable, yet alert, almost until the end. ' 311 This was achieved by regular giving of 
pain-killers, before the recurrence of pain. Medication was administered where possible 
by mouth rather than by injection. 
309 David Tasma felt he was dying after an unfulfilled life and found comfort in the thought that his death 
might have a meaning. In one of their conversations he told Cicely: 'I'll be a window in your home': 
Shirley Du Boulay, Cicely Saunders: The Founder of the Modern Ho~pice Movement (London: Hodder & 
Stoughton, 2"d rev.ed., 1994), 58 [hereafter abbreviated CS]. 
310 Ibid, 61. 
311 Ibid. 
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With cancer taking place of tuberculosis as the most common incurable 
disease,312 the numbers of patients in need of specialised terminal care grew rapidly. 
They were also no longer confined to the lower classes of the society. However, in the 
medical world the quest to find a cure prevailed over the demands of care. The skills 
and the knowledge acquired in the hospices for some unaccountable reason were neither 
systematically studied nor widely spread. Perhaps, the fact that hospices relied mainly 
on visiting physicians and had no doctors on their staff could have been one 
explanation.313 At the time pain in the terminally ill was a totally new field in medicine 
and having graduated as a doctor Cicely Saunders received a research scholarship from 
the Halley Stewart Trust to work under the supervision of Professor Harold Stewart at 
St Mary's Hospital. She spent three days a week at St Joseph's Hospice in Hackney, 
'observing the patients, evaluating the use of drugs and, most important of all, 
listening.'314 In 1958 St Joseph's had 150 beds in total, between forty and fifty of which 
were for dying patients, the rest occupied by homeless frail and elderly and those with 
chronic illnesses who did not qualify for rehabilitation. 
It was outside the National Health Service, but contractual arrangements with 
the Health Service meant that for most patients it was free. Only three of the 
nuns were trained nurses, the rest were auxiliaries - young Irish girls. They all 
worked prodigiously hard, seven days a week with just one two-week holiday a 
year, nevertheless the nursing care was excellent, the nuns serene and the 
atmosphere cheerful. Though the medical care was unsophisticated, the patients 
felt accepted in their pain and anxiety. The nuns were not trained to cope with 
acute pain, or some of the distressing symptoms that can accompany terminal 
cancer, such as intractable vomiting or breathlessness; there were no resident 
doctors, just two part-time GPs, busy with their own practices. 315 
Cicely Saunders was the first doctor to give all her time, skills and versatile professional 
expertise exclusively to the dying. She applied the regular giving of analgesics, which 
she has learnt in St Luke's, starting with Omnopon and gradually introducing morphine. 
This technique was the beginning of a real breakthrough as it has clinically proved not 
to turn the patients into 'drug-addicts', which has always been and to some extent still 
remains the dread ofthe medical profession. Cicely Saunders wrote: 
It is our experience that if pain is kept permanently in remission tolerance is 
remarkably slow in developing and may never appear. We have patients on the 
312 According to Clare Humphreys tuberculosis remained one of the leading causes of death until the mid-
twentieth century: WLS, 156. 
313 Only the Hostel of God had a salaried Medical Officer and St Luke's had a Medical Superintendent: 
ibid. 
314 CS, 69. 
315 Ibid, 69-70. 
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same dosage for months and even years, and many who have had drugs on 
request before they come to us are able to have less analgesic in the twenty-four 
hours once control has been established? 16 
The other method that she carried on from St Luke's was giving the medication by 
mouth whenever possible. It helped the patients to retain as much independence as they 
possibly could. 
In the 1960s many new drugs became available and by painstaking investigation 
Dr Saunders was finding ways of improving symptom control as well as advancing pain 
control. Having been a nurse herself, she involved the nursing staff in the decision-
making process with regard to treatment. Her prescriptions were written in a way that 
allowed a certain flexibility in the dosage so that the nurses could assess it according to 
the immediate needs of the patient. The type of drugs, the dosage and the frequency of 
giving were reviewed on a regular basis. She entered a neglected field and laid the 
foundations for a new medical specialty. During her time at St Joseph's she produced 
meticulously detailed records on each of the thousand patients dying of cancer that she 
observed. The patient's family, if there was one, was included in the notion of each 
patient being a 'human microcosm'. Equally important, she took the love, which 
permeated the atmosphere in St Joseph's, and turned it into a new philosophy of care by 
insisting that 'feelings are facts in this house'. 317 No wonder the nuns at St Joseph's 
were calling her 'Manna from Heaven'.318 
The success of Dr Saunders' activity soon reached the wider world. Many 
visitors to St Joseph's, including nurses, medical students and simply anybody who was 
interested to learn, were gladly taken round the hospice. Dr Leonard Colebrook, the 
chair of the Voluntary Euthanasia Society, who visited St Joseph's in 1959, 'was 
impressed to the point of bewilderment'319 by what he saw there. Afterwards in his 
letter to Cicely Saunders he wrote: 
The visit did help me very much to try and get this difficult problem in 
perspective. I still feel that there would be little or no problem of euthanasia if 
all the terminal disease folks could end their lives in that atmosphere you have 
done so much to create - but alas that can hardly be for many a long year and 
meanwhile, how many thousands will end their lives in very different 
circumstances? You will raise the standard of tenninal care throughout the 
profession- more power to you.320 
316 CS, 71. 
317 lbid, 72. 
318 Ibid, 71. 
319 Cicely Saunders' expression in her letter to her former tutor Betty Read, quoted in CS, 72. 
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Finally it was the time to act. Now Dr Saunders could start building round that 'window' 
left to her by David Tasma. With the help of many professional and personal friends 
who shared her new vision for terminal care, she managed to raise money on top of 
David's five hundred pounds and bought two sites in Lawrie Park Road in London. In 
March 1965 the first spit for the future building was dug. The new Hospice, named after 
St Christopher, was officially opened on 24 July 1967 by Princess Alexandra. It was the 
first modem hospice in the UK and in the world. 
3. From St Christopher's World Wide 
St Christopher's Hospice was not just another home for the dying. It was a new 
type of institution based on the central idea of combining 'deeply rooted spirituality 
with the very best care that medicine can provide. ' 321 This idea presupposed not only a 
particular practice or method, but also a way of life that has developed into the hospice 
movement, the impact of which 'does not depend on bricks and mortar. ' 322 The most 
significant part of this impact consists in the emerging specialty of palliative care, 
which was officially recognised in 1987 simultaneously in the UK, Australia and New 
Zealand. 323 In 1990 the World Health Organisation gave the following definition: 
Palliative care is the active, total care of patients whose disease is not responsive 
to curative treatment. Control of pain, of other symptoms and of psychological, 
social and spiritual problems is paramount. The goal of palliative care is 
achievement of the best possible quality of life for patients and their families. 324 
The National Council for Hospice and Specialist Palliative Care Services reaffirmed the 
lasting relevance of this definition. 325 The range of incurable conditions to which 
palliative care can be now applied is from cancer to MND and is constantly widening. It 
includes both malignant and chronic illnesses. Palliative care affirms life, while neither 
hastening nor postponing death, and can be delivered at home, in nursing homes, within 
residential care, in hospitals and specialist units. 326 Hospice care comprises specialist 
palliative care services for those whose death is anticipated. Terminal care is provided 
321 CS, 88. 
322 The phrase used by Sir George Young, Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Department of Health 
and Social Security. Quoted in Cicely Saunders, Dorothy H. Summers and Neville Teller (eds.), Hospice: 
The Living Idea (London: Edward Arnold Ltd., 1981), vii. 
323 CAAS, 292. 
324 Cancer Pain Relief and Palliative Care. Report of WHO Expert Committee. Technical Report Series 
804. Geneva, 1990, 11. 
325 Avril Jackson and Ann Eve (eds.), Direct01y 2002: Hospice and Palliative Care Services in the United 
Kingdom and Republic of Ireland (London: Hospice Information, 2002), ix. 
326 National Council for Hospice and Specialist Palliative Care Services, Specialist Palliative Care: A 
Statement of Definitions (Occasional Paper 8) (London: NCHSPC, 1995), 52 [hereafter abbreviated 
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within the hospice care for patients during their last few days, weeks or months of 
life.327 All this has emerged and gradually shaped into a system due to St Christopher's 
role not only as a model hospice, but also as an excellent clinical research and education 
facility, much of which stems from the extraordinary personality of its founder, now 
Dame Cicely Saunders. The largest and best developed in the UK, this system has 
overtaken the world and is constantly spreading and improving. At present there are 98 
countries where palliative care services are already established in various forms and a 
further four countries are working towards it. The estimated number of services is 
reaching eight thousand. 328 These include hospices, home care teams, day care centres 
and hospital palliative care units. 
III. The Russian Context 
1. Background 
One of the patients who died in St Christopher's in the mid-1970s was Jane 
Zorza, a 25-year-old girl with advanced melanoma. Her parents, Victor and Rosemary, 
later wrote a book A Way to Die: Living to the End, which described how hospice care 
enabled their daughter to have a peaceful and beautiful death. Published in 1980 and 
subsequently translated into many languages this personal account changed the way of 
thinking about dying in many countries and gave strong support to the international 
force of the growing hospice movement. Victor Zorza, a political journalist born in 
Western Ukraine, helped to open the first Russian hospice, 'Lachta', in St Petersburg in 
1990. The second hospice appeared in Tula in 1992. The building of the First Moscow 
Hospice was officially opened in 1997. At present there are hospices, hospital palliative 
care units and pain control departments in more than fifteen Russian regions. 
To start establishing itself on Russian soil the idea of hospice care had to 
overcome three main difficulties. 
First of all, the subject of death was in a certain way taboo during Soviet times. 
For those Russian doctors who realised the needs of the dying patients there was 
virtually nothing to build on. IfCicely Saunders could draw most ofher knowledge and 
inspiration from a continued tradition of religious institutions for the dying poor, 
Andrey Gnezdilov, the founder of the first Russian hospice, had to start from scratch 
327 NCHSPC, 53. 
328 Summary of Hospice and Palliative Care Provision by Continent, http://www.hospiccinformation.inf(J 
/docs/worldwide stats.doc (21 August 2002). 
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totally relying on his own intuition and experience as a doctor. Seventy-odd years of 
communism had on the one hand completely destroyed the social ministry of the 
Church and on the other hand carried the medical bias towards cure to its utmost. 
Within the communist ideology of social equality and the quest for a 'happy future' 
there was no place for the spiritual either in health or in illness. Death acquired a 
meaning only in the forms which were seen to be heroic: on the battlefield or in social 
martyrdom. Prolonged dying from an incurable disease seemed to be not only 
disgraceful, but also devoid of meaning. Since religious beliefs in the afterlife were 
declared myths, such a death could not quite fit into the pattern of living. Hence it was 
'not to exist, not to be seen or encountered. ' 329 Soviet medicine was uncompromisingly 
'victorious,' and cases that fell short of curative treatment were regarded as defeat.330 
Nonetheless the patients who personified this defeat did not disappear, they still lived 
and suffered. They spent their last days either in the specialised cancer clinics or at 
home. The building of the Moscow Oncology Institute named after P .A. Herzen is said 
to have been designed specifically as a symbol of horror, because cancer was something 
to be feared, something that had no place in the happiness of the communist society. 331 
It is a multi-storey grim construction, whose exterior gives the patient an impression 
that his condition must be grave indeed, if he is sent to this monster for treatment. Inside 
is no better: Boris Yudin, psychologist in the First Moscow Hospice, compared the set 
up in the institute to the production line of a factory, where the patient is transfened 
from one stage of the process to another without being much considered. It has to be 
said, though, that only a small number of people actually died in the special institutions. 
After exhausting the possibilities of curative treatment patients were discharged to bring 
down the official mortality rates. With the underdevelopment of pain control and the 
absence of palliative care approach deaths at home were often excruciating and lonely. 
The end of the communist regime and the spiritual revival that followed made it 
possible for Russian society to discuss the problem openly and to take on board Western 
experience in end-of-life care. One of the greatest silences of the Soviet era was 
vocalised in the birth of the Russian hospice movement. 
329 The phrase used by Vera Millionshikova, seminar on the needs of terminally ill at the First Moscow 
Hospice, 25 December 2001, personal recording. 
330 Interview with Vera Millionshikova, Medical Director of the First Moscow Hospice, 
http://wwvv.bospice.ru/win/intervie.htrnl (22 August 2002). 
331 Everybody who sees the building immediately has that feeling of induced fear. The architect later 
confirmed to Vera Millionshikova that it was planned to that effect. Seminar on the needs of terminally ill 
at the First Moscow Hospice, 25 December 2001, personal recording. 
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However, this acknowledgement was not sufficient. To secure non-interference 
in the quest for medical victories the system had created a concept of the 'sacred lie', 
which was so successfully implemented in the mentality of generations of doctors that it 
is still to be overturned. The patient was never told the true diagnosis if the disease 
appeared to be malignant. As Professor Boris Peterson, the former Head of the Moscow 
Oncology Institute named after P.A. Herzen, put it: 'We frequently tell our patients that 
it is necessary to operate on account of ulcers, benignant neoplasms, etc. ' 332 This 
medical conspiracy was believed to be beneficial for the patient, oriented to mobilise 
him to fight the disease. It may have worked where the treatment succeeded, but those 
unfortunate ones for whom it was a failure were left in total psychological as well as 
social isolation. By the last stages of the illness they would know the truth, in spite of 
the joint efforts of others to conceal it. This situation maintained the vicious circle. 
How could one discuss one's death if nobody admitted to the existence of incurable 
diseases? The home care team of the First Moscow Hospice still comes across families 
who ask them not to mention that they are from the hospice, but to introduce themselves 
as social services or as coming from the local polyclinic.333 However, most of the 
patients would be well aware of their real condition, but would not have the opportunity 
to share their knowledge and in doing so ease the burden of suffering. The secrecy that 
surrounded cancer has also created collateral myths about it being contagious and 
untreatable. In this situation the ostracism experienced by patients reached its climax. 
In 1998 Article 31 of the Foundations of the Healthcare Law of the Russian 
Federation for the first time stated the patient's right to see his medical history and to 
be provided with the copies in order to get a second opinion. 334 In the past, medical 
documentation was never shown to the patient. Like criminal records, it had to be 
always locked away and not to be left unattended. Hospices must have contributed to 
the legal change, as they work with self-referral. However, several generations being 
brought up in a totalitarian state, it takes time to realise that one does have rights and to 
learn how to exercise them. The psychological set-up formed by seventy years of living 
in fear will take decades to get rid of. Moreover, in an unstable economic situation, 
where only some can afford commercial medicine and state healthcare keeps itself 
going on bribes, it is extremely problematic to stand up to the system when faced by a 
life-threatening illness. Therefore the right to information about one's medical condition 
332 Michael Ryan, 'Ethics and the Patient With Cancer', BMJ, 25 August 1979, 480-481. 
333 Vera Millionshikova, seminar on the needs of terminally ill at the First Moscow Hospice, 25 
December 200 I, personal recording. 
334 FHL, 25. 
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still remains mainly on paper, restricting the patient's ability to participate in the choice 
of treatment options in the earlier stages of the disease. And the pre-existing 
superstitious beliefs about cancer, reinforced by the negative aura surrounding it, result 
in most cases being diagnosed at the third and fourth stages of the disease. 
The third stumbling rock inherited from the Soviet healthcare system is 'the 
continuing negative attitude towards morphine' .335 It is still largely regarded as highly 
addictive and inevitably developing tolerance. Although Cicely Saunders by her clinical 
research in St Joseph's had proved this to be a misconception, which was later 
reaffirmed by the studies that Dr Robert Twycross carried out in St Christopher's and is 
constantly reconfirmed by palliative care specialists world wide, the limits on the 
dosage for terminal pain relief in Russia are still stipulated by the Ministry of Health 
regulations.336 Not very long ago the stated maximum daily dosage of narcotic drugs per 
patient was 50 mg.337 It has now been increased to 120 mg.338 It remains 
incomprehensible how these restrictions manage to co-exist with the WHO guidance on 
cancer pain control, officially recognised and adopted in Russia for hospice practice, 
which clearly indicates that there is no upper limit even on the dosage of strong opioids 
in terminal care.339 Since all the hospices in Russia are run by the state, this situation, 
compounded by the general inadequate drug supply, is very difficult to resolve. 
Palliative care specialists have to be inventive in finding the best combination of the 
available quantities of opioids and NSAIDs (non-steroid anti-inflammatory drugs) to 
achieve the needed quality of pain control. Very often, as Dr Audrey Gnezdilov put it, 
'clinicians are the real medication for the dying patient' .340 In other words, in the deficit 
of analgesics, the doctor has to help the patient by 'offering oneself, concentrate harder 
on providing psychological support. For almost fifteen years before he was able to open 
the first Russian hospice 'Lachta' in St Petersburg, Dr Gnezdilov was doing exactly 
that. In his work as a psychotherapist with cancer patients he pioneered setting up an 
unusual theatre at home. Patients were invited to an evening performance, where they 
335 Stuart Milligan, 'Sharing Experiences', Palliative and Cancer Matters, Issue 25, June 2002, 5. 
336 MHHHCTepcTBo 3.UpasooxpaHemrn P<l>, flpHKaJ .N2 2 oT 09.01.2001 r. (rrpHno>Kemte)/Ministry of 
Health of the Russian Federation, Order No. 2, 9 January 2001, Supplement, http:/ 
/www.nedug.ru/lib/docmn/doc02/min200 1 6.shtml.htm1 (26 August 2002). 
337 AH.upeii fHe3.UJUIOB, Jlymb Ha Tonzocj;y: ottepKu pa6ombz ncuxomepaneema e onKonozu'lecKou 
KJIUHUKe u xocnuce (CaHKT-TieTep6ypr: A03T «10U1HT», 1995)/Andrey V.Gnezdilov, A Way to 
Golgotha: Essays on the work of psychotherapist in the oncology clinic and in the hospice (St. 
Petersburg: AOZT 'KLINT', 1995), 38 [hereafter abbreviated WG]. 
338 Pavel Lopanov, Head of Social and Medical Development, the First Moscow Hospice, personal 
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could dress up as different characters and take part in acting. This helped them to 
communicate their feelings non-verbally and to distance themselves from 
'personification of cancer' .341 This is an account of a visit to this house theatre: 
Andrei greeted us, dressed in top hat, tails and cane. His assistant was also 
dressed in period costume. Andrei explained this was part of one of the therapies 
he uses. He showed us a wall covered with dozens of dolls (clients are asked to 
choose one which they feel represents them, and keep it with them throughout 
their consultation). His flat was full of objects and artefacts, many of a religious 
nature, or with some other spiritual significance. Most impressive were the flat 
metal "bells" which he also uses as part of his therapy. Also of interest were the 
wire sculptures representing different human emotions and experiences which 
seem to take on life of their own when they are placed on a revolving turntable 
and a light used to cast their shadows against the wall. 342 
It is interesting to note that before the experience of his foreign colleagues became 
known in Russia, Dr Gnezdilov's practice targeted all the three difficulties that cancer 
patients faced within the Soviet system. In acting the taboo of death was broken, the 
'sacred lie' gave place to the openness of non-verbal communication, and the feeling of 
being accepted made up for the inadequacies of pain control. 
2. 'Personified Therapy' 
Just like Cicely Saunders, Andrey Gnezdilov converted his long standing 
personal experience into a way of thinking which shaped the character of Russian 
hospice philosophy. The principles outlined at the end of his book A Way to Golgotha, 
were later expanded by the team of the First Moscow Hospice to form the Hospice 
Commandments:343 
1. Hospice is not about death. It is about dignified life till the end. We just work 
with people whose lives are shorter than ours. 
2. Hospice is the place to ease pain and suffering, attending both to body and 
soul. There is little we can do on our own, only together with the patient and 
family our resources are endless. 
3. Neither hasten nor impede dying. Everyone has their allotted span and we are 
only fellow travellers on the way. 
4. Death and birth are free of charge. 
5. Absence of cure should not equal absence of care. Tiny things that go 
unnoticed when healthy are much appreciated when sick. 
6. The patient and family are a whole. Do not judge, help. 
7. Approaching the end gives wisdom. Watch out for it... 
341 WG, 89. 
342 
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343 TiepBhiH MocKOBCKHH xocnHcftiTo TaKoe 'Q>HJiocoQ>m1 xocnHca'?/The First Moscow Hospice/What Is 
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8. Everyone is a personality. Do not impose yourself. You receive more than 
you can gtve. 
9. Your image is the hospice image. 
10. Never rush your visit, sit down. However short the time it is enough to do 
your best. Caring for the family of someone who has died is part of it. 
11. Accept everything from the patient, even aggression. Understanding before 
action, acceptance before understanding. 
12. Tell the truth if the patient feels like hearing it. Always be open, but never 
push. 
13. Whether planned or unexpected, your visit is equally appreciated. Come 
often, call if you cannot come, think if you cannot call and .. .lift the receiver. 
14. The hospice is a home. Behave accordingly. 
15. Being kind, honest and open is not for the patients, it is a way of life. 
16. The main thing you should know is that you know very little. 
These commandments to a great extent reflect the hospice care philosophy world 
wide. However, the experience of both the first Russian hospice in St Petersburg and 
the First Moscow Hospice show that there are differences in practice, which largely 
stem from the peculiarities of the background outlined in the previous section. 
As the first commandment emphasises, hospice is not a place of death, it is first 
and foremost a place of living. It does not take people to die, it helps them to live with 
their illness. The idea behind the hospice as a specific building is to provide a short-
term support for the patients and their families. The aim is to enable people to stay at 
home as long as possible and to admit them only to work out or adjust an individual 
pain control scheme, or to provide respite care where needed. However, two-thirds of 
the hospice patients in Russia actually end their lives there. As Gnezdilov remarks, this 
is a 'bad figure' ,344 which gives a wrong impression about the tasks and aims of hospice 
as an institution and runs contrary to the philosophy of it. 
A complex of cultural, social and economic reasons accounts for this 
'unfortunate' statistic. The Soviet perseverance in banning death from the socio-cultural 
context backfired after the ban was lifted. Paradoxically the hospice movement in the 
post-communist Russia while struggling to destroy the former ideology is trapped in the 
consequences of it. Death having been shut off for so long a time resulted in the 
inability of people to face ie45 and hospices rather than helping to re-establish the long-
forgotten practice of caring for the dying at home, within the family circle, adopt the 
role of a modem substitute of this tradition. The fact that all Russian hospices are state-
344 WG, 49. 
345 In autumn of 2001 Andrey Gnezdilov opened his address at the first International Conference of the 
Multinational Centre for Quality of Life Research by stating that 'Russians can't cope with dying': 
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run346 creates an impression that death, once reinstated into the public agenda, has been 
immediately institutionalised. There was a lot of misunderstanding and poor 
communication before a satisfactory interaction between local polyclinics and hospices 
was established. Until then self-referral dominated, which more often than not took 
place when there was too little time left for proper terminal care and people died in the 
arms of the hospice team.347 
On the one hand, after the decades of cultivating the ideology of death as a 'no 
man's land', when there was no place for dying within the healthcare system, hospices 
came as a proper locus, that long-awaited missing structure into which it might fit. In 
other words, the figure over which Dr Gnezdilov laments will remain the same as long 
as the hospice is perceived to be a place of death. Moreover, this distorted perception is 
unwittingly strengthened by the absence of any kind of life-support machines in the 
Russian hospices, 348 which is often presented as an integral part of the hospice 
philosophy, which it is not. For example, in St Luke's Hospice in Kenton Grange in 
London they do have ventilators and even resuscitation equipment.349 Artificial 
ventilation is part of the everyday life for some of the children at the Rainbow Family 
Trust in Manchester. 350 It is not that the use of medical technology ends where hospice 
care starts; they just do not need to be mutually exclusive. The aim of hospice 
philosophy is not the rejection of modem biomedical achievements, but the balanced 
and appropriate use of them. As Dame Cicely Saunders' vision goes, 'a hospice as a 
protest against the shortcomings of modem high technology' should not 'lose the 
benefits that modem technology has to offer. ' 351 
On the other hand, family bonds in Russia are traditionally very strong and even 
after seventy-odd years of brainwashing most people appear reluctant to put their 
nearest and dearest in an institution unless it is absolutely unavoidable. If in the West 
balancing one's own interests and those of others is part of the culture, the Russian 
mentality is still more of a sacrificial character. Therefore more often than not the 
hospice is contacted when all the domestic resources, both physical and emotional, are 
346 80% of the First Moscow Hospice budget comes from the Moscow city government, the rest is 
covered by charitable donations: Vera Millionshikova, seminar on the needs of terminally ill at the First 
Moscow Hospice, 25 December 2001, personal recording. However, the inpatient unit of the 
Lomintsevsky Hospice in Tula is fmanced chiefly by an American organization (but still run by the state). 
347 Report by Dr T.V. Saveljeva, consultation on palliative care in the First Moscow Hospice in 1994 
(unpublished materials). 
348 My interview with Pavel Lopanov (28 December 2001). 
349 My interview with John Comer, Chairman of St Luke's Hospice, Kenton Grange, London (18 July 
2002). 
350 My interview with Margaret Hickie ( 17 June 2002). 
351 CS, 183. 
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not just at a low ebb, but completely exhausted. In such circumstances it is difficult to 
see the hospice as 'a home from home' and not as a grim and hostile 'point of no 
return'. Instead of offering respite care, Russian hospices end up being 'a last resort'. 
If some families succeed in their struggle to look after the sick person till the 
end, for those lonely souls who do not have any relations the hospice becomes a place to 
end their lives simply because there is no other. In the situation where the system of 
social services is appallingly weak, many of those who are admitted to the hospices on 
the basis of so called 'social indications' end up spending months and even years 
there.352 Ailish Carr, Ward Manager at St Christopher's Hospice in London, where the 
average stay is not more than several weeks, during her visit to one of the Russian 
hospices was puzzled to find patients who had been there for several months. 353 
Compared to Britain, where hospice provision complements the services available 
within the web of residential care, nursing homes and a wide range of specialised 
charitable organisations, Russian hospices often have to act as a substitute for them. 
Again, instead of exemplifying a new approach to the life affected by a serious illness, 
they appear as just another type of institution for the dying poor. 
These cultural and social dimensions are reinforced by economic factors. State 
disability benefits and pensions can hardly cover basic everyday necessities and make it 
impossible to stay at home when the illness enters an advanced stage, increasing not 
only physical and moral, but also financial burdens. Special equipment giving the 
opportunity to maintain independence and various devices enabling a sick person to 
remain at home till the end are costly and thus unaffordable for many. 
Another distinctive characteristic of the Russian hospice reality is the level of 
personal emotional involvement required from the staff, which due to the specifics of 
the Russian situation has a higher toll on them compared to their British colleagues. 
'Personified therapy' or 'therapy of presence' 354 are not simply part of the concept of 
'total care' integral to the hospice philosophy everywhere, but the core of the Russian 
hospice set up. The significance given here to the 'soul to soul' communication 
between the patient and the carer has led British nurses to acknowledge that a special 
352 The fact that in Russian hospices many of the patients are admitted for the duration of their illness has 
been observed by many specialists from abroad. See, for example: Mary A. Cooke, 'The Russian Way of 
Hospice', The American Journal of Hospice & Palliative Care, 7-8 (1995), 9-13. 
353 Ailish Carr, Ward Manager at St Christopher's Hospice in London, personal communication (16 July 
2002). 
354 Terms coined by Dr Gnezdilov. See: WG, 49; A.B. fHe3.D.IUIOB, 'TicHXOTepanesm'-lecKHe acneKTbi B 
xocnucHoii cny)!{6e', Tla;IJiuamueHGR MeOUlfUHa u Pea6wrumal{Wl, 1 (1998), 31/ A.V. Gnezdi1ov, 
'Psychotherapeutic Aspects of the Hospice Services', Palliative Medicine and Rehabilitation, 1 (1998), 
30. 
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expertise of easing the suffering as opposed to the art of pain relief undoubtedly belongs 
to their Russian colleagues.355 This, of course, reflects first and foremost the nature of 
the society in general. In Britain the high quality of life in terms of material wealth, 
social security and legal awareness of the citizens naturally extends to the hospice 
environment. In post-Soviet Russia, the impact of political turmoil and economic 
instability compounded by legal ignorance and the seriously underdeveloped network of 
community-based services becomes fully exposed within the hospice system. This 
general connection between the aspects of societal reality and the needs of the hospice 
patients is an important part of a cultural set-up within which palliative care specialists 
inevitably find themselves. However this connection can be interpreted in different 
ways. Some would argue, as Andrey Gnezdilov does,356 that the high level of personal 
engagement on the part of the staff in the Russian hospices is determined and sustained 
by the deficit of medications and the unwise restrictions on narcotic painkillers applied 
by the Ministry of Health. Others, like Vera Millionshikova, Medical Director of the 
First Moscow Hospice, have a deeper insight into the matter and are certain that the 
psychological make-up consequential to the totalitarian regime will take a long time to 
shrug off, the amount or variety of drugs as well as the availability of the most updated 
medical techniques and special equipment notwithstanding. 357 Dr Millionshikova asserts 
that 80% of the pain experienced by the patients in Russia is not physical, but 
psychological. 358 Profound disregard for the person demonstrated by the Soviet state is 
echoed in the story of every patient suffering not so much, if at all, from pain and 
discomfort, as from the lack of basic human attention. The psychological component of 
'total pain' prevails in the Russian hospices increasing the demand for a healing 
individual commitment of the staff. 
On the administrative side, the biggest problem encountered in the Russian 
hospices is a rapid staff turnover. The concept of 'bum-out' that has been successfully 
dealt with in the British hospice system still seriously affects the work here. The 'shelf-
life' of approximately three years appears to be rather a norm than an exception for 
those working in the field of palliative care in Russia. It can be explained by the scope 
and intensity of the 'therapy of presence', although this alone would not suffice. As the 
British and, indeed, Western experience shows, whatever the level and nature of 
355 WG 11 
356 Ibid, 49·. 
357 Vera Millionshikova, 'Peculiarities of the Russian Hospices', a paper delivered at one of the 
consultations on palliative care in the First Moscow Hospice in 1994 (unpublished materials). 
358 Vera Millionshikova, seminar on the needs of terminally ill at the First Moscow Hospice, 25 
December 2001, personal recording. 
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difficulties involved in the hospice work they need not trigger professional 'expiry 
dates'. They need to be balanced by an appropriate staff support, which includes 'issues 
of recruitment, orientation, training, appraisal, communication and team-building'. 359 
In Russia, however, effective realisation of this task is hindered by locating the hospices 
within the state health care system. For hospice staff salaries, already ridiculously low 
in Russian healthcare, cannot by definition be compensated by 'side earnings'. Thus 
permanent staff see their work as a vocation rather than professionally enhancing or 
career beneficial. Even more so is it for volunteers, who are significantly smaller in 
numbers compared to their Western counterparts. 
Instead of moving 'out of the National Health Service in order that ideas and 
knowledge could move back in' ,360 which task has been successfully accomplished by 
the hospice movement in Britain,361 the Russian hospices attempt, as it were, building 
from inside the system. The result is ambivalent. While having introduced certain 
attitudes and skills previously unknown in the Soviet medicine, the hospices at the same 
time automatically inherited a heavy negative residue of the old healthcare system. 
Unfortunately, a lot of time and effort is still spent attempting to shake off the latter 
leaving much fewer resources to develop the former. 
IV. How Hospice Philosophy is Different From Euthanasia 
It is repeatedly stressed in the multitude of publications that 'hospice care and 
euthanasia are mutually exclusive philosophies'. 362 However, in spite of continuous 
utterance of this mantra, the claims persist that euthanasia and physician-assisted 
suicide should form a logical extension of terminal care or even that they already exist 
as part of hospice practice that just fails to be fully recognised.363 In the face of such 
disagreements, it is important to understand how proper end of life care should be 
distinguished from euthanasia. 
359 Barbara Monroe, 'The Cost to the Professional Carer' in Cicely Saunders and Nigel Sykes (eds.), The 
Management of Terminal Malignant Disease (London: Edward Arnold, 3rd ed., 1993), 236 [hereafter 
abbreviated MTMD]. 
36
° Cicely Saunders' explanation why she did not want St Christopher's to be part ofNHS. 
361 There is a possibility though that since palliative care, as an official specialty, is now a responsibility 
of statutory bodies (NHS), the core hospice service might end up being funded by the state healthcare 
system. However, it is extremely unlikely that things will get completely assimilated into it. 
362 Robert G. Twycross, 'Where There Is Hope, There Is Life: A View From the Hospice' in EE, 152. 
363 See, for example, how Barbara J. Logue argues this in her article entitled 'Rejoinder to Saunders', 
OMEGA, 32 (1) (1995-96), 7-9. 
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1. Medical Aspects 
With the advances in palliative medicine it became easier to draw the distinction 
medically, i.e. to determine with the help of clinical evidence whether a doctor intends 
the death of a patient. 
In the use of drugs, the nature of the substance, its quantity and the manner of 
administration matter. In cases, like that of Dr Cox, the occurrence of euthanasia can be 
quite easily established on the basis of medical evidence. Injecting potassium chloride, 
which has no analgesic properties, neat into a vein in quantities double that ofthe lethal 
dose has clearly nothing to do with palliative care.364 With narcotics and sedatives, 
which are widely used in palliation, this line of demarcation appears to be significantly 
blurred: the nature of these substances is ambivalent, as they can both relieve suffering 
and kill. Therefore one should pay more attention to the quantity and to the way of 
administration. The most comprehensive guidance is summarised by Lo and Jonsen in 
their concept of a counterfactual test: 
... a practical application of the test would require the physician to first consider 
other means of relieving the neurologic symptoms or to try low doses of 
narcotics and sedatives. If the lower doses were ineffective, he could then give 
progressively higher doses. Ultimately he might find that the only way to relieve 
the symptoms would be to make the patient unconscious. But even then the 
physician would not be justified in giving more than the appropriate dose to 
maintain unconsciousness. Giving more than this dose would again be intending 
to kill the patient, and hence be indistinguishable from administering an air 
bubble or from any other form of active euthanasia.365 
But how low is 'low' or how high is 'high'? To use this test correctly, it is important to 
understand that these qualifications do not have a categorical, but a relative meaning. 
What is decisive is not the physical quantity of the drug given, but its correlation with 
the patient's medical condition. For some a single dose of20 mg of morphine can tum 
out to be lethal, whereas for others 1000 mg is a daily amount which helps them to 
maintain an active style of life. 366 Palliative care is precisely about the medical skill in 
"ki h b 1 367 stn ng t e a ance. 
364 For a detailed medical expertise in the case see: R v Cox (1992), 12 Butterworths Medico-Legal 
Reports (BMLR). 
365 B. Lo and A.R. Jonsen, 'Ethical Decisions in the Care of a Patient Terminally Ill With Metastatic 
Cancer', Annals of Internal Medicine, 92 (1) (1980), 109. 
366 One lady was driving a car on lg of morphine per day and the cause ofher death was something other 
than cancer (my interview with Margaret Jefferson, St. Cuthbert's Hospice, 6 September 2002). 
367 The standard technique in pain relief, which in most cases also applies to symptom control consists in 
giving medication 'by mouth, by the clock and by the analgesic ladder': World Health Organisation, 
Cancer Pain Relief With a Guide to Opioid Availability (Geneva: WHO, 2"d ed., 1996). 
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The same skill is applied when deciding on withholding and withdrawing of 
treatments or machines. Within the hospice set up it is again, a medical indications 
policy. Any particular treatment or device has its medical potential. The higher it is, the 
closer one would be to committing euthanasia in not starting or stopping them. The 
lower it is, the greater is the likelihood of adhering to good medical practice in 
abandoning them. Like the dosage of medication, this potential does not have an 
independent value scale, but corresponds to the patient's medical condition. To refer to 
the cases in the previous chapter, refusal by the hospice to switch off the artificial 
ventilation for Miss B would have had perfectly sound medical grounds. In her case, the 
potential of the device used was high, because it sustained her life. The nature of the 
disease was such that it would not have precluded her living as long as she will, 
provided the artificial ventilation was in place. In contrast, for Diane Pretty, the same 
device would have had its potential at the lowest, if not on zero. The nature of her 
disease was such that it would not have allowed her to live either way: whether with the 
artificial ventilation or without it. In her case, it would not have sustained life, but only 
impeded dying. There are, of course, middle way situations, where in one and the same 
patient the medical condition varies through the course of their illness, so that greater 
medical skill is required in adjusting the potential of certain treatments and devices to 
each particular stage. One example can be determining the time spans during which a 
patient with a specific illness should be put on and off a ventilator. 368 
2. Christian Aspects 
No matter how advanced the sctence of palliative care becomes, there will 
always remain 'grey areas', where medical criteria alone would be insufficient to 
divorce it from the practice of euthanasia. Consider an anonymous account, which 
appeared under the title 'It's Over, Debbie' in the Journal of the American Medical 
Association: 
I grabbed the chart from the nurses' station on my way to the patient's room, 
and the nurse gave me some hurried details: a 20-year-old girl named Debbie 
was dying of ovarian cancer. . . . As I approached the room I could hear loud, 
labored breathing .... She was receiving nasal oxygen, had an IV, and was 
sitting in bed suffering from what was obviously severe air hunger. ... A second 
woman, also dark-haired but of middle age, stood at her right, holding her hand . 
. . . The room seemed filled with the patient's desperate effort to survive .... She 
368 My interview with Margaret Rickie, Senior Nurse at the Rainbow Family Trust, Manchester, 17 June 
2002. 
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had not eaten or slept in two days. She had not responded to chemotherapy and 
was being given supportive care only .... Her only words to me were, "Let's get 
this over with." 
I retreated with my thoughts to the nurses' station. The patient was tired and 
needed rest. I could not give her health, but I could give her rest. I asked the 
nurse to draw 20 mg of morphine sulfate into a syringe. Enough, I thought, to do 
the job. I took syringe into the room and told the two women I was going to give 
Debbie something that would let her rest and to say good-bye . 
. . . I injected the morphine intravenously and watched to see if my calculations 
on its effects would be correct. Within seconds her breathing slowed to a normal 
rate, her eyes closed, and her features softened as she seemed restful at last. The 
older woman stroked the hair of the now-sleeping patient. I waited for the 
inevitable next effect of depressing the respiratory drive. With clocklike 
certainty, within four minutes the breathing rate slowed even more, then became 
irregular, then ceased. The dark-haired woman stood erect and seemed relieved. 
It's over, Debbie.369 
From a purely medical point of view, there is nothing in this story to indicate that what 
the doctor had done constitutes euthanasia and not good medical practice. He saw a 
young woman in what seemed to have been an absolute agony. Since it was not a 
hospice or a palliative care unit and the doctor was not a specialist in palliative care, but 
simply happened to be on duty in a large private hospital,370 he acted to the best of his 
medical abilities. Opioids, of which morphine is one, are widely used 'for subjective 
relief of dyspnoea'. 371 Understanding that the only thing he could do for this patient is 
to give her rest, the doctor assessed the dose, which in his view should have been 
adequate for this purpose. Neither what has been done nor what has been said suggests 
the intention to kill - apart from the doctor's acknowledgement that he waited for the 
patient to stop breathing. This tiny detail recasts the whole story. It speaks of the 
doctor's calculations in choosing a dose beyond the limit indicated by Lo and Jonsen. 
The patient was not just rendered unconscious, her breathing was stopped. Yet, if it 
were not for the doctor's own account, there would have been no grounds for 
suspecting malpractice. It is a vivid example of the 'razor's edge' 372 situation, where 
'the line to be drawn between a primary purpose to alleviate pain, which may, or even 
will, incidentally cause death, and, on the other hand, a purpose to kill which may - for 
however short a time - incidentally alleviate suffering'373 is almost undetectable. It 
shows that intention, being a difficult philosophical concept, depends ultimately on 
369 Reprinted by permission in Michael M. Uhlmann (ed.), Last Rights? Assisted Suicide and Euthanasia 
Debated (Grand Rapids, Mi.: Eerdmans, 1998), 317-318. 
370 I am referring to the circumstances, which are omitted in my abridged quotation. They are not 
essential, but have only an assisting function in the argument that follows. 
371 Louis Heyse-Moore, 'Respiratory Symptoms', inMTMD, 82. 
372 The metaphor used by Dr Dixon during the trial and quoted by the judge in R v Cox (1992), 12 BMLR, 
48. 
373 Submission of the defence, ibid. 
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what one thinks, not on what one does or says. The latter two can either help or hinder 
the detection, as words and actions can be interpreted the way one chooses.374 It is 
especially true in medicine, where the force of factual evidence is in many cases far 
from being straightforward. For if there were ways to argue the intention to alleviate 
suffering in the use of potassium chloride,375 which does not have any analgesic 
properties, how much more easier (and persuasive) would it be to do the same where 
such a well known palliative drug as morphine is used. It seems that the story told in the 
JAMA is anonymous precisely because it holds the doctor's confession, which alone 
discloses his real intention. Instead of giving the patient rest, he, so to say, laid her to 
rest. It was her life in the first place that the doctor intended to 'get over with'. The 
motive, to relieve suffering, however benevolent, does not change the intention. 
The above story shows once again, that in the treatment of terminally ill patients 
a lot, if not all, depends on a doctor's disposition. Engelhardt rightly observes that 'what 
is important is often not what one does or does not do medically, but why and how one 
does it' .376 Hospice is not different from euthanasia in the sense that it is just a different 
medical practice or even a different philosophy, although it is both. It is at loggerheads 
with the 'euthanasiac' ethos because it comprises a different kind of people, ones who 
act out of the Christian commandment 'do not kill'. Everything else within a hospice set 
up, including medical skills in symptom control, is subordinate to 'hitting the mark' -
obeying this commandment. It is not that in the hospice they do not kill because they 
can alleviate suffering, but they alleviate suffering, because they may not kill. This is 
the order of priorities, which should be restored in the exchange of arguments between 
the advocates of euthanasia and those who take a firm stance against it and in favour of 
the hospice movement. In euthanasia the issue is 'may I kill if ... ', in the hospice the 
issue is 'what if I may not kill'. These two approaches are not only incompatible, they 
are epistemologically and ontologically opposite: the second strives to fulfill the moral 
law, while the first seeks to justify the exceptions. This is a core difference and it is not 
medical or philosophical, but spiritual. The point is that there will always remain a 
constant per cent, however small, of the cases, which would test to the utmost the 
steadfast commitment of the hospice staff not to take human life. Such instances would 
require 'just going with the suffering' and that is hard to do without faith. As Cicely 
374 Consider Dr Moor, whose arrest and acquittal both depended almost solely on his own contradictory 
statements. Paraphrasing Keown, only an unusually honest or an unusually stupid doctor would report 
intention and thereby expose himself to the charge of murder if he has an opportunity to declare foresight 
of virtual certainty and be acquitted as following 'good medical practice'. 
375 Submission of the defence in R v Cox (1992), 12 BMLR, 48. 
376 FCB, 319. 
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Saunders says: 'Only a God whose love shares all pain from within can still our doubts 
and questions, not because we understand but because we can trust' .377 Palliative 
medicine is not the source, but the product of such trust. Therefore Christianity is of 
crucial importance to the identity of the hospice movement. Christian faith permeates 
the history of the care of the dying from the early days of AD to the first Hospice for the 
Dying founded by the Irish Sisters of Charity in Dublin in the nineteenth century. As a 
result of an inspiration by the religious atmosphere at St Joseph's and in gratitude for a 
personal conversion, the modem hospice movement took shape in St Christopher's 
being 'fully committed to the belief that, in Jesus of Nazareth, God knew a human life 
and the ultimate weakness of death as we know them, and this for all men, whether or 
not they believe' .378 The majority of those who work at St Christopher's and in many 
other hospices throughout the world show unceasing faithfulness to this commitment.379 
Without it no amount of external safeguards can secure the moral integrity of the 
medical profession. Neither most detailed and tight regulations on issuing death 
certificates, nor controlling the circulation and limiting the dosage of narcotic drugs in 
palliative care would alone guarantee us from doctors like Shipman. 
V. ConcDusion: How Christian Ethics Became Hospice Philosophy 
The rise of the hospice movement has fulfilled Ramsey's longing for the day 
'when the dominant secular viewpoints on morality will be extended from the church of 
Jesus Christ' .380 In the hospice the covenants of 'life with life' are kept by 
communicating to each and every person: 'You matter because you are you and you 
matter to the last moment of your life and we will do all we can not only to help you die 
peacefully but to live until you die. ' 381 Being prepared to stay and watch with those who 
suffer even when there is nothing one can do to ease the suffering is precisely what 
Hauerwas has always taught is a true Christian bioethics. The hospice has a character 
that would be immediately recognised by Engelhardt as explicitly libertarian, because it 
can compass divergent moral visions, while assisting the traditional Christians in the 
'final tum from oneself to God, from pride to holiness.' 382 
377 CS, 158. 
378 Ibid, 158. 
379 Ibid, 165. On the Russian side, Dr Gnezdilov confirms the important role of faith in the hospice work 
by admitting that 'believers just about compensate for the rapid staff turnover': WG, 49. 
380 Quoted in WW, 129-130. 
381 Quoted by Cicely Saunders in CAAS, 291. 
382 FCB, 323. 
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The growth and development of the modem hospice movement coincided in 
time with the growth and development of Christian bioethics as an academic discipline. 
This parallel time scale incurs some analogies in essence. Christian theological thought 
struggled to clarify its premises on the matter of death and dying by placing its 
opposition to euthanasia consecutively within Ramsey's concept of covenant, 
Hauerwas' sobering vision of 'suffering presence' and Engelhardt's uncompromising 
'pursuit of the Kingdom of Heaven.' It was a process of wrestling Christian ethics back 
from its secularised medical version. The academic world gradually came to realise that 
for opposition to euthanasia to have force it must be explicitly Christian. In contrast, the 
modem hospice movement started with candid Christianity, but in the second half of the 
twentieth century what was once a Christian ethics of 'only caring for the dying' has 
been transformed into a global phenomenon of 'hospice philosophy'. The departure of 
the hospice movement from its Christian roots is more and more evident nowadays. If 
St Christopher's was established as a Christian foundation, where everything from the 
symbol at the entrance to the everyday prayers in the wards witnessed to a religious 
faith, most of the modem hospices are increasingly non-religious.383 And this is a 
worrisome tendency. Without the cornerstone of faith all that the hospice movement has 
achieved so far can be too easily turned into pre-euthanasia care. A former hospice 
nurse assisting the patient's suicide in the Swiss organisation 'Dignitas' is just one 
example. Moreover, if one is to believe authors like Barbara Logue, some hospice staff 
already accede to the patients' request for euthanasia and 'more would be willing to do 
so if laws were changed to permit it. ' 384 To resist the ever-growing pressures of the 
liberal ethos the hospice movement has to focus on nurturing its Christian identity, 
which task seems to have been somewhat neglected in the effort to excel medically. 
Conclusion 
The above research has highlighted three basic dimensions to the problem of 
euthanasia, which, understood within a proper scale of importance, are crucial in 
forming a Christian attitude towards it. Euthanasia as a phenomenon touches upon three 
main spheres of human existence: legal, moral and spiritual. The intense debate it has 
provoked over the last decades for the most part concentrated on the legal and moral 
383 When I visited the Nightingale House Hospice in Wrexham, I was told that the chapel is arranged in a 
way that would provide for the absence of any reminder of a particular religious identity, since the 
hospice is a non-religious enterprise. 
384 
'Rejoinder to Saunders', 8. 
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Issues, hardly ever ascending to the spiritual level. Within a framework of faith, 
however, the problem of euthanasia has first of all a spiritual nature. 
The meaning currently ascribed to the word euthanasia has caused a lot of 
controversy and confusion. Both the advocates and the opponents have gone so far in 
striving to argue their cases that it is now difficult to see the forest for the trees. There 
are all manner of explanations from both sides as to why euthanasia is a good or an evil, 
but much less attention to its essence. Euthanasia is neither about mercy, nor dignity, 
nor personal autonomy, nor best interests. It is primarily about intending death. Being 
an extremely hard to grasp philosophical concept, intention poses two major problems 
bearing on the whole of the euthanasia debate. 
First comes the difficulty of defining intention. It can be (and indeed very often 
is) easily conflated with motives, wishes, hopes and desires. To avoid the confusion, 
one must remember that 'the issue is not why the physician performs his actions (for 
example, for benevolent or malicious motives), but what he wants to bring about'. 385 
The will to achieve a particular purpose is the core characteristic which helps to draw 
another important distinction: between intention and foresight. The difference is best 
argued by John Keown, who asserts that 'aiming to bring about a consequence is not the 
same as simple awareness that it may or will occur'. 386 
The practice shows that these nuances of definition can effectively impede 
detection. Human nature being what it is, in deciding about life and death people are 
more inclined both consciously and unconsciously to camouflage their real intentions. 
Therefore, although in most cases there is, as Keown points out, the evidence of what 
they say and/or do, it often turns out to be disturbingly controversial (the cases of Drs 
Moore and Shipman giving good examples). Words and actions can be skillfully 
interpreted to the effect one chooses. The danger of manipulation is there in the majority 
of every day legal cases where juries demonstrate apparent success in spotting 
intentions. In the medical context the force of the factual evidence is often so inadequate 
that it only accelerates this danger. 387 
Ultimately then, intention depends on the inner state of the agent. Euthanasia is 
not so much about how people behave, as it is about who they are. The mistake of 
secular bioethical frameworks is precisely in their attempt to set up a web of external 
moral rules to be followed by morally unidentifiable agents. No matter how logically 
coherent, rules cannot properly function unless sustained by those who know where 
385 
'Ethical Decisions in the Care of a Patient Tenninally Ill With Metastatic Cancer', 109. 
386 EEPP, 18. 
387 See J Ognall commenting on this in R v Cox (1992), 12 BMLR, 40-41. 
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they come from. The prohibition of killing which was once meaningful no longer holds 
water precisely because it has lost its moral agency and became purely legalistic. It is 
the value and the advantage of Christian bioethics that it starts by identifying the kind of 
people to address the rules to. With Paul Ramsey these are people of the covenant. With 
Fletcher these are people of love. Paradoxically, however, in the history of Western 
Christian bioethics these and similar concepts have led to the justification of killing in 
certain circumstances. Not least, it seems, because it has long been forgotten what it 
really takes to be people of the covenant, to live in a true Christian love and to exercise 
faithful stewardship. Stanley Hauerwas came as a reminder. His was the call for 
Christian bioethics to be lived and, thankfully, it sounded no less challenging and up to 
the moment than Peter Singer's urge to 'rewrite the commandments'.388 Tristram 
Engelhardt actually reintroduced the Christian meaning of covenant, love and 
stewardship within the endless journey to holiness. The ethics of asceticism shows that 
many Christian intellectual anti-euthanasia undertakings have gone astray because 
'when the heart is clouded, discursive reason tends to start from the wrong premises and 
therefore fails to provide the kind of conclusions to which natural law philosophers 
aspire'. 389 Starting with Ramsey, Christian bioethicists in the West have continuously 
stumbled over the problem of justification. Sensing that no matter how hard they try 
there would still exist the killings one cannot avoid, they began simply to claim them 
exempt from the prohibition of the sixth commandment and thus morally justifiable. No 
wonder such an approach at best rendered Christian bioethics indistinguishable from the 
secular one, at worst created an impression of sheer hypocrisy. Hauerwas was the first 
to understand that theodicies should be exchanged for the living experience, but 
concentrated more on the form rather than the substance of it. He vigorously insisted 
that as Christians we should learn to live with evil, not eliminate or explain it. And 
Engelhardt's therapeutic approach shows how it should be done. The focus is not on 
justifying certain forms of intentional killing while condemning others, but on purifying 
one's heart and cultivating one's soul in a way that would not allow evil intentions to 
form. To be of effect this spiritual labour should start with attention to the foresights of 
evil of various degree of certainty. Not only intentional killing as a voluntary sin harms 
the soul gravely and requires the most serious therapy of repentance, but also unwilling 
388 Peter Singer, though undoubtedly a prominent figure in the world of modern bioethics, in his works 
takes the stance, which, to my mind, 1s not only post-Christian, but indeed anti-Christian. 
389 From a recent unpublished interview given by Tristram Engelhardt, Jr. to Mihail Neamtu from King's 
College, London. Courtesy of the interviewer. 
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homicide as an involuntary sin can cause a spiritual injury which, if left untreated, will 
eventually add up to form a deadly intention. 
Before asking whether euthanasia should become part of our lives we should ask 
ourselves what has happened to us that prompted such a question. The real issue is not 
whether euthanasia is a curse or a blessing for the society, but what is the driving force 
behind it. Within the liberal framework euthanasia is gradually beginning to be seen as 
an ultimate cure not only for a physical illness, but also for suffering in general. This 
kind of reasoning can be appealing indeed if taken within the boundaries of this earthly 
life. However, from a truly Christian point of view it is nothing but an upside down 
spiritual logic. As Christians, we place the meaning of our existence beyond the 
individual life span in eternity and therefore in preparation for it view suffering as a 
cure for various spiritual illnesses of which euthanasia is one. This is a core difference 
in mentality that should be observed if we are to resist the spiritually awesome force of 
global euthanazation. 
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